CHINA IN AFRICA: FRENCH ARE WATCHING CLOSELY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 005733 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON EAID ETRD CH XA FR SUBJECT: CHINA IN AFRICA: FRENCH ARE WATCHING CLOSELY AND SEEK DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. IN MEETING THE CHALLENGE PARIS 00005733 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: CDA Josiah Rosenblatt, reason 1.5 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: French observers believe China's growing presence in Africa reflects a strategic decision by the PRC to exploit a resource-rich continent susceptible to an aggressive Chinese approach. French contacts express apprehension at Chinese inroads into areas of Africa once seen as a French preserve, and concern that the way China provides assistance and does business -- employing dubious commercial practices and avoiding calls for local reforms -- gives the PRC an advantage over France and the West. An expanding Chinese diaspora in Africa (in the 500,000-750,000 range, according to MFA and MOD estimates) facilitates and complements the official PRC presence. One element of China's Africa policy is to limit, if not eliminate, Taiwan's influence in Africa, with Chad's recent recognition of the PRC an evident success. The French nonetheless believe there are countervailing factors that may inhibit Chinese expansion in Africa, with Africans possibly becoming wary of colonial-style exploitation by the PRC, racism on both sides that could impede progress, and attractive alternatives offered by other global partners. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT'D: According to our interlocutors, Chinese engagement in Africa is not necessarily bad, with some Chinese projects likely to strengthen Africa's economies. And, while the Chinese currently express little interest in or sensitivity to domestic political or "sovereignty" issues, they may eventually need to join others in pushing for good governance and the rule of law, if only to protect their investments. Despite their concerns about Chinese activity in Africa, our French contacts offer few thoughts on a French counter-strategy. The challenge China presents is one of several the French are confronting as they try to maintain an influence in Africa that is slowly eroding. French calls for a larger EU engagement in Africa partially in response to the growing U.S. presence, and may now have a China focus as well. Ironically, China's appearance in Africa and the challenges China represents may lead France to view the U.S. less as a rival and more as a potential partner in responding to this new and important regional player. The French seem eager to consult with us on China and Africa, and we believe it in our interest to encourage such dialogue. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶3. (C) The June 28-30 visit of Deputy NIO for Africa, Dr. Eric Silla, provided an opportunity to discuss China's presence in Africa with a range of experts (identified below by name/affiliation as appropriate) at the MFA, MOD, and Prime Ministry, and from the academic and think-tank communities. These discussions followed several months of tracking the issue in the French press (which reports regularly on China's activities in Africa),other on-going exchanges with our contacts, and via the many China-related reports our missions in Africa have provided. French perceptions of the China-Africa relationship are not seamless -- few of our interlocutors are experts on both China and Africa, and most expressed frustration that their views were largely shaped by anecdotal evidence. A Strategic Objective -------------- ¶4. (C) All of the experts agree that China has begun a concerted effort (which some believe reflects a "master plan") to establish and expand its presence in Africa, with a focus on obtaining long-term access to resources, primarily petroleum and minerals. China has made Africa a strategic objective to a greater degree than have the U.S., France, and the rest of the developed world, several experts believe. The need for China to ensure resources for its expanding economy and population is the obvious reason for this policy. ¶5. (C) China expert Professor Francois Godement (Sciences-Po) shares the view that China's interest in Africa has accelerated in recent years, and he attributes Chinese urgency in part to the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq. In China's view, the U.S. presence in Iraq suddenly created an uncertain and perhaps unstable global energy market, causing China to take steps to secure access to oil and other resources from places outside the Middle East. Godement and PARIS 00005733 002.2 OF 005 other local experts say that Africa, rich in resources and often endowed with weak industrial, political, and legal infrastructures, serves as an attractive target for the Chinese, who gear their approach to exploit whatever opportunities a target country may present. Chinese Advantages -------------- ¶6. (C) The PRC's way of doing business offers advantages over Western competitors, our contacts believe. China often offers a single package to prospective partners, which includes labor, support services for the labor force, technology, and expertise. These single packages allow China to avoid cumbersome bidding/procurement procedures and the requirement to address each element of a project separately, as China's competitors often must do. Although not making the point explicitly, our interlocutors suggest that China is less constrained by legally imposed ethical practices that Western governments and businesses are required to adopt. ¶7. (C) In that vein, one of the PRC's biggest selling points in Africa is its openly stated policy of non-interference regarding local internal politics. Western assistance is often accompanied by calls for, or predicated on, reform in such areas as democratization, human rights, good governance, and sound business practices. Calls for reform may be hailed or resisted, depending on the country involved and the segments of society that would be affected by such reforms. From our perspective, many Africans are receptive to calls for reform, even if some leaders and governments resist change. In contrast, China's "non-interference" policy makes relatively few, if any, demands for political, economic, and social reform. Chinese business projects and economic assistance come with relatively few strings attached, and thus do not involve "sovereignty issues," as CNRS expert Roland Marchal notes. This makes Chinese offers attractive to African leaders tired of Western insistence on good governance, human rights, and transparent business practices as conditions for doing business or receiving assistance. However, although China may benefit from the status quo, the Chinese may have to change their practices in order to operate in a more open and transparent environment should reform spread in Africa, some experts believe. ¶8. (C) Despite its emerging superpower status, China is still able to appeal to notions of third-world solidarity and, when convenient, depict itself as a "victim" of the West and thus a logical partner of other such "victims." It does not hesitate to take advantage of this perception in wooing potential African partners not far removed from the colonial era, in our contacts' view. China's African Diaspora -------------- ¶9. (C) French experts agree that the growing Chinese diaspora in Africa is also helping solidify China's presence. MFA DAS-equivalents Bruno Foucher (West Africa) and Remi Marechaux (South and East Africa) said that the MFA recently asked its African posts to provide estimates of the number of Chinese residents in each country, in an effort to supplement anecdotal evidence. The MFA's final overall tally (admittedly an imprecise ball-park figure) amounts to about 500,000 Chinese throughout the continent. The French Defense Ministry's estimate is even higher, in the 500,000-750,000 range, according to MOD Africa and Middle East advisor Colonel Eric Bonnemaison, who discussed the matter on August 22 with visiting U.S. Ambassador to Burundi Patricia Moller. Steven Smith, co-author of "How France Lost Africa," estimates 40,000 Chinese in Nigeria alone. ¶10. (C) There is no clear agreement among our contacts on the degree to which the expansion of this diaspora reflects official policy or whether it is a natural phenomenon resulting from China's population pressures and the historical tendency of individual Chinese, in a pioneer spirit, to seek their fortunes abroad, often in the form of a simple restaurant. Our contacts did agree that this diaspora complements China's industrial and trade policies by providing a convenient continent-wide network that can serve as an outlet for selling Chinese products. They also believe PARIS 00005733 003.2 OF 005 the diaspora sometimes functions as an in-place community able to influence local views of China. ¶11. (C) China's official business and economic assistance packages operate from a "top down" perspective, while the diaspora functions at the grassroots level. Our contacts related several anecdotes on the growing integration of Chinese immigrants at the shop-owner and street-market level. Although varying from country to country, small businesses and traders are sometimes integrated into the local commercial culture or may operate in a nearby parallel environment. Susan Perry (American University of Paris and expert on both Africa and China) was once offered a free meal when she used an appropriate Mandarin dialect in addressing a Chinese restaurateur in an East African country. She described her surprise at seeing Chinese street vendors intermingled with African counterparts lining a road to the airport in another country. Several contacts believe that the Chinese network of small merchants may rival, if not supplant, the network of Lebanese and Syrian merchants that has long existed across much of Africa. ¶12. (C) One unanswered question concerns China's interest and ability to protect the growing number of its citizens in Africa. While none of our interlocutors thinks that China is likely to develop a force-projection capability that would allow rapid deployment to protect or evacuate its citizens in times of crisis, MFA DAS-equivalent Marechaux confided that the Chinese have on occasion asked the French discreetly for help with respect to PRC nationals in Africa requiring assistance. Taiwan -------------- ¶13. (C) Reflecting a commonly held view, Emmanuel Lenain (a foreign policy staff member at the Prime Ministry) stressed that China's policy of expanding its presence in Africa was also designed to reduce Taiwan's influence, a worldwide Chinese objective. At present, five African countries recognize Taiwan -- Burkina Faso, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland, with Chad switching relations from Taiwan to the PRC on August 6, 2006. One of our contacts quipped that PRC engagement does come with at least one string attached -- no recognition of Taiwan. Several experts believed that China's policies in Sudan have been intended to pressure Chad to cease its recognition of Taiwan, which may have played a role in Chad's August 6 decision to do just that. Obstacles to Chinese Success in Africa -------------- ¶14. (C) Notwithstanding China's successes to date, several French experts believe that its Africa policies may not remain trouble-free. Africans may begin to view Chinese engagement for what it is -- another exploitation of Africa by non-Africans -- and several African leaders have already expressed this concern publicly. Cultural differences may limit China's ability to engage Africans -- our contacts commented on the crude racist views Chinese sometimes have of Africans and vice-versa, and they reported a number of cases of friction between local merchants and Chinese immigrants. ¶15. (C) Despite some persisting anti-European sentiments in Africa dating from the colonial era, our contacts believe that France and other Western countries will continue to benefit significantly from the cultural, linguistic, and commercial ties developed over many decades, if not centuries. China may offer attractive packages, but in many ways Westerners will retain certain advantages in Africa reinforced over time that the Chinese may never be able to match. One expert notes that the U.S. enjoys several advantages in this respect; Africans have a generally positive view of the U.S., in part because it was never a colonial power in Africa. ¶16. (C) Deals with Western business sometimes provide ancillary benefits that Chinese projects may not. These include much broader job opportunities for locals, improved infrastructure given over to local control, and more willingly shared technology and expertise. Our group of experts said that Africans have begun to complain that PARIS 00005733 004.2 OF 005 Chinese companies arrive, build their own facilities with their own labor, ship raw materials back to China, and do not add much to the local economy other than by making cheap Chinese goods readily available. Over time, Africans will probably grow to resent this mercantilism, our contacts predict. China's Engagement Isn't All Bad -------------- ¶17. (C) Sciences-Po Professor Godement reminds that we should resist the temptation of assuming that China's enhanced African presence is necessarily all bad. There are positives we should acknowledge, he notes -- some economic and technological benefit for Africans (even if limited) and a larger role for Africans in the global economy. Chinese success in expanding the world's energy resources would be a net gain. Paradoxically and despite China's pretensions of non-interference, Godement observes that the PRC may eventually come itself to advocate good governance and the rule of law, if only in the interest of protecting its investments. In discussing a relatively new France-China strategic dialogue on Africa, MFA AF PDAS-equivalent Elisabeth Barbier disclosed that France wanted to identify projects for partnership with the PRC in Africa that would help to commit Beijing to the cause of good governance. ¶18. (C) On Chinese recognition of the need for sound business practices, MFA DAS-equivalent Marechaux noted as an example that the Chinese had approached the French for advice on Zimbabwe. France had previously furnished a large portion of Zimbabwe's armaments but curtailed this arrangement following an EU decision to ban arms transfers to Zimbabwe as a result of President Mugabe's erratic leadership. The Chinese stepped into the void. Not long after, the Chinese asked the French for suggestions on now to make Zimbabwe pay for the arms China had supplied. Marechaux said the French response was along the lines of "welcome to the club" in terms of expecting prompt payment from a client not known for its reliability. These kinds of experiences, he believes, will encourage the Chinese to support, if not insist on, good governance and sound business practices as their ties to Africa grow. Japan and India -------------- ¶19. (C) Our interlocutors seem to take for granted that Japan and India will try to expand their presence in Africa to counter China's efforts. India (which they discussed less than they did Japan) may have certain advantages given the South Asian communities already established in eastern and southern Africa. With respect to Japan, notwithstanding clear indications that Japanese attention to Africa is increasing in part because of China (e.g., Asia Times August 15 article "Japan Takes on China in Africa"),our French contacts, in our view, tended to overestimate Japan's willingness and ability to compete in Africa with China and on China's scale. The Chinese employ practices the Japanese may be reluctant to adopt. Moreover, the Japanese are likely to require higher comfort levels for operating in Africa than are the Chinese, and the development of a Japanese diaspora in Africa similar to the Chinese diaspora is an impossibility. In addition, Japan's growing engagement in Africa may in part be driven by an entirely separate agenda -- the desire for increased African support for Japan's campaign to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which was one reported objective of PM Koizumi's visit to Ethiopia and Ghana in April-May 2006. The Japanese are certainly following France's Africa policy closely -- two Japanese emboffs in Paris cover Africa, assisted by a MOFA specialist. (We would welcome Embassy Tokyo's views on the extent to which the Japanese are tracking China's activities in Africa and how China's approach is affecting Japanese thinking.) A New Challenge For France -------------- ¶20. (C) Local experts did not articulate what, if anything, France and other Western countries should do in response to Chinese activism in Africa. There are several likely reasons for their lack of advice on next steps. First, the issue is a relatively new one that has only recently risen to the PARIS 00005733 005.2 OF 005 level where it is receiving focused attention. The French are in an information-gathering mode and give the impression that they are just now beginning an analytic process. As noted, they are hampered by the fact that much of their information on China and Africa is anecdotal. Second, several of our interlocutors state bluntly that ex-colonial power France is not in a position to lecture Africans on the ills of foreign exploitation. ¶21. (C) In broader terms, France is grappling with the slow but steady erosion of its influence in Africa as the colonial era and initial period of independence recede into the past. Although ties with former colonies remain, and are in some cases still strong, they are gradually weakening. Today's Africans do not share their predecessors' reflexive look to the colonial power on matters of importance. Political leaders in France and Africa seem less likely to develop the close personal ties that have often been central to relations. Many observers view President Chirac as the last in a line of French politicians able to charm, cajole, or reward African leaders into doing France's bidding. Africans are more willing to look beyond the former colonial powers to meet their needs, with the U.S. an attractive interlocutor. Global popular culture (often defined by the U.S.) is increasingly accessible to Africans, offering alternatives to traditional French and European cultural norms. Conclusion: An Opportunity for the U.S. -------------- ¶22. (C) Within this context, China's move into Africa is one of many challenges to France's former predominance. As with other challenges in Africa, there seem to be no simple solutions for the French. France has increasingly sought an expanded EU presence in Africa in an effort to retain influence, albeit at one step removed. Some of France's concern has heretofore been directed at the growing U.S. presence in Africa, with the French ambivalently expressing both unease at this growth but also relief that the U.S. may be able to do more to "share the burden." China's appearance and status as a "rival" raise new concerns and may provide an opportunity for the U.S. to work with France and other Europeans more comfortable with an expanding U.S. rather than Chinese presence. ¶23. (C) We expect that French interest in China's role in Africa will grow, both within the private sector, now increasingly forced to compete with China, and within the GOF, which will seek diplomatic and foreign assistance leverage to preserve French influence. Whether the French will be able to develop such leverage remains (to the French as well) unclear The French seem eager to discuss this issue with the U.S. -- they asked DASD for Africa Theresa Whelan specifically for a briefing on China and Africa during her June 26-28 consultations, and were quick to accommodate Deputy NIO for Africa Silla when he arrived on the heels of DASD Whelan's visit. We would encourage a continuing dialogue on China and Africa with the French, as a topic for both periodic senior-level consultations and working-level exchanges. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Rosenblatt