TFLE01: FRENCH FM RETURNS FROM MIDDLE EAST: LOOKS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005014 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PREL AEMR MARR CASC LE KHLS FR SUBJECT: TFLE01: FRENCH FM RETURNS FROM MIDDLE EAST: LOOKS TO ROME REF: PARIS 04982 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO NS 1.4 B/D ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Political Minister Counselor met on July 24 with FM Douste-Blazy's Middle East Cabinet Advisor, Christophe Guilhou. Guilhou had returned earlier in the morning with the FM after visiting Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Discussions with leaders in the region, Guilhou said, had focused on the need for an immediate cease-fire, the possibilities for a political process, economic issues (primarily aid and reconstruction efforts),and the conditions for an international force presence. Egypt and Jordan, he said, shared many of France's concerns, while Israel's political goals, and not the toll on the Lebanese people, and economy, were foremost on PM Olmert's mind. Guilhou articulated France's approach going to Rome, particularly on the need for an immediate cease-fire and a political process in place prior to the deployment of an international force, whatever its composition. France could not support deployment of an international force absent a political agreement, one which enjoyed (at least tacit) support of Hezbollah. END SUMMARY ¶2. (S) Political Minister Counselor met on July 24 with FM Douste-Blazy's Middle East Cabinet Advisor, Christophe Guilhou. Guilhou had returned earlier in the morning with the FM after visiting Cyprus, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. He noted that the FM had received the invitation to Wednesday's Core Group Ministerial from the Secretary (via the MFA) on Friday during a meeting with PM Siniora. As a result, he said, Douste-Blazy had turned the focus of his discussions towards economic issues (aid and reconstruction) while trying to get a better understanding from regional players of the political realities. ¶3. (S) According to Guilhou, Douste-Blazy met first with PM Siniora. Siniora expressed his support for full implementation of UNSCR 1559, reiterated the need to disarm Hezbollah, changing the status quo ante, including to address Shebaa Farms. Siniora remained very concerned about the mounting toll from Israeli attacks, and reviewed Lebanese humanitarian needs. ¶4. (S) Guilhou reported that Douste-Blazy's meetings with Jordanian and Egyptian officials produced general agreement that the current situation was threatening to completely destabilize Lebanon's government and would not have the effect of leading to the disarmament of Hezbollah. Quite the contrary, they said, and the French agreed, the more damage to civilian targets and to general infrastructure, the more the Lebanese people would support Hezbollah's targeting of Israel. An immediate cease-fire was the first priority, which would open the way to an enforceable, longer-term political agreement. Guilhou said the Egyptians and the Jordanians both agreed that a return to the pre July 12 status quo ante was not acceptable. They both remained supportive of disarming Hezbollah- but Israel's continued devastation of Lebanon would not bring us to such a conclusion. ¶5. (S) Guilhou explained that Israeli PM Olmert was extremely gracious and treated the French with a great deal of respect and warmth. That said, Olmert's position was rather divergent from their own. Olmert had not expressed regret for Israel's actions, nor compassion for the Lebanese people. Olmert's attitude was that Israel was defending itself; the damage it was inflicting on Lebanon did not enter the equation. Israel had expressed openness to the idea of an international force, noting possible participants such as NATO, the EU, and Arab states. Douste-Blazy, in response, stressed the need for a political solution before any force could be deployed. ¶6. (S) Looking towards Rome, Guilhou said that France would continue its call for an immediate cease-fire. The GoF (and public opinion) felt strongly that Israel was not only creating a humanitarian disaster, but crippling the Lebanese government, and creating additional support for Hezbollah. France would argue for a political solution that included agreement by Hezbollah to demilitarize. An international force could not be sent in to finish what Israel had started, and end up getting caught in the crossfire. Guilhou did not directly address the composition of such a force, emphasizing instead that agreement on its mandate was the most pressing issue. The GoF hoped that the Rome meeting would address Lebanon's humanitarian needs and identify elements for a durable peace. That said, the GoF did not expect a dramatic announcement outlining a final settlement. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON