FRENCH VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004979 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM IZ FR SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON IRAQ COMPACT PARIS 00004979 001.6 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow briefed French MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye on planning for the Iraq Compact on July 18. Laboulaye welcomed the initiative for an Iraq Compact as "encouraging", calling it a good approach that had worked well in the case of Afghanistan. Engaging quickly with Russia -- not foreseen as an Iraq Compact member -- would be critical to the Iraq Compact's success, he advised. He further emphasized the need to identify a role for the Arab League and to take care in managing the sensitivities of Gulf Arab states. Laboulaye remarked that the Iraq Compact should seek to build upon work by the IMF and World Bank since the Madrid Conference. He pinpointed the use and abuse of oil revenues, e.g. the lack of any systemic reinvestment within Iraq, as the crux of the problem, decrying how oil revenues were fueling the establishment of piecemeal internal "empires" within Iraq and stressing how Iraq needs a central fiscal system. Laboulaye singled out that the French representative to the Iraq Compact has a track record of cooperation with the USG, including Ambassador Khalizad, on Afghanistan. Embassy Comment: Laboulaye's constructive engagement was noteworthy as was the positive tone. End Summary and Comment. ¶2. (C) Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow briefed French MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye and senior MFA staff on planning for the Iraq Compact on July 18. Laboulaye welcomed the initiative for an Iraq Compact as "encouraging". He called it a good and sound approach that had worked well in the case of Afghanistan. While the Iraq Compact's overarching objectives and criteria for membership may be economic, there were inextricable political ramifications, he observed. Finding a Place for the Arab League -------------- ¶3. (C) Counselor Zelikow noted the ambivalence, if not instinctual hostility and mistrust, of Persian Gulf Arabs toward the Government of Iraq. Laboulaye remarked that the personalities in the Persian Gulf were "touchy people" and it was important to manage the conversation in tandem with the Arab League. He said France would continue to push a more 
active role for the Arab League. Zelikow agreed there was a role for the Arab League in reconciliation efforts. However, he stressed that the Iraq Compact should focus on transforming the political economy of Iraq. Arab League participation would convert the Iraq Compact into a political process. Deputy Secretary Kimmitt accentuated the need for limited membership initially in the Iraq Compact. Membership would soon expand but it was vital, during the technical phase, not to derail the timetable, which sought to conclude the Compact in advance of the UNSC renewal of the MNF mandate, which is required by years end. Engage Russia Quickly -------------- ¶4. (C) Laboulaye advocated engaging Russia quickly in the Iraq Compact. He called attention to what he termed as heated exchanges that he had witnessed between FM Lavrov and the Secretary at the G-8 summit. Russia was unhappy at its exclusion from the Compact and there should be some effort, he advised, to include Russia on the level of "at least a reflection of the Compact." Russia believed it had real interests in Iraq and as well as area knowledge. To Laboulaye's claim that Russian participation on the Afghanistan Compact had been necessary, Deputy Secretary Kimmitt riposted that Russia had not been helpful and was holding up debt forgiveness unless Russian companies gained more Afghan contracts, a posture unhelpful, he underscored, to the Paris Club process. Russia had to be pinned down, he added, before entering the tent. Finding a Balance on Participation Criteria -------------- ¶5. (C) Kimmitt further emphasized that Iraq Compact composition should not mirror the P-5 or else the debate on UNSCR renewal would overshadow its work. Zelikow added that the SYG had backed the decision to limit Iraq Compact participation after the an initial effort to launch a Contact Group (which included Iraq's neighbors and the P-5) had foundered after only two meetings in 2003 and 2004. Zelikow predicted the Iraq Compact would broaden its membership in the fall. Laboulaye reiterated his judgment that the Iraq Compact represented an encouraging approach, however he bet PARIS 00004979 002 OF 003 it would not go far without Russian buy-in. ¶6. (C) To MFA NEA Acting A/S-Equivalent Antoine Sivan's inquiry about a role for Turkey, Zelikow said he saw no solution for the challenge would then become how not to open the door to Iran and Syria in the initial phase of the Iraq Compact. Iran, he added, did not appear to support a strengthened Iraq or want to facilitate a boost in Iraq's oil exports. Whereas Saudi Arabia and the Emirates believed the added competition would be offset by new investment opportunities within Iraq, Iran by contrast saw petroleum exports as a zero sum game. Iranians moreover were deeply conflicted about whether Iraq should develop a strong central government, he added. Discouraged by Corruption in Iraq -------------- ¶7. (C) Laboulaye noted the MFA had difficulty evaluating matters in Baghdad, despite a significant embassy presence outside the Green Zone. France contributed assistance, both bilaterally and in tandem with European partners, for largely political reasons, he stated. Training initiatives, he regretted, were foundering due to huge corruption. Laboulaye claimed that the Iraqi government did not identify proper candidates, instead sending personnel to Paris on shopping tours. The MFA still did not understand why the French offer to train gendarmes had gained no traction. There was deep skepticism within Paris circles, de Laboulaye observed, making it more difficult internally to persuade the French government to step up its fiscal contributions for Iraq. Deputy Secretary Kimmitt responded that Jordan-based police training has proved successful, suggesting that there was a lesson therein that locally or regionally based training initiatives worked best. ¶8. (C) Deputy Secretary Kimmitt commented that German interlocutors, with reference to Iraq-related assistance, had flagged to the delegation that discussion on the 2007 EU budget was underway. He appealed to the French MFA to help lay down a marker on need for availability of EU external funds to support the Iraq Compact. Jean-Louis Falconi, Adviser for EU External Relations, commented that there was already debate about how to justify retaining an European Commission budget line of circa 200 million euro, because the EC consistently was unable to disburse the full allotment due to the failure for Iraq-related projects to meet EC conditionalities on good governance, etc. Deputy Secretary Kimmitt commented on the importance of Iraqi PM Maliki's upcoming meetings with the UN. He noted there were promising indications from Baghdad that the UN and Iraqi representatives were taking ownership of the Compact. Building on the Afghan Compact -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Jean-Pierre Guinhut, French representative for the Iraq Compact, drew on his experiences in Afghanistan, where he said he had worked alongside Ambassador Khalizad toward the success of the Afghanistan Compact. Guinhut offered a highly positive appraisal of the situation in Afghanistan, which he said far surpassed expectations prior to the Coalition intervention in 2001, especially in terms of achievement of the current level of security. Praising the Afghanistan Compact, whose success he qualified nonetheless as "not absolute," Guinhut regretted that the Afghan population was not better informed about the Compact's benefits, for instance the major highways linking Kandahar, Kabul, and Herat. There would be inevitable discrepancies in the circumstances of the Afghanistan and Iraq Compacts, he observed, since the Afghanistan intervention went forward with a broad and unified international coalition and UNSCR 1401 (2002) had accorded the UN SRSG a highly influential role. He also noted the absence of consensus among the Iraqi population about the way forward. ¶10. (SBU) Responding to Deputy Secretary Kimmitt's invitation for Ambassador Guinhut to join the party's technical discussions in Baghdad, given the postponement of the Iraq Compact meeting, de Laboulaye said French embassy personnel, who were well-informed about the project, would be available instead. ¶11. (C) Embassy Comment: Laboulaye's constructive engagement at this meeting was noteworthy, as was his positive tone. Laboulaye singled out Ambassador Guinhut's track record of working well with the USG as an essential qualification for his appointment. Laboulaye's positive feedback on the Iraq Compact as the right approach was PARIS 00004979 003 OF 003 tempered by a comment, offered twice, that the MFA liked the UK version of the proposal better, yet it was far from a rebuff. The French still tend to react reflexively on Iraq. Hence, the traditional appeal for broadening the camp, in this case to include Russia and build in a dignified role for the Arab League. Meeting Participants -------------- ¶12. (U) French Representatives: Stanislas de Laboulaye, Political Director Ambassador Jean-Pierre Guinhut, Interministeral Representative on Iraq Antoine Sivan, MFA NEA Acting A/S-Equivalent Christophe Guilhou, MFA Cabinet Adviser Jean-Louis Falconi, MFA Adviser for EU External Relations Bernard Chappedelaine, MFA NEA Officer Philippe Errera, Deputy of MFA Policy Planning Office Nicolas de Labrusse (DE/AFI) Gael Veyssiere, Notetaker. U.S. Delegation: Ambassador to France Craig Stapleton Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury Philip Zelikow, Counselor to the Secretary Admiral Robert Moeller, CENTCOM Evangelina Bouzis, NSC Director for Iraq Karen Mathiasan, Director for Middle East and Africa, Dept. of Treasury Alexander Montsarrat, Economist, State Department Greg D'Elia, Embassy Notetaker ¶13. (U) This cable was clear by Deputy Treasury Secretary Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON