UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JULY 13 MEETING WITH INDIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004955

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL BM NP CE IR IZ VE GT CU FR
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JULY 13 MEETING WITH INDIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER SARAN -- REGIONAL ISSUES


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) July 13, 2006; 10:30AM - 2:45PM; Paris, FRANCE


2. (U) Participants:

U.S.
U/S Nicolas Burns
Anja Manuel, P Staff
Political Officer Greg D'Elia, U.S. Embassy, Paris
Political Officer Leslie Ordeman, U.S. Embassy, Paris
(notetaker)

India:
Foreign Minister Saran

S. Jaishankar, Head of MEA Americas Division
Hamid Ail Rao, Joint Secretary
DCM Bhagirath, Embassy of India in Paris
Political Officer Shubhdarshini Tripathi, Embassy of India in
Paris (notetaker)


3. (C) SUMMARY: On July 13 U/S Nicolas Burns met with
Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran to discuss details of
the House and Senate drafts of legislation (Septel) and
various regional and bilateral issues. Saran offered
readouts of his talks in Sri Lanka saying that the GoI was
urging the Sri Lankan government to refrain from waging a war
against the Tamils and instead focus on driving a wedge
between the Tamil population and terrorist groups that
purport to represent their interests. U/S Burns reported on
his meeting with the Sri Lankan Defense Minister. On Nepal,
Saran said the GoI had an important role to play but warned
that its ability to do so would be hampered if the UN came in
to decommission Maoist weapons under a UNSC mandate. Also
important, he said, was Nepali PM Koirala's state of health,
which he described as "weak but improving." U/S Burns
reiterated the importance of US-Indian cooperation on this
issue, and agreed to look into a possible UN decommissioning
role without involving the UNSC.


4. (C) SUMMARY CONT: Saran said that Iranian FM Mottaki
would visit India on July 19 (Comment: visit has since been
postponed) and that the GoI would, in its own way, encourage
Iran to cooperate with the EU3 plus 3. Saran offered harsh
words on Pakistani president Musharraf, saying that Pakistan
undermined Indian efforts to help in Afghanistan and that
Musharraf himself, in trying to marginalize other political
parties, was boosting the influence of more extreme Islamic
groups in his own country. U/S Burns explained U.S. concerns
on Burma and Venezuela. Saran noted them and promised to
follow up. U/S Burns suggested that Indian PM Singh visit
New York in conjunction with his visit to Havana for the
non-aligned members meeting. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Sri Lanka
--------------


5. (C) Saran said that on a recent visit to Sri Lanka he had
encouraged the Sri Lankan government to be prepared to deal
with potentially violent scenarios given the LTTE's recent
escalation in attacks against the government while
encouraging them not to engage in open hostilities. Saran
said that the GoI believed that governmental retaliation in
the form of air strikes and other high-profile, high-casualty
operations would only embolden the terrorist movement.
Instead, he said, the GoI encouraged the Sri Lankan
government to separate the interests of the Tamil population
from the terrorist movement of the LTTE.


6. (C) Saran said he believed one reason for the escalation
in violence has been the gradual step-down from real
political progress after the Oslo accord. He said that after
the accords both sides showed a tendency to opt for temporary
arrangements rather than longer-term political solutions.
The result, he said, was that dialogue between the factions
and any political process had been diminished. He added that
India, with its interests, geographical location and
influence needed to play a role in bringing the parties
together.


7. (C) U/S Burns said that the U.S. shared India's views,
particularly on separating the interests of the Tamils, with

their legitimate grievances, from the LTTE terrorists. He
said that a contact group was being formed and that the
co-chairs could play a more active role. He added that Bob
Blake would serve as U.S. Ambassador in Colombo. Ambassador
Blake, he said, is well aware of the importance of India in
any Sri Lankan peace process, given his experience in New
Delhi, and would bring it to bear in his Sri Lanka posting.


8. (C) Saran said that the Sri Lankans sometimes had a
negative assessment of the role of the Norwegians in the
conflict but that he continued to support the Norwegian role
as they were the only credible interlocutor between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE.

--------------
Nepal
--------------


9. (C) Saran said that the physical condition of Nepalese
prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala was worrysome.
Currently, he said, Koirala's condition did not permit him to
travel to India for treatment; he was "weak but recovering"
and would be bedridden for some time. Saran said that, in a
recent talk with Koirala, he emphasized that the strong pitch
by Maoists to have a role in government without giving up
arms should not be accepted. This, he insisted, would be
"political suicide." He added that the Maoists committed to
a UN role in arms management (decommissioning Maoist arms)
and then backed out of it. He warned that the Maoists might
try to claim that they would decommission weapons themselves,
which would have little credibility.


10. (C) Saran said that a UN role under a UNSC mandate would
be unwieldy and would complicate efforts that India was
making to remedy the situation "behind the scenes." He said
he was also concerned about who would be included in any UN
mission. Saran suggested that a UN role would be helpful,
but at a more technical level, dealing with concrete issues
such as the decommissioning of weapons (this, he stressed,
needed to take place "sooner rather than later"). Other
issues such as a cease-fire and monitoring needed to be
separated. Saran added that there have been "some Maoist
noises" asking for a release of their leaders held in India.
India, he said, had no intention of releasing Maoist
prisoners. Saran said that the Maoists needed to understand
that if they are brought into the government, they needed to
leave violent and extortionary practices behind. This would
include allowing opposing parties to canvass in Maoist
territory. Saran said he would be in Nepal on July 23.


11. (C) A/S Burns said that India had the key role to play
in Nepal. He said that he could see a well-defined technical
role for the UN in decommissioning weapons, rehabilitation
and resettlement and would examine ways these important
missions could be undertaken without the UNSC. Saran
suggested it would be beneficial if the UN Task Force,
scheduled to visit Nepal, could stop by India first in order
to be briefed by Indian experts on the issue.


12. (C) Saran mentioned that the Defense Consultation Group
between India and Nepal that had stopped after February 1,
2005 would reconvene in the next two weeks.

--------------
Iran
--------------


13. (C) U/S Burns gave a summary of EU 3 plus 3 talks noting
that Iran's behavior enabled the six countries, at one time
thought to be fractured on the subject, to come to a
unanimous agreement on the severity of the problem and the
steps ahead. He said that suspension would be mandatory in
an upcoming UN Security Council Resolution and that Iran
would be given a deadline, probably 20-45 days to comply.
U/S Burns said that Iran's recent behavior managed at once to
aggravate Russia and baffle the U.S. The U.S., he continued,
had taken a big step in joining the parties to negotiate with
Iran and Iran, in turn, did not "meet us half way." He added
that there are additional concerns with Iran concerning Iraq,
where Iran has consistently supported Shia factions at the
expense of stability; and Lebanon, where Hezbollah's recent
abduction of two Israeli soldiers showed evidence of Iranian
and Syrian involvement. Saran said that Iranian FM
Manouchehr Mottaki would be in India the following week (July

19) and that the GoI would pressure Iran "in it's own way,"
adding that it was problematic that the Iranians had "begun
to believe their own rhetoric."

--------------
Pakistan
--------------


14. (C) Saran said that India and Pakistan should be working
together on stabilizing Afghanistan but it was not the case.
He said the problem was with Pakistan though he did not know
at what level of government difficulties were being created.
He said that the recent beheading of an Indian engineer upset
the GoI. The GoI, he said, heard that orders for his grisly
execution had been given from Pakistan. He added that a
Pakistani official, speaking recently in London, said that if
Indian Counterterrorism teams participated in Afghanistan,
that Pakistanis would "love to take pot-shots at them."


15. (C) Saran cited Afghan president Hamid Karzai's "sea
change" in attitude towards Pakistan coming as a result of
Pakistan's unhelpfulness. He added that Walid Khan, a leader
in northwest Afghanistan, spoke to Indian officials saying
that members of Pakistan's ISI had been active in Afghanistan
for 20 years and were not about to give up their influence.
When asked if PM Singh would meet with Musharraf, Saran said
that the two would see each other at the non-aligned
conference in Havana but that setting up a one-on-one meet
given the recent terrorist attacks would be out of the
question.


16. (C) On Kashmir, Saran said that before the earthquakes
Pakistan had been somewhat effective in curbing cross-border
incursions into India; however, since the earthquakes, the
Pakistani government has lost control. Saran warned that
Musharraf was working to keep moderate parties at bay in
Pakistan and that the result was a relative increase in the
influence of more extreme Islamic groups. Saran predicted
that Musharraf would ensure that he would stay President
after 2007.

--------------
Terror Attacks in India
--------------


17. (C) U/S Burns offered his condolences for the Mumbai
bombings and asked if the U.S. could do anything to help.
Saran thanked U/S Burns, and asked him to thank President
Bush and Secretary Rice for the gestures of solidarity and
offers of U.S. help. He said the attacks have made Indians
realize that they are in a state of war and underscored the
prominence of fighting terrorism on the GOI's agenda.
However, he added, Indians have been resilient and have not
allowed the attacks to completely disrupt their lives. A
mere four hours after the attacks in Mumbai, he said, the
city was "almost back to normal."

--------------
PM Singh NAM Visit
--------------


18. (C) U/S Burns asked if Singh was considering a visit to
New York after his upcoming visit to Havana. He suggested
that a visit to Havana without visiting the U.S. might be
misunderstood in the United States. Saran said that he would
check, noting that Singh's visit to Havana would be to attend
the non-aligned summit and should not be seen as a political
gesture towards Cuba. Furthermore, he said, if Singh was
unable to visit the United States during that timeframe, it
would be a function of his tight schedule rather than a
signal to the U.S.


19. (C) U/S Burns said he'd be in New Delhi in early
September adding that Secretary Rice was considering a visit
to India and Central Asia in late October or early November.
Saran said that the Secretary was always welcome and
suggested that it could add momentum to how the public viewed
the India-U.S. relationship.

--------------
Burma
--------------


20. (C) U/S Burns said that Burma's inhumane treatment of

Suu Kyi was not right; the U.S., he said, would sponsor a
non-punitive UNSC Resolution and asked for India's support.
Saran said that Burma, wedged between China and India, played
a key role as a buffer to Chinese influence. The government,
he admitted, had a propensity to act strangely (i.e. moving
the capital abruptly); the alternative, however, appeared to
be a country under complete Chinese domination.

--------------
Guatemala and Venezuela
--------------


21. (C) U/S Burns said that Guatemala and Venezuela were
each vying for seats on the UNSC. Given Venezuelan president
Chavez's unhelpful attitude about the U.S., India support for
Guatemala would be appreciated. Saran said he would note the
U.S. request and follow-up.


22. (U) Members of P staff have cleared this cable.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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