UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JULY 13 MEETING WITH INDIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 004955 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL BM NP CE IR IZ VE GT CU FR SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JULY 13 MEETING WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SARAN -- REGIONAL ISSUES Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) July 13, 2006; 10:30AM - 2:45PM; Paris, FRANCE ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. U/S Nicolas Burns Anja Manuel, P Staff Political Officer Greg D'Elia, U.S. Embassy, Paris Political Officer Leslie Ordeman, U.S. Embassy, Paris (notetaker) India: Foreign Minister Saran ¶S. Jaishankar, Head of MEA Americas Division Hamid Ail Rao, Joint Secretary DCM Bhagirath, Embassy of India in Paris Political Officer Shubhdarshini Tripathi, Embassy of India in Paris (notetaker) ¶3. (C) SUMMARY: On July 13 U/S Nicolas Burns met with Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran to discuss details of the House and Senate drafts of legislation (Septel) and various regional and bilateral issues. Saran offered readouts of his talks in Sri Lanka saying that the GoI was urging the Sri Lankan government to refrain from waging a war against the Tamils and instead focus on driving a wedge between the Tamil population and terrorist groups that purport to represent their interests. U/S Burns reported on his meeting with the Sri Lankan Defense Minister. On Nepal, Saran said the GoI had an important role to play but warned that its ability to do so would be hampered if the UN came in to decommission Maoist weapons under a UNSC mandate. Also important, he said, was Nepali PM Koirala's state of health, which he described as "weak but improving." U/S Burns reiterated the importance of US-Indian cooperation on this issue, and agreed to look into a possible UN decommissioning role without involving the UNSC. ¶4. (C) SUMMARY CONT: Saran said that Iranian FM Mottaki would visit India on July 19 (Comment: visit has since been postponed) and that the GoI would, in its own way, encourage Iran to cooperate with the EU3 plus 3. Saran offered harsh words on Pakistani president Musharraf, saying that Pakistan undermined Indian efforts to help in Afghanistan and that Musharraf himself, in trying to marginalize other political parties, was boosting the influence of more extreme Islamic groups in his own country. U/S Burns explained U.S. concerns on Burma and Venezuela. Saran noted them and promised to follow up. U/S Burns suggested that Indian PM Singh visit New York in conjunction with his visit to Havana for the non-aligned members meeting. END SUMMARY. -------------- Sri Lanka -------------- ¶5. (C) Saran said that on a recent visit to Sri Lanka he had encouraged the Sri Lankan government to be prepared to deal with potentially violent scenarios given the LTTE's recent escalation in attacks against the government while encouraging them not to engage in open hostilities. Saran said that the GoI believed that governmental retaliation in the form of air strikes and other high-profile, high-casualty operations would only embolden the terrorist movement. Instead, he said, the GoI encouraged the Sri Lankan government to separate the interests of the Tamil population from the terrorist movement of the LTTE. ¶6. (C) Saran said he believed one reason for the escalation in violence has been the gradual step-down from real political progress after the Oslo accord. He said that after the accords both sides showed a tendency to opt for temporary arrangements rather than longer-term political solutions. The result, he said, was that dialogue between the factions and any political process had been diminished. He added that India, with its interests, geographical location and influence needed to play a role in bringing the parties together. ¶7. (C) U/S Burns said that the U.S. shared India's views, particularly on separating the interests of the Tamils, with their legitimate grievances, from the LTTE terrorists. He said that a contact group was being formed and that the co-chairs could play a more active role. He added that Bob Blake would serve as U.S. Ambassador in Colombo. Ambassador Blake, he said, is well aware of the importance of India in any Sri Lankan peace process, given his experience in New Delhi, and would bring it to bear in his Sri Lanka posting. ¶8. (C) Saran said that the Sri Lankans sometimes had a negative assessment of the role of the Norwegians in the conflict but that he continued to support the Norwegian role as they were the only credible interlocutor between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. -------------- Nepal -------------- ¶9. (C) Saran said that the physical condition of Nepalese prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala was worrysome. Currently, he said, Koirala's condition did not permit him to travel to India for treatment; he was "weak but recovering" and would be bedridden for some time. Saran said that, in a recent talk with Koirala, he emphasized that the strong pitch by Maoists to have a role in government without giving up arms should not be accepted. This, he insisted, would be "political suicide." He added that the Maoists committed to a UN role in arms management (decommissioning Maoist arms) and then backed out of it. He warned that the Maoists might try to claim that they would decommission weapons themselves, which would have little credibility. ¶10. (C) Saran said that a UN role under a UNSC mandate would be unwieldy and would complicate efforts that India was making to remedy the situation "behind the scenes." He said he was also concerned about who would be included in any UN mission. Saran suggested that a UN role would be helpful, but at a more technical level, dealing with concrete issues such as the decommissioning of weapons (this, he stressed, needed to take place "sooner rather than later"). Other issues such as a cease-fire and monitoring needed to be separated. Saran added that there have been "some Maoist noises" asking for a release of their leaders held in India. India, he said, had no intention of releasing Maoist prisoners. Saran said that the Maoists needed to understand that if they are brought into the government, they needed to leave violent and extortionary practices behind. This would include allowing opposing parties to canvass in Maoist territory. Saran said he would be in Nepal on July 23. ¶11. (C) A/S Burns said that India had the key role to play in Nepal. He said that he could see a well-defined technical role for the UN in decommissioning weapons, rehabilitation and resettlement and would examine ways these important missions could be undertaken without the UNSC. Saran suggested it would be beneficial if the UN Task Force, scheduled to visit Nepal, could stop by India first in order to be briefed by Indian experts on the issue. ¶12. (C) Saran mentioned that the Defense Consultation Group between India and Nepal that had stopped after February 1, 2005 would reconvene in the next two weeks. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶13. (C) U/S Burns gave a summary of EU 3 plus 3 talks noting that Iran's behavior enabled the six countries, at one time thought to be fractured on the subject, to come to a unanimous agreement on the severity of the problem and the steps ahead. He said that suspension would be mandatory in an upcoming UN Security Council Resolution and that Iran would be given a deadline, probably 20-45 days to comply. U/S Burns said that Iran's recent behavior managed at once to aggravate Russia and baffle the U.S. The U.S., he continued, had taken a big step in joining the parties to negotiate with Iran and Iran, in turn, did not "meet us half way." He added that there are additional concerns with Iran concerning Iraq, where Iran has consistently supported Shia factions at the expense of stability; and Lebanon, where Hezbollah's recent abduction of two Israeli soldiers showed evidence of Iranian and Syrian involvement. Saran said that Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki would be in India the following week (July 19) and that the GoI would pressure Iran "in it's own way," adding that it was problematic that the Iranians had "begun to believe their own rhetoric." -------------- Pakistan -------------- ¶14. (C) Saran said that India and Pakistan should be working together on stabilizing Afghanistan but it was not the case. He said the problem was with Pakistan though he did not know at what level of government difficulties were being created. He said that the recent beheading of an Indian engineer upset the GoI. The GoI, he said, heard that orders for his grisly execution had been given from Pakistan. He added that a Pakistani official, speaking recently in London, said that if Indian Counterterrorism teams participated in Afghanistan, that Pakistanis would "love to take pot-shots at them." ¶15. (C) Saran cited Afghan president Hamid Karzai's "sea change" in attitude towards Pakistan coming as a result of Pakistan's unhelpfulness. He added that Walid Khan, a leader in northwest Afghanistan, spoke to Indian officials saying that members of Pakistan's ISI had been active in Afghanistan for 20 years and were not about to give up their influence. When asked if PM Singh would meet with Musharraf, Saran said that the two would see each other at the non-aligned conference in Havana but that setting up a one-on-one meet given the recent terrorist attacks would be out of the question. ¶16. (C) On Kashmir, Saran said that before the earthquakes Pakistan had been somewhat effective in curbing cross-border incursions into India; however, since the earthquakes, the Pakistani government has lost control. Saran warned that Musharraf was working to keep moderate parties at bay in Pakistan and that the result was a relative increase in the influence of more extreme Islamic groups. Saran predicted that Musharraf would ensure that he would stay President after 2007. -------------- Terror Attacks in India -------------- ¶17. (C) U/S Burns offered his condolences for the Mumbai bombings and asked if the U.S. could do anything to help. Saran thanked U/S Burns, and asked him to thank President Bush and Secretary Rice for the gestures of solidarity and offers of U.S. help. He said the attacks have made Indians realize that they are in a state of war and underscored the prominence of fighting terrorism on the GOI's agenda. However, he added, Indians have been resilient and have not allowed the attacks to completely disrupt their lives. A mere four hours after the attacks in Mumbai, he said, the city was "almost back to normal." -------------- PM Singh NAM Visit -------------- ¶18. (C) U/S Burns asked if Singh was considering a visit to New York after his upcoming visit to Havana. He suggested that a visit to Havana without visiting the U.S. might be misunderstood in the United States. Saran said that he would check, noting that Singh's visit to Havana would be to attend the non-aligned summit and should not be seen as a political gesture towards Cuba. Furthermore, he said, if Singh was unable to visit the United States during that timeframe, it would be a function of his tight schedule rather than a signal to the U.S. ¶19. (C) U/S Burns said he'd be in New Delhi in early September adding that Secretary Rice was considering a visit to India and Central Asia in late October or early November. Saran said that the Secretary was always welcome and suggested that it could add momentum to how the public viewed the India-U.S. relationship. -------------- Burma -------------- ¶20. (C) U/S Burns said that Burma's inhumane treatment of Suu Kyi was not right; the U.S., he said, would sponsor a non-punitive UNSC Resolution and asked for India's support. Saran said that Burma, wedged between China and India, played a key role as a buffer to Chinese influence. The government, he admitted, had a propensity to act strangely (i.e. moving the capital abruptly); the alternative, however, appeared to be a country under complete Chinese domination. -------------- Guatemala and Venezuela -------------- ¶21. (C) U/S Burns said that Guatemala and Venezuela were each vying for seats on the UNSC. Given Venezuelan president Chavez's unhelpful attitude about the U.S., India support for Guatemala would be appreciated. Saran said he would note the U.S. request and follow-up. ¶22. (U) Members of P staff have cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON