FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004817

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I-MAGSAMEN, S/I-SANFORD, EUR/WE-LARREA, C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV EAID IZ FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DEPUTY
SECRETARY KIMMITT AND COUNSELOR ZELIKOW

SIPDIS

Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REA
SONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) The visit of Deputy Secretary Kimmitt, Counselor
Zelikow and the Iraq Compact delegation offers the best
opportunity thus far to move the French toward significant
involvement in Iraq's reconstruction. The GOF has been
publicly supportive of the new Iraqi government. However,
its response to past appeals for aid has been poor, citing
corruption, the lack of security, and the presence of
Coalition troops in Iraq. These concerns, coming on top of
their objection to the Coalition,s 2003 intervention in
Iraq, continue to stand in the way of meaningful French
engagement. Any change in the French stance would require a
decision at the top -- by President Chirac.

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FRANCE AND IRAQ
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2. (C) The GOF has publicly supported the Iraqi
Constitution, elections, and formation of a new government,
all of which it has hailed as elements of progress toward the
restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. FM Douste-Blazy met in
June with new Iraqi Vice-President Abdel-Mehdi, and expressed
support for the new Iraqi government. The GOF has
consistently pushed for greater inclusion of Sunni
representatives in the Iraqi political process. Though the
French are not in favor of a precipitate withdrawal of
foreign troops from Iraq, they have argued that a clear
perspective for their departure would facilitate Sunni
inclusion, and weaken the political foundations of the
insurgency. GOF interlocutors also express frequent concern
about the security situation inIraq, and have been reluctant
to entertain proposals for additional assistance to Iraq
without evident progress toward a secure and stable Iraq.
The abduction of French journalists in 2004 and 2005 became a
matter of national concern, and the GOF remains deeply
reluctant to take any risks in Iraq.

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ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ: A MIXED PICTURE
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3. (U) France has provided its most meaningful assistance for
Iraq reconstruction through multilateral initiatives. Its
assistance to Iraq in 2005 totalled about 50 million Euros,
of which 34 million euros was the French portion of EU
assistance funds for Iraq. In addition, France is
contributing 2.5 million euros or 13 percent of
commonly-funded operating expenditures for the NATO training
mission in Iraq (NTM-1),and contributed 500,000 euros to a
NATO trust fund for training of Iraqis outside of Iraq.
France has trained 40 Iraqi police in France via the EU
JUSTLEX program; up to 200 are expected to participate in the
program, though Iraq has had trouble identifying candidates
and results of program are mixed.


4. (U) The GOF signed a bilateral debt reduction agreement
with Iraq in December 2005, offering an 80 percent reduction
of Iraq,s debt between 2005 and 2008. The total debt
canceled amounts to approximately 4 billion euros. It has
sponsored cultural exchanges for Iraqi students to study in
France, usually for periods of between two and six months;
more than 500 students have participated. The GoF is also
providing a 500,000 euro grant to a joint training project
with the Japanese government for Iraqi engineers in Jordan in

2006.


5. (U) However, we have argued France could and should do
more. It has not implemented a long-stalled offer to train
1,800 police outside Iraq; the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC) could provide a viable alternative to
training in France, but has made little headway since first
proposed in 2003. France has not made a bilateral
contribution to the UN/World Bank,s International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. It has not provided
non-lethal material assistance to Iraq Security Forces, nor
has it sent French trainers to NTM-1 or increased its
contribution to the special NATO trust fund or general funds
of NTM-1. It has not considered canceling the last 20
percent of Iraqi Paris Club debt to France.

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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
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6. (C) Up to the present France has neither opposed nor
greatly assisted Iraq reconstruction. In spite of the
pragmatic line the GOF recently has taken with us in private
on Iraq -- stressing the downside of a precipitous U.S.
withdrawal and the shared international interest in ensuring
a successful transition to a stable, democratic government--
new offers of assistance have so far not been forthcoming.
The GOF routinely voices its willingness to consider an
increase in assistance, but always qualifies this as pending
an improvement in the
security situation.


7. (C) Because of the Compact,s focus on UN involvement,
stress on Iraqi ownership and multilateral framework, it
offers an excellent opportunity to engage the French about
what they can do to increase and improve their assistance to
Iraq. However, any significant increase in French aid and
involvement would require a political decision at the top, by
President Chirac.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON