IRAQI VP ABDEL-MEHDI MEETS WITH FM DOUSTE-BLAZY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI VP ABDEL-MEHDI MEETS WITH FM DOUSTE-BLAZY
AND ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR

REF: STATE 109400

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary and comment: While in France for personal
reasons, Iraqi Vice-President Abdel Abdel-Mehdi met on June
26 with FM Douste-Blazy and President Chirac's diplomatic
advisor, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne. Abdel-Medhi also gave
numerous press interviews during which he described the
situation in Iraq but did not publicly press for more support
for Iraq from the GOF. Abdel-Mehdi, a fluent French speaker
with substantial personal ties to France, discussed with the
MFA and Elysee his views on the situation in Iraq, although
when asked about the Iraq Compact, he said he was uninformed
of the details. Although the GOF maintained its reluctance
to expand assistance, an MFA contact revealed in a later
meeting with poloff that it was considering expanding its
cultural ties/resources with the Kurdish north. Once fully
scoped out, the Iraq Compact (reftel),with its multilateral
framework, UN involvement, and stress on Iraqi ownership,
provides just the right kind of vehicle to press for more
substantial French assistance to Iraq. End summary and
comment.


2. (C) Iraq VP Abdel-Mehdi met on June 26 with FM
Douste-Blazy and separately, with President Chirac's
diplomatic advisor Gourdault-Montagne. On June 29, poloff
discussed the visit with the MFA's DAS-equivalent for Middle
East Affairs Antoine Sivan and Iraq desk officer Bernard
Chappedelaine. Sivan read extensively from the MFA's
reporting of the Douste-Blazy meeting. According to Sivan,
Abdel-Mehdi began by discussing the formation of the new
Iraqi government, thanking the GOF for its forgiveness of 80
per cent of Iraqi debt, and calling on France to support the
new government. Douste-Blazy responded that France was ready
to help, but would need to see an increase in the level of
overall security before engaging on the ground in Iraq.


3. (C) Douste-Blazy raised France's training programs for
Iraqi government employees in the judicial and police
services. (Note: In addition to sponsoring small groups of
Iraqi students, the GOF trains approximately 500 Iraqis in
the judicial and police sectors every year. End note.) He
told Abdel-Mehdi it was necessary to improve the selection of
Iraqi candidates for the training programs. Sivan explained
that the GOF had received negative reports from its
gendarmerie and magistrature training academies that Iraqi
trainees refused to participate in the programs and insisted
on being sent to Paris instead of the provinces. Iraqi
Embassy DCM Nafia Mahdy confirmed to poloff July 3 that this
issue had been raised. Abdel-Mehdi said he would look into
the Iraqi selection process. Sivan said the GOF was open to
increasing training programs for Iraq, but that initial
reports on Iraq trainees had been so negative that the MFA
had been forced to defend the training program from the
criticisms of other French ministries.


4. (C) Abdel-Mehdi outlined to Douste-Blazy his views on the
Iraqi political process. He said that Iraq was faced with
numerous destabilizing factors, but that there had been real
progress in recent months. He believed that the Iranian
influence in Iraq was being exaggerated, and said that a
strong Iran-Iraq relationship and a strong Iraq-U.S.
relationship were not mutually exclusive. Abdel-Mehdi added
that he was optimistic that the situation was improving in
the south of Iraq. Sivan commented that he considered
Abdel-Mehdi a forthright and honest interlocutor, but that
Abdel-Mehdi's opinion regarding the situation in the south
seemed overly optimistic.


5. (C) Poloff asked Sivan if the GOF was considering any
other gestures towards the Iraqi government. Sivan said
France was considering expanding its cultural resources in
the Kurdish north, but that any other type of initiative was
on hold until the security situation improved. Douste-Blazy,
said Sivan, had asked Abdel-Mehdi about the Iraq Compact, but
the Iraqi VP said he was not aware of the latest details.
Sivan complained that the Iraqi government had repeatedly
changed Abdel-Mehdi's appointment requests. The GOF, said
Sivan, had originally proposed a much larger slate of
meetings for Abdel-Mehdi, to include PM Villepin, but that
the frequent time and date changes had forced the GOF to
minimize the Iraqi VP's schedule. (Note: Abdel-Mehdi, who is
fluent in French, frequently visits France for personal
reasons, and has extensive personal ties here. Although he
has had contacts with GOF officials on Iraq as Vice-President
and previously, as Minister of Finance, these contacts have
been sporadic at best. Sivan told poloff that the GOF has
not insisted, but knowing Abdel-Mehdi's connection with
France, has been eager whenever possible to accomodate his
infrequent requests for meetings. End note.)

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6. (C) Iraqi Embassy DCM Mahdy noted that Douste-Blazy raised
the presence of foreign troops in Iraq. Douste-Blazy
reportedly said that, in France's opinion, the withdrawal of
these troops was essential to reducing violence in Iraq.
Sivan did not mention this in his debrief with poloff.
According to Mahdy, Douste-Blazy was insistent on this point,
but Gourdault-Montagne did not raise it at all.


7. (C) Comment: Both sides clearly felt considerable
frustration with the other, and both stated, either directly
(the Iraqi DCM) or indirectly (Sivan),that the ball was in
the other side's court. Mahdy said the Iraqi Embassy was
focused on improving the relationship "little by little," and
was not expecting any grand gestures from the French. Given
the GOF's reluctance thus far to ratchet up its support for
the Iraq government (usually citing security conditions),
Abdel-Mehdi's and the Iraqi Embassy's cautious engagement is
perhaps understandable. That said, the Iraq Compact (reftel)
with its multilateral framework, UN involvement, and stress
on Iraqi ownership, provides just the right kind of vehicle
to press for more substantial French assistance to Iraq. End
comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON