U/S JOSPEH, U/S LEVEY JUNE 20 MEET WITH FRENCH MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004441 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ETTC IR KN IN FR SUBJECT: U/S JOSPEH, U/S LEVEY JUNE 20 MEET WITH FRENCH MFA POLDIR LABOULAYE: NORTH KOREA, INDIA, FINANCIAL TOOLS FOR NP AND NSG CONTROLS DISCUSSED Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a June 20 meeting between U/S Joseph and Treasury U/S Levey and French Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, a range of proliferation-related topics were covered, including the US-French-UK-German-Italian meeting later that day aimed at preliminary consultations regarding financial measures against proliferation activities; responses should North Korea test a long-range ballistic missile; progress on the US-India civil nuclear agreement; and the moratorium on the transfer of sensitive technology. Laboulaye and Joseph agreed on the importance of a unified and clear international reaction to DPRK provocations, but disagreed on whether a UNSC Presidential Statement would suffice. Laboulaye expressed his growing concern that the Indian Government was not taking adequate steps to meet the nuclear commitments agreed upon in the US-India civil nuclear agreement; U/S Joseph described recent US-India expert discussions that were encouraging and suggest India is becoming serious in its implementation efforts. French Strategic Affairs Director Carre aired French concerns over the Nuclear Suppliers Group's sensitive technologies moratorium, saying France could support it in this year's G-8 statement, but it was not sustainable for longer than a year and that it should not be misconstrued as being indefinite. Joseph, Levey, and Laboulaye agreed on a way forward for the afternoon multilateral meeting on proliferation finance and Carre indicated that the French would propose hosting another meeting early in the fall and outline a work-program in preparation for that meeting. In a separate meeting, MOD Director for Strategic Affairs Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt and U/S Joseph discussed the state of play with Iran and shared respective discussions on security cooperation with six gulf countries. Septel describes U/S Joseph's and U/S Levey's participation in a French-hosted multilateral meeting on measures against WMD financing. END SUMMARY. -------------- Participants: -------------- France: Stanislas de Laboulaye - Director General for Political Affairs and Security Philippe Carre - Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament Philippe Errera - Director for Policy Planning Gael Veyssiere - Deputy Advisor to the Director General Etienne de Gonneville - Desk Officer, Nuclear Nonproliferation (multilateral) Nicolas Roche - Desk Officer, Nuclear Nonproliferation (regional) David Bertolotti (notetaker) U.S.: U/S Joseph U/S Levey Patricia McNerney (T) Karl Hofmann - DCM, Embassy Paris Josiah Rosenblatt - POL M/C, Embassy Paris Otto Van Maerson - ECON, Embassy Paris Leslie Ordeman - POL, Embassy Paris (notetaker) -------------- North Korea -------------- ¶2. (C) U/S Joseph gave a synopsis of the U.S. assessment of North Korea's recent move to fuel a long-range ballistic missile. Laboulaye said that, whatever happens, the message in response to North Korea's launching of the missile should be clear and unanimous. A UNSC resolution would be ideal; if not, however, a Presidential Statement would suffice. He advised that it would be best to focus on the launching and not bring in too many broader elements such as the NPT and the six-party talks. ¶3. (C) U/S Joseph said that he could make a strong case for a Chapter VII resolution, as a launch was clearly aimed at intimidating those in the region and beyond. He warned against too weak a response. He suggested that North Korea's weapons trade, which was sending weapons to volatile countries, should be effectively shut down. A Presidential Statement, he continued, would be too weak a response, and the Chinese could be persuaded to support something stronger based on their own regional security concerns. Laboulaye said that the Chinese would not go as far as sanctions, and Carre added that the Chinese would like to keep the matter outside of the Security Council altogether, preferring that it be handled in the context of the six-party talks. Carre added that the sum of the resolution's focus on North Korea should be narrowed down to what China would accept. U/S Joseph reminded the French that the Chinese were very much against a nuclear-armed Japan and that a missile launch by North Korea could push Japan closer to pursuing a nuclear program and would represent a radical change in the regional geopolitical landscape. -------------- India -------------- ¶4. (C) Laboulaye said that he is worried about India's progress in meeting its commitments under the US-India agreement, which would make changes in the NSG more difficult. He said France remained firmly behind the efforts with India, which were consistent with French policy, but he said that the GoF did not have the impression that India was being forthcoming. New Delhi was not approaching the appropriate international organizations to offer the appropriate assurances, which led him to fear that the process was not moving in the right direction. Carre joined in arguing that India must be perceived internationally as having done more. U/S Joseph assured that he had always known that the process would be difficult, but he was more optimistic in light of recent expert level meetings held in New Delhi. U/S Joseph said that India has been making moves recently that demonstrate its desire to move forward on the issue, and the upcoming dialogue with the IAEA would also be useful. U/S Joseph reviewed the state-of-play on the India nuclear issue in the U.S. Congress including the upcoming mark-up of legislation in the relevant House and Senate committees. He responded to questions about Congressional concerns, indicating that questions were all centered on nonproliferation and not the U.S.-India strategic relationship. ¶5. (C) Laboulaye asked about the Chinese, who had the capacity to complicate matters significantly. U/S Joseph suggested that the U.S. and France, together with Russia, work to bring China around on the issue. U/S Joseph suggested intensifying coordination among the P3 by creating a working group for an NSG strategy. Laboulaye agreed it was a good idea. -------------- NSG Controls -------------- ¶6. (C) Carre said that the sensitive technologies moratorium was not sustainable as a long-term solution. He said that the French could stick with the moratorium, provided no one is under the mistaken impression that it would be indefinite. He said six-months-to-a-year is as long as the moratorium should last and that we were nearing the "end of the road." ¶7. (C) U/S Joseph explained that the President wanted this loophole in sensitive technology transfer closed for good. He said that the U.S. is willing to take another look at criteria but, as he had mentioned in previous meetings, the USG needed the presumption of denial. Currently, he said, this presumption only existed for certain flagged cases, while the rest was predicated instead on restraint. He said that the U.S. does want the moratorium to become long-term and, in the meantime, will push for any interim solution that keeps the moratorium going, be it one year or five years, to serve as a bridge between now and a time when it would no longer be needed due to advances in technology. He said Canada and Italy have the greatest interest in exports, and it would be good to have G8 language. ¶8. (C) Carre said that the only U.S. language on the issue that the French have seen is that of "embargo." The French, he said, while willing to maintain the moratorium for another year, need language that better acknowledges the intricacies of the issue. U/S Joseph pointed out that the French are not restricted by the moratorium, as they do not deal in the technologies that are limited by it and asked why the GOF was concerned with the issue. Laboulaye said that he thought that it posed a "conceptual problem;" it could be argued, he said, that strong U.S. pressure on the subject was forcing countries, namely Iran, to sprint toward acquiring the technology for fear that the U.S. was on the verge of clamping down on their access to it. Allowing criteria would give these countries an incentive not to make the mad dash because they felt that their rights could remain intact. U/S Joseph said that Iran typically manipulated issues such as criteria as a tactic and that he hoped to count on French support for G8 language on the issue. Laboulaye agreed that France could support the moratorium language from Glen Eagles and that he thought that the Canadians had fine-tuned their language for the St Petersburg statement, though, he said, they have a huge industrial interest. -------------- New French Gulf Cooperation Initiative -------------- ¶9. (C) In a separate meeting, MOD Director for Strategic Affairs Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt reviewed very generally with U/S Joseph the state of play of Iran's nuclear program and the importance for Iran to accept the P5 plus one offer. Ponton d'Amecourt also noted that during her recent visit to the Gulf region, Defense Minister Alliot-Marie had initiated discussions on security cooperation with some six Gulf countries. The idea, he explained, was to provide a loose forum for the region's defense ministers to discuss security issues, along lines similar to the "five plus five" cooperation agreement France, Italy, Spain, Malta and Portugal enjoy with Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania. Ponton d'Amecourt added that the United Kingdom and Germany also would participate in this new Gulf security group, which local countries cautiously welcomed, although they remained sensitive that the grouping not be perceived by the Iranians as directed against them. Talks were still in their infancy, but we understood from Ponton d'Amecourt that this grouping was not intended to conflict with EU or NATO efforts. U/S Joseph shared with D'Amecourt results of his April visit to the Gulf and the U.S. approach to Gulf Security, including developing a Gulf Security dialogue with Gulf States. He highlighted concrete efforts we can undertake together, including PSI exercises and activities, missile defense, and other steps to increase the security posture of the Gulf States vis a vis Iran. -------------- Proliferation Financing -------------- ¶10. (C) Laboulaye previewed for U/S Joseph and U/S Levey how he intended to chair the afternoon meeting on proliferation financing, to include the UK, Germany, and Italy in addition to France and the U.S. They agreed to characterize the meeting as a preliminary conference and that they would not publicize the effort at this time. The French indicated that they would conclude the meeting with some next steps, including a follow-on meeting in late September. The meeting is reported ref tel. ¶11. (U) U/S Joseph cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON