(C) PESSIMISTIC ELYSEE LINE ON LEBANON/SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004225

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY IR PTER FR
SUBJECT: (C) PESSIMISTIC ELYSEE LINE ON LEBANON/SYRIA
DEVELOPMENTS

REF: A. PARIS 4175


B. PARIS 4173

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chirac's Middle East advisor Dominique
Boche recently shared a pessimistic assessment of
Lebanon/Syria developments, criticizing UNSYG Annan's
passivity on the issue, and citing the potential for the
Lebanese government to collapse, amid internal divisions and
active undermining by Hizballah and others. Boche stressed
the need for Lebanon to get through the summer months
peacefully, but viewed the GoL's reform effort as "buried."
Boche assessed that one way to reverse Lebanon's fortunes
could be a breakthrough with Iran on the nuclear issue, and
concluded that an Iran engaged in negotiations might adopt a
more constructive stance in Lebanon. As for Syria, Boche
viewed the Asad regime as increasingly isolated in the Arab
world due to its alliance with Iran and facing a more
restive, but still nationalistic population. At the same
time, he assessed that the international community should be
more active responding to human rights abuses in Syria and
conceded that France had ignored the issue for too long. End
comment.


2. (C) During a June 15 discussion on the Chirac-Olmert
meeting (ref B),Presidential Advisor for the Middle
East/Americas Dominique Boche offered a brief, but generally
pessimistic assessment of Lebanon/Syria-related developments.
Boche offered a mixed response to the recent Brammertz
report, noting positively that UNIIIC was making significant
progress, and commending the possible linkage between the
Hariri assassination and the 14 other bombings/attempted
assassinations. On the other hand, Boche described as
"regrettable" the report's observation that Hariri's
assassination might have been the result of internal tensions
within Lebanon. Boche had harsher words for UNSYG Kofi
Annan, whom he described as seeking to leave the UN "on good
terms," and therefore inactive on the Syria/Lebanon account.
Boche reported that when UNSYG Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen had
recently approached Annan on the need for Larsen to visit
Damascus to press the Syrians on UNSCR 1680 and UNSCR 1559
implementation, the SYG said that he had taken no decision,
and that he might undertake the visit himself. Boche
assessed that if nothing happened after adoption of UNSCR
1680, Syria would view the resolution as having no
consequence and would be emboldened in its efforts to block
the Lebanese government.


3. (C) As for the GoL, Boche viewed the March 14 movement as
weak and divided, with obstacles on all sides and the
collapse of the government remaining a real possibility.
Boche assessed that Hizballah might seek to hasten the fall
of the GoL, given its continued status as an "Iranian-Syrian
joint venture." Boche described the behavior of Michel Aoun
as similarly disturbing and undermining GoL stability. Asked
about divisions between PM Siniora and Sa'ad Hariri, Boche
made no attempt to paper over their differences, and instead
criticized Siniora's June 9 letter to Bashar al-Asad on the
anniversary of his father's death, which Boche viewed as
ill-advised and adding to divisions within the March 14
movement. With the GoL in great difficulty, Boche stressed
the need for the national dialogue to continue, and for
Lebanon to get through the summer months without
confrontations. At the same time, he held out little hope
for progress, concluding that the prospects for reform in
Lebanon were "buried."


4. (C) Pressed for options to move forward in Lebanon, Boche
assessed that negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue
could have a salutary effect in Lebanon and add to Syria's
isolation. He opined that when Iran faced difficulties, it
reacted via its regional proxies; therefore, in the event of
negotiations on the nuclear issue, Boche hoped that Iran
could play a more constructive role in Lebanon, similar to
the role it had played in the interim period between the
Hariri assassination and Ahmadi-nejad's election as
president, during which the GOI pushed Hizballah to
participate in Lebanon's June 2005 presidential elections.
Boche offered no specifics on what constructive role Iran
might play under current circumstances or what might prompt
such a shift in Iranian policy.


5. (C) On Syria, Boche viewed the Asad regime as more
isolated than ever, with Saudi Arabia and other key Arab
governments viewing Bashar al-Asad's reinforced ties with
Iran as a "treasonous" betrayal of his Arab brethren. Boche
described other Arab governments as embittered by Bashar's
conduct and NOW disinclined to undertake mediation efforts on

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his behalf, as seen in Egypt's recent rebuff of a mediation
request from Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Boche
concluded that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others were waiting
for the UNIIIC findings to implicate the SARG, but would do
nothing on Syria's behalf, or against it in the interim.
Boche viewed the Syrian population as dissatisfied with
Syria's increased isolation, but at the same time showing a
nationalistic tendency to support their government in the
face of outside pressure. He professed little certainty on
the impact of external Syrian opposition activities within
Syria. He opined that former Vice-President Khaddam had "no
credibility" with the Syrian public, though he had potential
sympathizers within the Syrian military and security
establishment. Boche agreed that the international community
should take a more forthright stance on human rights abuses
in Syria, and opined that France and others had perhaps
ignored the issue too long. He noted that in the case of
France, public opinion was much more mobilized on human
rights abuses in Tunisia, for example, while there was little
media or public outcry on more serious and systematic abuses
in Syria. On the latter point, Boche cautioned that he was
expressing personal views.


6. (C) Comment: Boche's overwhelming pessimism on Lebanon
developments contrasts with the more upbeat perspective
offered by a Hariri family advisor (ref A) on divisions
between Siniora and Sa'ad Hariri and prospects for the GOL to
implement reforms. Also disturbing is Boche's suggestion
that Iran holds the key to progress in Lebanon, and that the
Iranian regime can be counted upon to reverse its long
history of undermining Lebanese sovereignty and independence
to play a more constructive role. This would suggest that
Boche is putting greater stock in external actors'
willingness to pressure parties in Lebanon, in this case
Hizballah, rather than the capacity of the March 14 movement
to work together effectively. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON