Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS4175
2006-06-16 17:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

(C) HARIRI ADVISOR ON RISING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN

Tags:  PREL LE SY IR PINR PTER EAID FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1874
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #4175/01 1671733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161733Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8672
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004175 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY IR PINR PTER EAID FR
SUBJECT: (C) HARIRI ADVISOR ON RISING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN
LEBANON AND SA'AD HARIRI'S TRAVELS, RELATIONS WITH SINIORA

REF: A. STATE 93004


B. PARIS 1428

C. PARIS 327

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004175

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY IR PINR PTER EAID FR
SUBJECT: (C) HARIRI ADVISOR ON RISING IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN
LEBANON AND SA'AD HARIRI'S TRAVELS, RELATIONS WITH SINIORA

REF: A. STATE 93004


B. PARIS 1428

C. PARIS 327

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a June 13 discussion, longtime Hariri
family advisor Basile Yared put a positive spin on the recent
Brammertz report, which he viewed as compounding pressure on
Syria. Yared viewed the SARG as seeking to destabilize the
GoL, via arms and money transfers to Palestinian militias in
Lebanon and efforts to boost pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians.
At the same time, Yared described Iran as having displaced
Syria as the dominant power in Lebanon, and cited increased
Iranian payoffs to Hizballah and other pro-Syrian proxies.
Yared viewed SARG fealty to the Iranian regime as having cost
Bashar al-Asad the support of Saudi King Abdallah, and
concluded that the long-term survival of the Syrian regime
remained doubtful. Yared stressed the urgent need for the
GoL to deliver on economic reforms, and advocated a gradual,
"five year plan" approach. He downplayed reported tensions
between Sa'ad Hariri and PM Siniora, and affirmed that their
cooperation remained essential for the GoL to prevail. Yared
commended Sa'ad Hariri's recent travel to Germany and Moscow
as enhancing his international stature, and said a follow-up
visit to China was likely. Yared conceded that Hariri's
frequent departures from Lebanon were necessitated by the
high threat he faced there; at the same time, he described
Hariri's security posture as more professional and vigilant
than that of his late father. In closing, Yared appealed for
increased U.S. support and described the U.S. as Lebanon's
most important long-term partner, concluding that French
high-level attention to Lebanon would recede with President
Chirac's expected departure from office in summer 2007. End
summary.

SARG PRIVATELY VEXED BY BRAMMERTZ REPORT
--------------


2. (C) Pol M/C and POLOFF met June 13 with Basile Yared, a
prominent lawyer and longtime Paris-based advisor to the
Hariri family reputed to also advise the French Presidency on
Lebanon (see refs b-c for background),to discuss
Syria/Lebanon-related developments. In a wide-ranging
discussion, Yared put a positive spin on the recent Brammertz
report, especially the possible linkages between the 14 other
bombings and assassination attempts and the Hariri
assassination, and the elimination of the Addas track -- all
of which, in Yared's view, would focus the investigation more
clearly in the direction of Damascus. Yared commended

Brammertz' handling of Syria in the report; by reporting
"satisfactory" cooperation, Brammertz had defused potential
Syrian attempts to discredit him or UNIIIC. Yared concluded
that the SARG, despite outward calm, was very worried about
the progress of the UNIIIC investigation. Since Syria could
not attack Brammertz' credibility directly, it would seek to
destabilize the Lebanese government using its usual proxies,
including sending arms and money to the Palestinian camps and
reviving old cronies, like Suleiman Franjieh and former PM
Mikati.

INCREASED IRANIAN MONEY, INFLUENCE IN LEBANON
--------------


3. (C) Yared asserted that Iran was increasing payoffs to
pro-Syrian proxies in Lebanon, namely Hizballah, which he
speculated received about 10-15 million USD from Tehran per
month. (He conceded that some Lebanese estimated that
Hizballah received as much as 50 million USD monthly from
Iran, but he dismissed this figure as too high.) Yared
described Iran as now much more influential with Hizballah
than Syria, which he dismissed as a mere Iranian surrogate.
He assessed that Iran was seeking to increase its influence
to use the "Lebanon card" in wake of pressure over the Iran's
nuclear program. At same time, he concluded that Iran would
not seek to destabilize Lebanon as long as the negotiating
track with P5 plus 1 remained a possibility, and for now
wanted to avoid confrontation between Lebanon's Shi'a and
Sunni communities.

AND A MORE ISOLATED, BUT STILL DANGEROUS SYRIA
-------------- -


4. (C) Yared assessed that the Iran-Syrian axis had helped
sour Saudi King Abdallah's attitude towards the Asad regime,
and increased Syria's isolation in the Arab world. In
Yared's view, the Saudis had launched their Syria-Lebanon
initiative earlier this year because they saw no alternative
to the Asad regime in Syria and were afraid of change. Now
that Asad had allied himself with Saudi Arabia's Iranian

PARIS 00004175 002 OF 003


enemies, King Abdallah saw Bashar in a much more negative
light and would not seek to protect him. Yared concluded
that Syria was more isolated than ever internationally, and
that the regime had "no long-term future." Nevertheless, the
SARG had not given up its "hegemonic" designs on Lebanon or
lost its capacity to make trouble there.

URGENT NEED FOR GOL TO DELIVER REFORMS, HARIRI-SINIORA UNITY
-------------- --------------


5. (C) With both Iran and Syria seeking to destabilize
Lebanon, President Lahoud likely to stay put through the end
of his term, and the UNIIIC investigation not likely to bear
fruit for many months, Yared conceded that the GOL was in a
very difficult position. He remained determined, though,
that the GOL could find a way out by focusing on delivering
economic reforms and tangible, positive quality-of-life
improvement to the Lebanese people. Yared noted a new
initiative that Sa'ad Hariri was exploring with PM Siniora
and others to formulate a progressive reform package for the
next five years which could win the support of all government
factions. In Yared's view, the GOL should implement the plan
by first creating the legal frameworks necessary for changes,
such as privatization of Middle East Airlines or long-overdue
reform of the power sector. Such moves, he hoped, could win
the continued confidence and money of Lebanese diaspora,
attract increased foreign investment, and inspire confidence
in the international donor community.


6. (C) Yared agreed wholeheartedly that the success of any
GOL reform programs would be contingent upon close
cooperation between Sa'ad Hariri and PM Siniora. Yared
described rumored friction between the two as overblown; he
affirmed that both understood that they had to work together,
and though tensions came up from time to time, they were not
serious; Yared said Siniora understood that he had to work
with Sa'ad and Sa'ad understood that Siniora would stay put
for some time. Yared, who is rumored to detest Siniora, did
not say anything negative about the Lebanese PM; at the same
time he reserved praise for Sa'ad, whom he described as the
undisputed leader among Lebanese Sunnis and a moderate,
unifying force for the country. (Comment: As septel reports,
we heard a much more negative assessment of relations between
Hariri and Siniora and prospects for GOL reforms in a
follow-up discussion with Chirac's Middle East advisor. End
comment.)

SA'AD HARIRI'S RECENT TRAVEL, SECURITY SITUATION
-------------- ---


7. (C) Yared viewed Sa'ad's recent travel to Germany and
Moscow as a success, largely in increasing Sa'ad's
international credibility. He conceded that Sa'ad had to
leave Lebanon regularly due to the overwhelming security
threat he faced there, and that Sa'ad was seeking to put the
time abroad to good use by enhancing his international
profile. Yared viewed the Russian trip as particularly
important, since Moscow had underdeveloped ties with Lebanon
and, in the past, had spoken to Lebanon via Damascus. In
Yared's view, Sa'ad was able to present himself to the
Russians as a credible leader, and advanced bilateral
dossiers such as visas and economic cooperation. The fact
that Sa'ad was received by Putin "infuriated" the Syrians.
Sa'ad planned a follow-up trip to China soon, and would be
meeting with French senators in Paris the week of June 19.
Yared said Sa'ad had sought a meeting at the Vatican, but was
told that Pope Benedict XVI receives heads of state only.


8. (C) Yared conceded that he remained very worried about
Sa'ad's security in Lebanon; at same time, he assessed
Sa'ad's security as much more professional than that of his
father, who had thought mistakenly that he would not be
targeted and was much less cautious than Sa'ad in his
movements. Yared said Sa'ad's security package had been
constructed in response to what happened to his father; at
the same time, Yared concluded that no protection was
invincible, as the massive car bomb which killed Rafik Hariri
would have destroyed any convoy.

U.S. MORE IMPORTANT TO LEBANON'S FUTURE THAN FRANCE?
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Throughout the discussion, Yared stressed that the
U.S. would be Lebanon's most important future partner, and
expressed the hope that U.S. security, judicial and economic
cooperation would continue to expand. Asked about France,
Yared agreed that France had important historical and
cultural links with Lebanon. He stressed, nevertheless, that
it would take "only" a modest U.S. investment for Lebanon to
achieve full sovereignty and achieve its democratic
aspirations, which could serve as a model for the rest of the

PARIS 00004175 003 OF 003


region and vindicate U.S. efforts to democratically transform
the Middle East.


10. (C) Asked about post-Chirac GoF support for Lebanon,
Yared readily asserted that no future French president would
devote the amount of personal attention Chirac gave Lebanon.
Lebanon had been a major focus since beginning of Chirac's
presidency, with Chirac's involvement in cease-fire
negotiations which led to creation of the Israel-Lebanon
Monitoring Group in 1996, and Paris I and II, UNSCR 1559 and
beyond. According to Yared, Chirac had long viewed Lebanon
as a foothold from which to project French influence
throughout the Middle East. The Hariri assassination changed
the dynamic from a strategic vision to a personal one, with
Chirac feeling personally targeted and devoting intense
effort to bringing Hariri's killers to justice. That said,
Yared remained confident that France would continue its
supportive policies towards Lebanon regardless of who
succeeded Chirac, given the longtime affinity between France
and Lebanon and influence of the Lebanese community in Paris;
the difference would be that the French president would no
longer be playing such a pivotal role in the process.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -