(C) CHIRAC AND OLMERT DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004173

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: PREL IS KPAL IR LE FR
SUBJECT: (C) CHIRAC AND OLMERT DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS, REALIGNMENT, IRAN, AND LEBANON


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Elysee contacts described the June 14
Chirac-Olmert meeting as friendly and said the French
president was favorably impressed by his first encounter with
the Israeli PM. Presidential Middle East advisor Dominique
Boche stressed that Chirac urged Olmert to resume
negotiations with Palestinian Authority President Abbas, but
did not press him on Palestinian assistance. According to
Boche, Chirac "neither endorsed nor rejected" Olmert,s
realignment plan, and told Olmert France would judge the
initiative based on its adherence to the roadmap,s two-state
vision. Boche confirmed that Chirac and Olmert had
convergent views on Iran, with Olmert supportive of the P5 1
incentives package and possible "face saving" gestures for
Tehran. Addressing the current state of play with Iran,
Boche stated that Chirac believes that Khamenei and his inner
circle are focused, above all, on gaining U.S. recognition as
the ultimate guarantee of Iranian security. The same cannot
be said of President Ahmadi-nejad, whom the French view as
"irrational." Chirac and Olmert also briefly discussed
Lebanon, with Olmert dismissing prospects for a breakthrough
on Sheb,a Farms absent total dismantlement of Hizballah.
Boche's pessimistic assessment of the current situation in
Lebanon is reported septel. End summary.


2. (C) Presidential Middle East/Americas advisor Dominique
Boche briefed Pol M/C and poloff June 15 on the previous
day's meeting and working lunch hosted by President Chirac
for Israeli PM Ehud Olmert. (Note: Olmert conducted a
high-profile visit to Paris June 14-15; in addition to
meeting Chirac, he had separate meetings with PM Villepin, FM
Douste-Blazy, and French Jewish community leaders. He also
launched a new French-Israeli foundation to promote civil
society contact, and, with Villepin, dedicated a new monument
to those Parisians who resisted deportation of French Jews
during World War II. End note.) Boche described talks as
friendly, and said Chirac was impressed by his first
encounter with Olmert, who differed significantly from the
past generation of Israeli leaders -- military men such as
Rabin and Sharon. Boche opined that Olmert, unlike his
predecessors, was a lifelong politician and shared that point
in common with Chirac. Boche added that Olmert was
complimentary towards Chirac, commending him publicly for his
efforts to combat anti-Semitism and, in private, "seeking
Chirac's advice" based on his years of experience in the
region -- all of which added to the positive atmospherics.

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND REALIGNMENT
--------------


3. (C) Boche described the Chirac-Olmert discussions as
principally focused on two options: 1) direct
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, 2) or unilateral Israel
withdrawal and determination of borders in the event direct
talks are not possible or fail-- Olmert's so-called
realignment plan. Boche reported that Olmert reaffirmed his
strong preference for a negotiated solution and his readiness
to resume negotiations and meet with PA President Abbas. At
the same time, the Israeli PM expressed uncertainty as to
whether he could find a Palestinian partner, given the
Hamas-led government's continued rejection of the three
Quartet principles -- conditions first articulated by France.
In the event no Palestinian partner could be found, Olmert
stressed to Chirac that Israel could not accept continuation
of an unacceptable status quo; instead Israel would have to
define its own borders, which would leave the Palestinians
with a contiguous territory from which to build their own
state. On the latter point, Boche noted that Olmert didn't
enter specifics on the geographic parameters of a possible
Palestinian state; Boche interpreted Olmert's reference to
"contiguity" as a reference to contiguous territory within
the West Bank itself, not between the West Bank and Gaza.


4. (C) Boche stressed that Chirac insisted upon the need for
Israel to pursue negotiations with PA President Abbas, while
"neither approving or rejecting" Olmert's proposed
realignment plan. Chirac told the Israeli PM that, if his
realignment proposal "saw the light of day," France would
examine it and judge it based on its adherence to the
roadmap's vision of two states living in peace and security.
Chirac added that the first option -- direct negotiation --
must be pursued with full force and fully exhausted, in order
to justify recourse to the second option of unilateral
withdrawal. Boche affirmed that Chirac only briefly raised
the issue of Palestinian salaries with Olmert, and did not
press him on the issue.


5. (C) Boche conceded that the GoF viewed a disconnect

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between Olmert's expressed commitment to relaunching direct
talks, and Israeli actions on the ground in Gaza and the West
Bank, which France viewed as undermining PA President Abbas.
Boche said the GoF strongly felt that Olmert already had a
Palestinian partner in Abbas, so the Hamas government's
actions were irrelevant to the prospect for direct talks.
Boche listed a series of counterproductive actions, in the
French view, including Israel's dismissal of the so-called
Palestinian prisoners' initiative, delays in delivery of arms
to Abbas' security detail, and the "disproportionate" Israeli
military response to Palestinian rocket attacks. On the
latter point, Boche conceded that no government should accept
rocket attacks on its own territory, but he concluded that
the overwhelming Israeli response to what were largely
ineffective, non-lethal Palestinian rockets had created
"disastrous photo ops" of Palestinian suffering.


AGREEMENT ON IRAN, CHIRAC'S VIEWS OF IRANIAN MOTIVATIONS
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Boche noted that the two leaders discussed Iran at
length, with general agreement on both sides. Olmert
expressed support for the P5 1 incentives/disincentives
package and efforts to reach a diplomatic solution, provided
that they put a complete halt to Iranian nuclear activities.
At Chirac's behest, Olmert expressed willingness to accept
unspecified "face-saving" gestures for Tehran, again,
provided that Iran ended its nuclear program. Boche
concluded that Olmert confirmed Israeli support for EU
efforts as long as they were successful; he conceded that
discussion did not address what Israel would do if diplomatic
efforts failed. Boche described Israel as rightfully viewing
Ahmadi-nejad's threats against Israel as serious and not
empty rhetoric; in a parliamentary address following his
meeting with Olmert, PM Villepin affirmed the GoF's
commitment to Israeli security and that France would "stand
by Israel and protect it."


7. (C) In an aside on the current state of play with Iran,
Boche assessed that the Iranians were entering a discussion
phase on the European proposal, being careful not to accept
or reject it, which would feed internal political tensions.
Boche viewed Ahmadi-nejad as still outside the circle of
national security decisionmaking controlled by Khamenei, and
seeking a way in. Boche added that the opaque nature of the
Iranian leadership and Ahmadi-nejad's irrationality raised
questions as to whether Iran could deal with the nuclear
issue rationally. As an example of the Iranian president's
irrationality, Boche cited Ahmadi-nejad's fervent belief in
the return of the so-called "hidden imam," for which he had
ordered the widening of a highway leading to Iran's holiest
mosque, to accommodate the crowds who would welcome him.


8. (S) Boche noted that President Chirac viewed the Iranian
leadership, aside from Ahmadi-nejad, as rational and using
the nuclear issue principally as a pretext to rally public
support in the face of the continued U.S. non-recognition,
which struck at the very legitimacy of the regime. In
Chirac's view, the Iranian regime's desire for U.S.
recognition remained its overwhelming security concern and
outweighed its insistence on its "nuclear rights." The
Iranian regime was well aware that one nuclear weapon could
not bring Iran the security which U.S. recognition would
offer. As a result, Boche speculated, the Iranian regime
would seek to expand discussions with the U.S. beyond the
nuclear issue, to try to push the U.S. towards recognition.

LEBANON: SUPPORT FOR SINIORA, BUT NO DICE ON SHEB'A FARMS
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Boche confirmed that Chirac and Olmert briefly
discussed Lebanon, with not quite the same convergence they
enjoyed on Iran. On the one hand, Olmert affirmed to Chirac
his confidence in Lebanese PM Siniora, and support for GOL
extension of control over all its territory. On the other
hand, Boche suggested GoF disappointment with Olmert's stance
on Sheb'a farms; when asked by Chirac about prospects for an
Israeli withdrawal, which France has long viewed as a means
to pressure Hizballah disarmament, the Israeli PM asserted
that Hizballah must be fully disarmed and withdraw from
southern Lebanon first; only after that took place would
Israel be ready to negotiate on a possible withdrawal.

COMMENT:
--------------


10. (C) While considerable differences still exist between
France and Israel on issues involving the Palestinians, a
striking transformation in bilateral relations has taken

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place since 2004, with the landmark Sharon and Katsav visits
to France in 2005, and both sides stressing common ground on
issues like the fight against anti-Semitism, Iran, and Gaza
withdrawal. This transformation in the French-Israeli
relationship has been accompanied by an apparent turnaround
in French public opinion towards Israel, with a just-released
Pew Foundation poll showing an equal percentage of French
nationals -- 38 percent -- having sympathy for Israel,
compared to the Palestinians. (A Pew survey of French
respondents in 2002 showed a near 2 to 1 margin in favor of
the Palestinians -- 36 percent favoring Palestinians and 19
percent favoring Israel.) We would attribute the shift in
French attitudes to a number of factors, including
post-Arafat revelations of PA/PLO corruption, Iranian threats
against Israel's existence, and perceptions of a common
struggle against terrorism. When we asked Boche to explain
the shift in French public perceptions, he attributed the
change almost entirely to the perception of a common struggle
against Islamic extremists, present in both Europe and
Israel. Boche, who served previously at the French embassy
in Tel Aviv, also assessed that the French public has become
more educated about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and
were now less "naive" about the Palestinian cause. End
comment.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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