FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DHS SECRETARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000337 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF DHS OIA FOR SEQUIERA, THOMPSON STATE FOR EUR/WE-BALL, S/CT-KONTOS, EB/TRA-MATTINGLY, CA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 TAGS: PTER CVIS EAIR OVIP SUBJECT: FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF DHS SECRETARY CHERTOFF, JANUARY 23-25 2006 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION KARL HOFMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Paris is delighted to welcome Secretary Chertoff to France. We enjoy a warm and productive relationship with the French Government on many issues of high priority to the USG, including counter-terrorism and law enforcement, transportation security, and immigration and customs enforcement; we have also confronted on occasion vexing problems in ensuring French cooperation with the measures we have taken to ensure aviation and border security. ¶2. (SBU) You will meet with the head of the Prime Minister,s office of Counter-terrorism coordination Francis Delon, as well as one of France's leading contenders for president in 2007, Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy. We have also scheduled a meeting with the Director of France,s FBI equivalent (DST) Pierre de Bousquet de Florian. US Embassy Press officers are in contact with your staff to arrange possible media interviews, should you decide to do them. -------------- Nicholas Sarkozy -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy was appointed Minister of Interior in the new Villepin government in June 2005. Sarkozy previously served in the same position from 2002-04, winning praise for his efforts to reduce crime and rationalize France,s counter-terrorism efforts. He was elected President of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) political party in November 2004. ¶4. (SBU) Sarkozy is widely expected to be the party,s nominee in the 2007 presidential race and has signaled he will resign from the Villepin government in January 2007 to pursue his presidential ambitions. As no clear opponent has emerged on the center-left, Sarkozy,s closest rival for the presidency is Dominique de Villepin, the current prime minister and President Chirac,s hand-picked successor. Sarkozy is generally considered to be the most pro-American of France's top-tier politicians. Given the persistence of anti-American sentiment in France, however, it is not to his advantage to be too closely identified with the U.S. For public relations purposes, this is a meeting to discuss a common anti-terrorism agenda, not to meet with a future presidential candidate or party leader. We have agreed to a general discussion on anti-terrorism cooperation, and understand that he will brief you on the new antiterrorist legislation in France as well as his views on the possible radicalization of French citizens. We have also told the French that we will raise the biometric passport and visa issue, French plans and projects for use of PNR and the need to begin thinking about responses to the upcoming ECJ decision, and our views on the EU framework legislation on law enforcement data sharing. -------------- Francis Delon/SGDN -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Francis Delon was appointed to head the General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) in the Prime SIPDIS Minister,s Office in July 2004, after a varied administrative career including responsibilities for Counter-terrorism at the MFA, stints in the French mission to the UN and in the French education ministry, the film rating office, and the Council of State. His office is responsible for interagency co-ordination of national security policy, including civil defense, disaster planning, and crisis management; arms control, technology transfer, and WMD detection; and information security. He can be expected to discuss France,s plans for crisis management in the event of an avian flu outbreak; aviation security and French concerns about the No-Fly system; co-operation on Maritime Security; the French analysis on the extremist threat, and French U.S. NBCR exchanges. -------------- Pierre de Bousquet de Florian -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Director since 2002 of the Direction de la Suveillance du Territoire (DST: France,s FBI equivalent) Pierre de Bousquet de Florian spent portions of his previous career in the Interior Ministry, in the regional administration of Lower Normandy, as Advisor to President Jacques Chirac, and as Prefect of the Mayenne region. He is a graduate of France,s prestigious National School for Administration. He has been a willing partner for the U.S. in the fight against terrorism, but has also criticized some U.S. efforts as counterproductive. He appears to have overcome reported tensions with Nicholas Sarkozy after the latter,s arrival at Interior in mid-2004. In mid-2005 the Prime Minister appointed de Bousquet to lead a high-profile working group examining chemical, bacteriological and nuclear threats, one of several components that make up a soon to be released white paper on terrorism. ¶7. (S/NF) The DST is a police intelligence service that, within French Sovereign Territory, has primary responsibility for combating activities inspired or supported by foreign powers that threaten French national security. It is subordinate to the Interior Ministry, and its current priority is counter-terrorism, especially against radical Islamic groups, including those who appear to have ties to the Iraqi Foreign Fighter pipeline. We expect the discussion with DST to focus on C/T, intelligence sharing, and their view of the Islamic threat in France and Europe. Post will provide input for a more detailed briefing through other channels. -------------- C/T and Law Enforcement Co-operation -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and France is excellent. France consults extensively with the U.S. on terrorism, at the tactical and strategic level. The French government clearly believes that terrorism is a primary threat to France that requires its undivided attention. We continue to cooperate closely on border security issues, including aviation security and the Container Security Initiative. French police and security services have been very responsive to US requests. In addition, France is active internationally in proposing bioterrorism safeguards and nuclear facility safeguards. The U.S. and France continue their dialogue on nuclear security cooperation. ¶9. (SBU) Since March 2005, the French government has been drafting the above mentioned "white book8 on terrorism, which is expected to be made public by the time of your visit. A conference in late 2005 previewing some of the white book themes highlighted three particular issues of concern: 1) suicide bombers: the consensus was that suicide bombing would remain a tool of choice for terrorists. 2) many commentators focused on the growing role of French prisons in converting those involved in low-level criminality to global jihadism, and 3) the time between conversion to radical thought and action had become extremely short, making it much harder for intelligence services to track the new terrorists. We expect Francis Delon will want to brief you on the White Book,s contents, in particular the French assessment of the threat from extremists returning from Iraq. ¶10. (SBU) The GOF's counter-terrorism bill, which was developed in reaction to the July bombings in London and Sharm el-Sheikh, became law in December. After review by the Constitutional Council it is expected to enter into force by Spring 2006. It will vastly increase the amount of video surveillance in France and require retention of details about cellular phone connections for one year. Other major aspects of the bill include heightened surveillance of international trains and other transportation means (including authority to collect PNR data on passengers arriving from or departing to destinations outside the EU),and an increase in the maximum prison sentence for France's "terrorist conspiracy" charge from 20 years to 30 years. The maximum prison sentence for "terrorist association" will also be lengthened from 10 years to 20 years. Nicholas Sarkozy will probably wish to brief you on the implications of this bill, and to share with you his views regarding the potential for radicalization of Muslim youth in France. -------------- Aviation Security Co-Operation -------------- ¶11. (SBU) We have taken a long and circuitous path toward ensuring French co-operation with TSA Emergency Amendments. Designation of a number of &flights of interest8 requiring special security measures in December 2003-January 2004 led to the establishment of the Embassy and SGDN as the key channels for communication on aviation security issues. GOF insistence on maintaining sovereign control over name-screening performed by French airlines on French soil has led to a convoluted arrangement in which Air France must deal with TSA and the Embassy Legatt via the French Border Police on No-Fly cases. Air France is still awaiting government approval to implement new arrangements for transmission of the Master Crew List that came into effect in October 2004, and to implement Selectee EA screening which came into force in September 2003. ¶12. (SBU) Francis Delon may wish to discuss how our aviation security cooperation is working, and where it is headed. In response to our repeated requests that the that the GOF authorize Air France to implement Selectee List screening, the GOF responded in August 2004 that it could not move ahead without the results of &a joint analysis8 of No-Fly incidents, more information on U.S. provisions for PNR data protection, and a report from the French delegation that visited Washington in September 2004 to examine the functioning of the No-Fly system. We have indicated to SGDN that we believe all the elements of these requirements have been met. We should indicate to SGDN that it is past time for France to implement Selectee screening, in the interest of improved aviation security for all. We should also make clear that we are looking to enhance cooperation in a number of areas, including improved access to French airports for required security inspections and better information sharing about security measures in place in France. ¶13. (SBU) We have also been repeatedly told of GOF concerns that No-Fly screening stands on a shaky legal foundation, and could be open to challenge in court for non-conformity with French data protection legislation. Though apparently sincere, we have pointed to the hypothetical nature of this concern at present. In recent conversations Air France officials have indicated to us that they believe they received approval from CBP in December to participate as overseas airline pilot testers of Secure Flight. Air France is enthusiastic about the prospect, and the GOF may look to this as a possible solution to their legal concerns, or offer it as an additional reason to delay implementing Selectee screening. -------------- Flight Diversions, Watchlists, HSPD-6 -------------- ¶14. (U) French reluctance to advance on aviation security cooperation is linked to their oft-expressed doubts about the functioning of the No Fly system. Air France has in fact accounted for a disproportionate number of flight diversions due the presence on board of passengers on the U.S. No-Fly and Selectee List--a cause of concern for both the airline and the GOF. Five flights have been diverted, including three since the GOF ordered AF to begin No-Fly screening in December 2004. The most recent case dates to October 2005. Though no one cause appears to account for these diversions, the most recent case was apparently due to the inability of AF software to check for spelling variations in passenger names. In several cases of no-fly matches we have &downgraded8 no-fly listees to selectees and allowed them to fly after detailed examination of their cases. Our GOF interlocutors sometimes point to these diversions as evidence confirming their suspicions about problems with the quantity and quality of our watchlist data. We have responded by insisting on our need to make real-time decisions based on the best information available to the USG at the time. ¶15. (C) For these reasons, in responding to HSPD-6 we have recommended prudence in approaching the French with proposals for sharing watchlist data. We believe it is highly unlikely the GOF would consent to unilateral sharing of its data without strict reciprocity. The GOF would probably be reluctant to share names of French citizens or residents with us without clearly defined and mutually agreed upon criteria for inclusion or exclusion from our watchlists, and may argue that sharing data raises legal or privacy protection issues. We are also concerned that the GOF could use expanded information sharing as leverage for requesting underlying intelligence about names included on our lists, especially those of French citizens and residents, or to highlight the issue of why names are included or excluded from the No-Fly and Selectee lists. -------------- Other Transport Security -------------- ¶16. (U) Maritime port security is a high priority for the GOF as evidenced by its successful cooperation with Customs and border Protection on the Container security Initiative (CSI) and its intention to cooperate with the U.S. Coast Guard,s foreign port assessment program, although we have encountered some obstacles in maintaining the diplomatic status of CSI inspectors stationed at Le Havre and Marseille. France has also been highly concerned about the vulnerability of mass transit to terrorist attacks since the first metro bombings in 1985. SGDN has included many rail and maritime specific measures in its &Vigipirate8 reaction plans, and is likely to have a well-thought out response to any proposals involving cooperation on mass transit security. -------------- Biometric Passports/Visas -------------- ¶17. (SBU) In spite of MOI assurances to the Embassy that France would be able to produce biometric passports in time to meet the October 26 deadline by using a private contractor, production has been stalled because of a dispute with the National Printing Office,s labor union. Its lawyers have successfully argued in court that legislation gives them a monopoly over the production of such documents. We understand that the MOI continues to search for alternate solutions, but even under the most optimistic assumptions would not be capable of producing biometric passports before late April. ¶18. (SBU) The massive increase in visa demand has lead to a growing appointment backlog, long lines outside the consulate, and considerable ill will from travelers and the press, a situation we believe will worsen considerably by Spring and reach enormous proportions by summer if no solution is found. The Embassy has argued forcefully that it is doing all that it can to increase visa issuance, but is limited by available manhours, physical plant constraints, and security considerations from doing more. Though we recognize the costs in lost tourism and business and poor public relations, we think that the blame for this situation, and the responsibility for finding a solution, need to be placed squarely where they belong*on the French government. -------------- Avian Flu -------------- ¶19. (SBU) France's effort to prepare for avian flu is headed by an interministerial delegate, Professor Didier Hussin, who serves concurrently as the Director General of Health in the Ministry of Health, the lead French agency for this effort. France has an ambitious plan to prepare for the pandemic, on which French officials started working five years ago, and which was last revised in May. Goverment health authorities plan to cover the needs of thirty per cent of the population for anti-viral drugs, and have implemented measures to control the spread of the disease in approximately 25 per cent of the French territory. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Your visit will provide a welcome opportunity to reaffirm the strength and vitality of our cooperation with the French on C/T and transportation security. At the same time, we hope that it will reinforce the message that on biometric passports and aviation security, they need to do more before we can fully reap the benefits of this relationship. END COMMENT Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton