MAY 11 MFA MEETINGS WITH JEM KHALIL IBRAHIM AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003182 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016 TAGS: PREL CVIS PINS SOCI SU FR SUBJECT: MAY 11 MFA MEETINGS WITH JEM KHALIL IBRAHIM AND FORMER SLM ABDURAHMAN MOUSSA REF: A. STATE 74589 ¶B. PARIS 3129 Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim seemed determined to oppose the Abuja accords on Darfur despite GOF advice that he sign them, MFA AF DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal reported on May 12, following her meeting with him the previous day. Khalil Ibrahim did not seemed fazed by the possible imposition of sanctions against him, and said he planned to encourage opposition to the accords. Le Gal met separately on May 11 with SLM member Abdurahman Moussa, who told Le Gal that he intended to return to Darfur in order to build popular grassroots acceptance of and support for the accords. He told Le Gal that he no longer considered himself to be associated with SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Al-Nur, and explained why Abdulwahid Al-Nur had refused to sign the Abuja accords. Le Gal said that it was important for those supporting the accords to work to convince Sudanese and the people of Darfur to accept them, and to do so quickly, in order to counter the efforts of "spoilers" such as Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid Al-Nur. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MFA AF DAS-equivalent for East Africa Helene Le Gal on May 12 provided a readout on her separate May 11 meetings with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and former SLM member Abdurahman Moussa. KHALIL IBRAHIM ¶3. (C) Le Gal found Khalil Ibrahim quite "closed." He did not say he would never sign the Abuja accords, but he insisted on two conditions being met before he would do so. First, he objected to the way the accords handled funding for Darfur. He wanted specific allocations to be made to specific groups and families. Le Gal said that this was a way to ensure that his clan and associates would receive funding. Second, Khalil Ibrahim objected to the fact that, under the accords, Darfur remained subdivided into three regions. He wanted a single Darfur, without sub-regions. Le Gal said that these were positions that the rebel factions had all shared at the beginning of negotiations but on which the signers of the accords had eventually compromised. In Le Gal's view, Khalil Ibrahim's insistence on these conditions and his refusal to consider a compromise indicated to her that he was not serious about signing the accords and was stating these conditions as a pretext for not doing so. ¶4. (C) Le Gal said she tried to explain to Khalil Ibrahim that the negotiations were closed and that it would behoove all sides if he signed them before the May 15 deadline. He did not seem to accept this, she said, and expressed his intention to visit several of Sudan's neighbors in an effort to convince others of the correctness of his position. He had previously been in London and said he now wanted to go to Chad, DRC, and Ethiopia, among other possible destinations. ¶5. (C) Le Gal reminded Khalil Ibrahim that it was quite possible that sanctions, including travel restrictions, could be imposed against him in reaction to his refusal to sign the Abuja accords. She reported that he seemed unmoved by this possibility, and continued to describe his plans to continue his campaign against the accords. (COMMENT: Le Gal did not say directly that France would support such sanctions against him, but the clear implication was that France would do so. END COMMENT.) Le Gal said that Khalil Ibrahim's lack of concern about travel restrictions might be based on the fact that he could have a number of travel documents that he believed he could use to evade any restrictions. She said that she did not think this realistic if sanctions were imposed, but that that seemed to be his thinking. ¶6. (C) Le Gal said that Khalil Ibrahim was pleasant during his meeting with her. However, she said she did not place much stock in his demeanor -- "he's the kind of person who is charming to whomever he's talking to, and the next day he can bad-mouth you to whomever he's talking to that day." Le Gal confided that Khalil Ibrahim had asked Le Gal if he could hold a press conference using one of the press centers over which the MFA has some control. Le Gal said that she flatly refused -- "if he wants to meet with journalists at a cafe, he's free to do so, but we weren't going to help provide a forum, especially one associated with the French government." ABDURAHMAN MOUSSA ¶7. (C) In contrast, Le Gal said that Abdurahman Moussa was much more reasonable. He told her that he planned to return to Darfur soon, with the intention of working at the PARIS 00003182 002 OF 002 grassroots level to try to convince the people of Darfur that it was in their interest to support the accords and to reject the entreaties of Khalil Ibrahim and Abdurahman Moussa's former associate, SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Al-Nur. Abdurahman Moussa explained to Le Gal that Abdulwahid Al-Nur had not signed the accords because to do so would be a "capitulation" and because he was strongly influenced by a Darfurian resident in Canada (NFI) who opposed the accords. Le Gal added that Abdulwahid Al-Nur had reportedly asked Sudanese VP Taha that he (Al-Nur) be given a high-ranking government position, which Taha had no interest in giving him, which strengthened his opposition to the accords. Abdurahman Moussa, on the other hand, told Le Gal that he did not care about official positions and titles and was more interested in working on the ground to see that the Abuja accords were supported and implemented. ¶8. (C) Abdurahman Moussa told Le Gal that his split with Abdulwahid Al-Nur was final. She noted that the two were from different ethnic groups, which might have made it easier for Abdurahman Moussa to break from Abdulwahid Al-Nur's SLM faction. Le Gal said that Abdurahman Moussa was a long-time resident of France with a professorship at a university in Grenoble. His residency status in France was "regular," as opposed to the political refugee status Khalil Ibrahim enjoyed. NEED TO COUNTER THE "SPOILERS" ¶9. (C) Le Gal said that numerically, the JEM was less important that Abdulwahid Al-Nur's SLM faction but that both leaders could do harm as "spoilers" if they continued to campaign against the Abuja accords. She expressed admiration for Abdurahman Moussa's intention to go to Darfur soon and to begin explaining the merits of the Abuja accords. She said it was important that France, the U.S., and other supporters of the accords make a broad effort to "sell them" to the Sudanese and Darfur publics, to help offset the negative propaganda that Khalil Ibrahim, Abdulwahid Al-Nur, and their ilk seemed bent on spreading. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton