FRENCH NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA EXERCISE - "THANK GOD IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002834

SIPDIS

STATE FOR G/AIAG, S/ES-O/CMS, OES/IHA, CA/OCS, M/MED, EUR, EUR/EX
HHS FOR INTERNATIONAL - TGAY, SNIGHTINGALE
USDA FOR ITP/MACKE/THOMAS, CMP/DLP/WETZEL
USDA FOR FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS
CDC FOR DR NANCY POWELL
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OIA SEQUEIRA
DOE FOR DEPUTY U/S COUNTERTERRORISM AOKI
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FOR INTL STEIN
LONDON FOR DR. SUVARI

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFLU AMGT AEMR AMED ASEC CASC FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH NATIONAL AVIAN INFLUENZA EXERCISE - "THANK GOD IT
WAS ONLY AN EXERCISE...."


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1. (SBU) Summary: At the request of French authorities, on April
24-25 Embassy participated in their National Avian Influenza
Exercise, together with the Prime Minister's Office responsible for
security coordination (SGDN),numerous ministries, international
organizations (OIE, WHO, EU, FAO, and ECDC, the EU CDC equivalent),
as well as several other Paris-based embassies. While the GOF will
not provide results before end-May, from the Embassy's narrow window
on the exercise, it highlighted dramatically the need for thorough
multi-dimensional planning to cope with a pandemic. The opening
exercise scenario presented rapidly developing chaos in a fictional
SE Asian country once a mutated H5 virus developed human-to-human
transmissibility. Shortly thereafter infected airline passengers
embarked for destinations across the globe, including in U.S. and
European cities. On the second exercise day - fictionally weeks
later - the pandemic had blossomed to infect millions worldwide.
Even hyper-prepared countries like France suffered in a downward
pandemic spiral. End Summary.

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Ambitious Exercise
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2. (SBU) Following two postponements, on April 24-25 the French
government conducted an extensive 'tabletop' exercise to test the
French National Avian Influenza Plan (www.grippeaviaire.gouv.fr),to
train government officials in crisis management, and to evaluate
their performance. Several embassies (UK, Germany, Sweden,
Luxembourg, and Australia, beside our own) were included to help
test the Foreign Ministry's role in the National Plan. The exercise
was the product of elaborate preparation. In advance of receiving
instructions, those participating provided their own AI emergency
plans and contact information to GOF authorities. In addition,
planners from SGDN met with all participants to provide exercise
guidance and possible scenario themes, while preserving the release
of the detailed scenarios reserved for the exercise. Kicking off
the exercise on April 24, a paramilitary gendarme dropped-off at the
Embassy DVDs containing the actual exercise scenarios.


3. (SBU) In addition to the background DVDs, the exercise consisted
of a flood (every fifteen minutes) of SGDN-supplied information such
as diplomatic notes, French ministerial notices, newspaper articles,
television broadcast transcripts, Internet chat, emails, as well as
phone calls - intended to inform and disorient at the same time.
Participants reacted to pieces of information related to their part
in the pandemic exercise. Although the Embassy's point-of-contact
was with the AI crisis cell at the MFA, we had occasional contact
with other embassies participating wanting to know how we were
'gaming' our responses to Foreign Ministry queries.

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Deadly Scenarios....
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4. (SBU) The first day scenario depicted a time when the H5N1
virus had mutated into the H5N2 virus with human-to-human
transmissibility. Sickchikie, a fictional textile and high
technologies exporting country of 90 million inhabitants bordering
Vietnam (in place of the Gulf of Tonkin),provided the genesis of
the new pathogenic strain. After several cases of infected humans
in that country turned into a larger group of 200, the WHO announced
a world caution corresponding to phase five (5) of its AI plan.
Almost immediately, expatriates and Sickchickie nationals sought to
flee the country. Despite efforts to retard the progress of the
disease, passengers on aircraft to transportation hubs on several
continents developed avian influenza symptoms. Meanwhile, other
sources related tales of a panicked French population as parents
removed children from schools, did not themselves go to work, and
pharmacies and grocery stores quickly sold out of merchandise.


5. (SBU) By day two of the exercise - hypothetically several weeks
later -- the scenario had become grave. We moved to French AI plan

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level six (6) - full-scale pandemic. Millions of human beings
around the globe were infected and mortality rates of victims were
high: Greater than two percent in those countries with limited
medicines and health care systems. The scenario DVD for day two
showed long clips of mass interments. Many financial services had
ceased to function, as did sanitation services and private sector
delivery of goods and services. In France, the health system was
severely taxed, especially due to medical practitioner parents of
children deciding to tend to their children at home rather than to
flu victims in hospitals. Security services functioned but were
strained. We were bombarded with reports of looting, especially
with vigilantes seeking medicine. The Internet served to provide
information but also to disseminate rumors.

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Quickly Overwhelmed...
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6. (SBU) In a post-exercise debrief with other participating
embassies conducted by SGDN, all noted the intensity and rapidity
with which the crisis unfolded and described the sense of immediate
'stress and helplessness' felt by players. While the scenario set
the stage, responding to the constant stream of information from
exercise organizers redoubled the feeling of crisis. Although we
exclusively communicated with the MFA's crisis cell, the organizers
in the post-exercise debrief accepted that in reality the Embassy
would work directly with GOF contacts in the ministries, law
enforcement agencies, and local defense forces than route requests
through the MFA at every juncture.


7. (SBU) At the same debriefing, representatives of several
embassies mentioned that transportation issues, e.g., the treatment
of aircraft carrying possible AI infectees, had stymied gamers.
Tamiflu presented numerous problems for third country embassy
exercise participants. France, for example, wants to be in a
position to be able to dispense Tamiflu to each of its nationals,
worldwide. Other countries have limited access to Tamiflu. One
third-country consular officer mentioned to U.S. officers at the
debriefing that his government's guidance to its citizens is that
they secure their own, personal stocks of Tamiflu. However, he said
that it was unreasonable since private citizens have difficulty
obtaining personal stocks of the medicine, especially without a
prescription. This was important (at least for exercise purposes)
since Tamiflu treatment reduced the exercise AI mortality rates.
(It was very clear from the scenario documents, too, that those
countries accessing anti-viral medicines and possessing good medical
services had lower mortality rates from the fictional virus than
those, mostly poorer countries.) European embassies at the
debriefing raised challenges associated with dealing with the EU in
the AI pandemic situation. We learned at the debriefing that the EU
is planning its own AI exercise soon.

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Lessons?
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8. (SBU) The speed with which a highly pathogenic AI pandemic
crisis could erupt underscored for Embassy participants the
importance of having a crisis-reaction infrastructure in place
early. Awareness on the part of key mission elements of what roles
they would play in an actual crisis would also be important to
weathering a crisis. Physical infrastructure might require some
changes, too, at an Embassy in which only critical personnel
reported to work, possibly a place for an Embassy crisis cell.
Although Embassy's responses to GOF requests for information and
policy were creative and - we thought - mostly realistic, we did not
need to contact Washington agencies for guidance. But in a real
emergency, we would need to be in immediate contact with experts in
DHS, TSA, HHS, State, Defense, and other departments.


9. (SBU) Embassy exercise participants envisioned situations in

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which it could become difficult to assure security of all Embassy
facilities, particularly annexes of the chancery, due to breakdowns
in civil order occasioned by a full-scale pandemic. We hypothesized
that the Embassy staff could very well become degraded due to
sickness and physical inability to report to duty, for a variety of
reasons such as transportation disruptions. At one point in the
exercise, Embassy participants sought reinforcement of Embassy
facilities by French gendarmes following the discovery of an
Internet rumor that the Embassy had stockpiled antiviral medicine in
the off-site Consular Section. Embassy exercise participants as
well as exercise participants from other countries' embassies
experienced the sense of being quickly overwhelmed by demands from
their citizens for assistance.


10. (SBU) Comment: What was disquieting to participants in this
exercise was that from what we have read about avian influenza, the
scenarios - the outbreak of the human-to-human H5 mutation and the
subsequent, rapid descent into worldwide chaos and death - did not
strike us as wildly exaggerated. In the 'warm' de-briefing by
participants from different Paris-based embassies, the one refrain
was, "We hope to never have to deal with such a crisis." The
practical result of the exercise was that it served to focus the
minds of the participants on the need for preparation. Post
Management will assure that all members of the Tri-Mission Avian
Influenza Working Group watch the Exercise Scenario DVDs. Embassy
will report official exercise results as soon as available. End
comment.


STAPLETON