MFA OUTLINES FRENCH POSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002267 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV FR VE BO CU HA SUBJECT: MFA OUTLINES FRENCH POSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA A/S-equivalent for WHA Daniel Parfait provided visiting EUR/WE Director Kathy Allegrone with a candid assessment of French positions on Latin American issues April 5, touching on Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Haiti. Parfait acknowledged the close relationship Hugo Chavez shares with President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, but expressed growing concerns and "mixed feelings" about Chavez, particularly in light of recent actions concerning French oil company Total. Parfait had been briefed on the Secretary's March 30 discussion with President Chirac on U.S. concerns about arms sales to Venezuela, an issue on which Allegrone pressed repeatedly. Parfait counseled active engagement and support of Bolivian President Evo Morales in his efforts to avoid pushing him into the arms of Chavez and Castro. While the GoF position on Cuba has toughened, Parfait admitted the debate within the EU was "going nowhere" and, having tried unsuccessfully with both carrots and sticks to secure the release of imprisoned dissidents, France and the EU were "short of ideas" about what to do. He indicated that he would be traveling to Miami to meet with the Cuban community there, most likely in June, and was open to suggestions of being put in contact with U.S. experts to discuss the issue. Finally, Parfait noted that France would push for more EU assistance to Haiti and receive president-elect Rene Preval in June. Parfait indicated that he had just returned from consultations with the Germans on Western Hemisphere issues prior to a joint meeting with the Spanish. End Summary. ¶2. (U) EUR/WE Director Kathy Allegrone met April 5 with MFA Americas Director Daniel Parfait to exchange views on Western Hemisphere issues. Parfait was joined in the meeting by DAS-equivalent for North America Yves Oudin and U.S. desk officers Jean-Charles Bou and Sophie Hubert. EUR/WE Director Allegrone was accompanied by Deputy PolCouns and PolOff. "Listening" to Concerns on Venezuela -------------- ¶3. (C) On Venezuela, Parfait began by cycling through the GoF's well-rehearsed talking points: Hugo Chavez will be in power for the foreseeable future and must be dealt with; France prefers engagement, particularly as Chavez enjoys good relations with Chirac and Villepin; the media enjoys great freedom; there are currently no political prisoners; and France does not see Venezuela as a threat to regional stability. Somewhat unusually, he even claimed that the Venezuelan militia was not armed. However, he did say that France had "mixed feelings" about Chavez and there were distinct areas of growing concern. Without being prompted, Parfait noted that the Secretary had raised Venezuela in her March 30 meeting with Chirac and emphasized that France was "listening to our concerns on arms sales." France Policy on UNSC Seats, Too Early on Total -------------- -- ¶4. (C) When asked if France had reached a decision on support for Guatemala's bid over Venezuela for the GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries) UNSC seat, Parfait explained that GoF policy was not to reveal its position until the last minute, citing France's "delicate" position as a perm-five member of the Security Council. That said, there was strong (even "adamant") resistance to Venezuela's candidacy within France's IO bureau, and he expected that the issue would be discussed within the EU, which he described as "cautious" on the matter. Regarding Venezuela's recent actions against French oil company Total, Parfait admitted to not yet having all the details and cautioned that it was still too early to draw any conclusions. Based on his information, however, he believed that Total would abandon the 30,000 barrel-a-day Jusepin oil field that had been seized, while maintaining its interests elsewhere in Venezuela. Parfait also noted frustration with Venezuela over supermarkets owned by French firm Casino that had been shut down several times for unexplained reasons. Message to Pass Chavez? -------------- ¶5. (C) Allegrone explained to Parfait U.S. concern about Chavez' systematic attempt to stir up anti-Americanism within Venezuela, South America, and indeed internationally. Parfait responded that France was disturbed by Chavez' use of anti-Americanism as a political tool, which he saw as the only possible motive for its position on issues such as Iran (he was quite explicit that the French had tried to come up with other explanations, to no avail). Although Parfait judged that such tactics would continue through the upcoming Venezuelan elections, he expressed hope that there might be at least some level of reconciliation afterwards. Parfait acknowledged Allegrone's arguments that it was impossible even to begin a dialogue with Chavez given the level and vitriol of Chavez' rhetoric. Nevertheless, Parfait offered French assistance in serving as a potential go-between and asked if there were any messages the U.S. might want the GoF to pass to Chavez. ¶6. (C) Parfait indicated that he had recently held a round of consultations with German officials on Western Hemisphere issues, and on Venezuela in particular, prior to a scheduled meeting with the Spanish (it was not clear whether this would be a Franco-Spanish or trilateral meeting). He also indicated that he had recently discussed with German officials the idea of organizing a conference of experts on Venezuela to openly discuss the situation there. He asked if the U.S. would be interested in participating; in response to a question, he said that the current concept envisioned non-governmental involvement in the discussions. Allegrone reacted coolly to the idea but said she would nevertheless convey it to Washington. Bolivia -------------- ¶7. (C) Parfait recounted that Chirac had urged Bolivian president Evo Morales to seek better ties with Washington during his visit to Paris. He stated that the jury was still out on Morales, and that Paris was monitoring him closely, while asserting that it was also important for others to assist him where possible. Morales was not prepared to be president, Parfait acknowledged, and the GoF has little confidence in the people around him. Parfait argued that assistance was also necessary to ensure that Morales did not turn Chavez and Castro. Morales represented the first time that the people of Bolivia have had a champion in power, and he sincerely desired to improve the country, Parfait insisted, arguing that help from countries like the U.S. and France would reduce the influence of Chavez. To that end, Parfait said, mobilizing EU assistance for Bolivia would be high on his agenda in the upcoming meetings with the Spanish. Out of Ideas in Cuba -------------- ¶8. (C) Parfait did not offer much hope of renewed EU sanctions against Cuba when the issue comes up in June, as the debate seems to have devolved into a stalemate, with the Czech Republic and Spain at opposite extremes. After the suspension of EU sanctions last June, he explained, France had tried to open a constructive dialogue with the GoC by inviting Cuban authorities to July 14 national day celebrations -- a gesture reciprocated by the GoC with July 13 and July 22 crackdowns on dissidents. The French position has toughened as a result, Parfait said, and its priority remained the release of all dissidents; however, the GoF was out of fresh ideas as to what to do next, with both sanctions and gestures having failed to achieve desired results. Castro was no longer interested in the EU, he judged, given new opportunities and markets in China and Latin America. Allegrone responded that it was at least in part thanks to Chavez and his money that Cuba felt it now had a larger margin of maneuver. ¶9. (C) Parfait expressed interest in a detailed discussion with the USG on possible post-Castro scenarios. He indicated that he would be traveling to Miami to meet with the Cuban community there, most likely in June, and was open to suggestions of being put in contact with U.S. experts to discuss the issue. Haiti -------------- ¶10. (C) Parfait stressed France's continued commitment to working closely with the USG in Haiti. He indicated that president-elect Preval would visit France in June and that the GoF would support increased assistance to Haiti within the EU. Parfait recounted that when the issue of Jean-Claude Duvalier returning to Haiti first arose, French authorities had tracked him down and eventually located him in a hotel in Paris. Although the GoF had no legal authority to detain him, Parfait did not think support for "Baby Doc" was enough for him to risk his life by returning to Haiti. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Although Parfait offered more cautionary language than in previous discussions, the MFA still holds to what it calls a "balanced view" of Venezuela and Hugo Chavez, despite recent moves against French economic interests. The idea of organizing a conference to discuss Venezuela would appear to us to be counter to U.S. interests, given likely Venezuelan participation and the likelihood that it would risk becoming a forum for the defense of Chavez by European intellectuals attracted to his Bolivarian dream. Washington may wish to consider a counter-suggestion that the U.S. and EU member state officials meet to discuss our views on Venezuela. We believe Paris will make the right decision on the UNSC seat in the end, although the extent to which it is prepared to lobby is much less clear. ¶12. (U) EUR/WE Director Allegrone has cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton