FORMER PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING ON A TROUBLED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001966 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ELAB FR EUN PINR SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING ON A TROUBLED FRANCE, UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND NEXT STEPS FOR THE EU Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 21 meeting with the Ambassador, Former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing characterized the current social upheaval in France over the First Employment Contract as the latest episode in France's deep-seated resistance to change ("in no way pre-revolutionary"). He argued for change through the creation of prosperity -- either through "shock treatment" or more incremental steps -- as the only way forward. Giscard seemed to view a Segolene Royal/Dominique Strauss-Kahn ticket as representing the center-left's best chance for victory in the 2007 presidential elections, although these two mainstream politicians might have difficulty obtaining the support of the Socialist party's left wing. While clearly not enamored of Nicolas Sarkozy, whom he viewed as lacking in true presidential stature, Giscard was convinced he would be the candidate on the center-right, barring some unforeseen crisis that would allow Chirac to continue. Giscard argued that French voters are not anti-EU but are anti-enlargement. He asserted that they will be prepared after the elections to vote again on the EU constitutional treaty or renegotiate the existing text, but worried that the UK is drifting away from Europe. He lamented the absence of a true European leader, with the potential exception of German Chancellor Merkel, but described the Franco-German relationship as a rock for the ages. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met March 21 with a relaxed, expansive, and incisively insightful former centrist President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to discuss the current wave of unrest sweeping across France in opposition to the First Employment Contract (CPE),the domestic political scene in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections, and next steps for Europe. CPE AND FRENCH AMBIVALENCE TOWARD CHANGE -------------- ¶3. (C) Asked for his assessment of the current wave of strikes and demonstrations in reaction to the CPE, Giscard explained that regular bouts of turbulence were the norm for France since the French Revolution and reflected the deep reluctance, even resistance, of French society to change. This partly reflected France's history as a nation of hard-working, taciturn farmers, not open to the world, who had little in common with the free-traders of the Netherlands or the UK. While French society had produced its own "model" and could claim a glorious past, the fact was that its model was now obsolete, and no longer capable of producing economic growth. Giscard described a society on the defensive, characterized psychologically by negativism and rejection of anything new. This, as much as anything else, had played a role in French rejection of the EU constitutional treaty, and it was at play now in widespread opposition to the CPE. ¶4. (C) Calling the CPE "unnecessary but acceptable in substance," Giscard noted that two-thirds of the demonstrators, namely employees in the public sector and civil servants, would not be affected in any way by the CPE. He characterized business as largely silent. (Comment: In fact, business leaders tend to see the CPE as a small, if not sufficient, step forward. End comment.) Giscard predicted that the demonstrators would gradually exhaust themselves over a period of three to four weeks, also in conjunction with a gesture by the government to soften the law. While he did not rule out the possibility of a general strike (Note: The next day of strike actions is March 28, but the unions have stopped short of calling for a "general strike." End note.),Giscard was categorical that France is not/not in a pre-revolutionary mood. (Comment: This is an assessment that tracks widely with that of pundits, who see reaction to the CPE as focused on preserving privileges rather than effecting change. End comment.) 2007 ELECTIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CENTER-LEFT -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Giscard refused to make any firm predictions about the outcome of the 2007 presidential elections, although he repeated the conventional wisdom that the French tradition of protest against the government in office would tend to favor the center-left Socialist Party (PS). Asked about Segolene Royal's current lead in the public opinion polls, Giscard said she was "brilliant" (of the same ENA class as PM Dominique de Villepin and her companion and PS First Secretary Francois Hollande),by no means a political SIPDIS extremist (he noted her father was a retired Colonel and her brother a member of the far-right National Front),honest, and presented well on television. Giscard thought Royal's strategy of not speaking out too much on the issues was the PARIS 00001966 002 OF 004 correct one for the moment, as this allowed her to appear as a vessel for voters' hopes for change. At the same time, given her lack of high-level governing experience, Giscard thought Royal would do well to consider naming in advance her choice for PM in order to run as a ticket. ¶6. (C) Giscard cited Dominique Strauss-Kahn as the logical choice from the standpoint of experience and capability, but noted that Strauss-Kahn represented the mainstream at a moment when the left wing was becoming increasingly vocal. Giscard believed Royal's strategy of appealing to the center was correct overall in the context of winning the presidency, but perhaps premature at this stage of the nomination process. At a minimum, Giscard opined, Royal should drop her frequent references to Tony Blair, as this risked antagonizing the left wing. Asked about other possible PM candidates, Giscard disparaged former PM Lionel Jospin as stiff and repetitious (he continued to push his book and had no new ideas) and thought him unlikely to accept anything but the presidency. Giscard dismissed former PM Laurent Fabius as a shameless opportunist, in an age when voters demanded a certain honesty from politicians. Giscard offered former Culture Jack Lang as one possibility, especially vis-a-vis the left wing of the party, given his credentials with intellectuals. Less kindly, however, Giscard characterized Lang as a "brilliant" culture minister, provided one understood "culture" as "entertainment." He not only appeared to be, but indeed was, a lightweight, and certainly not a statesman, Giscard declared. FRANCE IN NEED OF A THATCHER? -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked whether France's perpetual sense of being in crisis might finally encourage voters to support more radical change, Giscard said he saw a need to make people happier through increased prosperity, and cited former Spanish PM Aznar as having convinced the Spanish electorate that prosperity would not be possible without reform. But he also held out the possibility of an even more radical, Thatcher-like "shock treatment," which he claimed only the center-right could administer given the center-left's enduring attachment to a large public sector. After reflection, however, he suggested that the government might best take a number of quick, pragmatic actions after the elections -- with no one step being seen as radical in and of itself and thus below the threshold of public consciousness and programmatic doctrine -- to reduce the wealth tax, drop taxes on main private residences (all Frenchmen want to own a house, he said),or refraining from replacing half of all retiring civil servants. ¶8. (C) Asked to what extent the center-right should stand for change, Giscard was cautious and, citing the French mood described above, commented that the elections would be won by persuading voters to say "no" to the left rather than "yes" to the right. He thought the center-right was well positioned to claim that the socialists were soft on security and had no real proposals for reducing unemployment. In sum, according to Giscard, it would be a mistake to run too overtly on a reformist ticket. In that regard, he noted that Sarkozy had stopped using the word "break" with the past, which was widely perceived as too radical. SARKOZY THE ONE? -------------- ¶9. (C) Giscard characterized Sarkozy as the center-right's leading candidate for the presidential elections -- although he had to assume that President Chirac was still holding out hope for a serious international crisis to lead to the "demand" that he continue to lead France. Giscard thought it helpful to Sarkozy's candidacy that he was associated with toughness on security and immigration issues, while characterizing Sarkozy's economic record as weak. Giscard also cautioned that Sarkozy's "hyperactivity" could be perceived as dangerous. Asked if Sarkozy would make a good president, Giscard noted that Sarkozy lacked the pedigree that the French people had come to expect, and characterized him as a sort of French "Clinton" in that regard. He acknowledged difficulty in perceiving Sarkozy as a figure of historical dimensions, notwithstanding his brilliance. Giscard hinted that Sarkozy might not survive more than a single term. ¶10. (C) Asked to compare Sarkozy to PM de Villepin, Giscard said he wanted to avoid directly criticizing the Prime Minister of a current government. He nonetheless judged Villepin to be more a poet than a politician, although he admired his energy and personal accomplishments. Giscard concluded with the observation that the three most important PARIS 00001966 003 OF 004 political offices in France would be up for grabs in 2007: President, Prime Minister, and Mayor of Paris. (Comment: Given the near certainty that neither Sarkozy or Villepin, if elected, would choose the other as Prime Minister, this would leave the Mayor of Paris as the consolation prize. Giscard apparently saw no obstacle in the fact that the center-right UMP party, through a primary election, had just chosen Francoise de Panafieu to run against PS incumbent Bertrand Delanoe. End comment.) NEXT STEPS ON EUROPE -------------- ¶11. (C) Calling the failed referendum on the EU constitution a "catastrophe" for France and Europe, Giscard accused the government of badly managing the issue. He recalled his attempt a month before the referendum to convince President Chirac to withdraw the referendum and to replace PM Raffarin instead and, before that, his effort to convince Chirac not to hold a referendum at all. Giscard insisted that the majority of those who voted "no" had voted against the government and Chirac -- especially many on the center-left who had been forced to support Chirac in the second-round 2002 election against Jean-Marie Le Pen). Moreover, Giscard asserted, "although the USG does not seem to want to recognize this," widespread unease with EU enlargement also played a significant role. Giscard claimed, citing poll data, that the French public favored either re-approving the existing text or renegotiating it slightly, although this probably could not occur until after the 2007 presidential elections. (Comment: Giscard has a personal stake in preserving as much of the existing text, which he largely wrote, as possible. End comment.) ¶12. (C) As for the future, Giscard judged that the real problem would be not France but the UK, which he described as "moving away from Europe." Giscard noted in this regard that the UK business and financial communities appeared to be more focused on Australia, China and the U.S. than Europe, perhaps because they perceive Europe as too complicated and less dynamic. Giscard also lamented the absence of authentic European leaders, with the potential exception of German Chancellor Merkel. He made clear his belief that such a leader need not necessarily be French, German, or British. ¶13. (C) Asked whether reports of increasing Franco-German differences portended a drifting apart of these two countries, Giscard declared that this was happily not the case. Waxing emotional for the only time in the meeting, he said the two peoples now saw each other as partners, notwithstanding the suffering of the past (he evoked his own family's losses in wars against Germany, citing his grand-father's death in the trenches of WWI and his father-in-law's experience in a deportee camp in WWII). He stated that when French delegations attend international meetings, they feel most comfortable with the Germans. This might appear strange, he concluded, but it was true. ¶14. (U) Giscard briefly mentioned his plans for traveling to the U.S. in the fall. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Notwithstanding his critical acumen (it is impossible not to admire how sharp he remains),Giscard's arguments themselves reflect France's contradictory desire for change and preserving the status quo, or for effecting change by increment and stealth rather than offering the public clear policy choices. By that measure, PM de Villepin's platform of "change in continuity," as represented tangibly by the CPE, should have enjoyed more success. It is hard to square Giscard's judgment that reform should be implemented incrementally stealthily (Villepin's strategy) with his call for a "shock treatment" for France (that only Sarkozy could provide). Similar considerations pertain to his judgment that winning elections is more about discrediting the opposition than by running on a platform for the future. ¶16. (C) Giscard mostly spoke in English, with a few digressions in French, in a manner that can only be described as sometimes elliptical but in which the choice of words always appeared deliberate and precise. As in past meetings, Giscard demonstrated his deep knowledge of European and U.S. history (he is currently reading a biography of Thomas Jefferson, whom he finds not very typically American) and geography. As he has done with previous Ambassadors, Giscard complained about the exaggerated stature Americans give to Lafayette -- whom Giscard dismissed as a "self-promoting member of the lower aristocracy" -- at the expense of the PARIS 00001966 004 OF 004 contributions to American independence made possible by the policies of the French government and the actions of the French fleet, including a Vice-Admiral d'Estaing Giscard counts among forbears. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton