MEETING WITH GILCHRIST OLYMPIO: "I'M READY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001919 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PREF PINR TO FR SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GILCHRIST OLYMPIO: "I'M READY TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, BUT THE LOME SIDE IS BLOCKING" REF: A. LOME 332 ¶B. GALINDO/DUNN/KANEDA E-MAILS PARIS 00001919 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Gilchrist Olympio, Paris-based UFC chief and opposition leader, told us March 23 that he was prepared to engage in national dialogue with the Faure regime but asserted that the regime was blocking the dialogue by not agreeing on the naming of a mediator/facilitator of the talks. The GOT had caused UN Special Advisor Brahimi, who was ready to assume that role, to step away when the GOT proposed that Brahimi accept a deputy for the talks nominated by the GOT with, Olympio claimed, connections to the Faure regime. Burkina Faso President Campaore went to Lome this week to try to resolve this issue. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Per refs A and B, we called on Gilchrist Olympio on March 23 and discussed for over an hour events in Togo, including the issue of a national dialogue. Isaac Tchiakpe, the Counselor for Communication of Olympio's UFC (Union des Force de Changement),also participated. AFTER EYADEMA'S DEATH AND THROUGH 2005 ¶3. (C) Olympio began by describing the meetings and discussions that took place after former president Eyadema's death early in 2005. He noted the manner in which Nigerian President Obasanjo, in his role as AU Chairman, had gotten involved in Togo soon after Eyadema's death. Olympio indicated that Obasanjo's early engagement was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the succession issue in Togo deserved the attention of a statesman of Obasanjo's stature. On the other, however, the impression that Obasanjo was taking control of the issue may have lulled observers into a false sense of security, which contributed, in Olympio's view, to the noticeable decrease in criticism by the international community of the way that Faure succeeded his father. ¶4. (C) Olympio discussed the meetings that took place during 2005, some under the aegis of Obasanjo's leadership or in conjunction with Sant'Egidio, and some which both Olympio and Faure attended. At several points UN Secretary-General Annan had also expressed his interest in Togo and the efforts to promote discussion between Faure and Olympio. Olympio said he quickly concluded that Faure (whom he consistently called "le garcon" or "le fils" during our meeting) had not changed and would not change, although he was better at projecting a positive image than his father had been. (NOTE: Olympio's description of these different meetings and talks was at times difficult to follow as he did not discuss them in chronological order or provide much context. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) The series of meetings in 2005 were not productive, Olympio said, owing to an excessive focus on establishing agendas and modalities. He blamed the Faure regime for the lack of progress. At one point he said that Faure did not want to talk because discussions might be the first step in a long process that might eventually lead to the end of the Gnassingbe dynasty. Olympio said that Faure would thus block and impede where possible and at the same time do his utmost to make it look like others, such as Olympio, were the obstacles to progress and reconciliation. ¶6. (C) Even the temptation of making peace with the EU by meeting its 22 conditions, and thereby allow EU assistance to flow to Togo, was not strong enough for Faure to change, Olympio suggested. He and Tchiakpe noted the regime's many criminal activities (e.g., drug and arms trafficking) that would always supply sufficient income for the Faure regime to meet at least its immediate needs, if not provide a life of luxury for a chosen few. ¶7. (C) Olympio said that in the early days of the Faure regime, when a slight possibility of change existed, he was very concerned about the legal obstacles Eyadema had enacted towards the end of his life, which Olympio believed were designed to impede specifically Olympio's political ambitions. These were laws on residency, one's ancestors, financial situation, and the like that made it difficult for Olympio to run for office in compliance with Togolese law. ¶8. (C) These issues became of lesser concern as time passed and the likelihood of Olympio's running for office dimmed. In later talks with Obasanjo, Campaore, and others, Olympio said that the issues he was most concerned about, and which PARIS 00001919 002.2 OF 003 could form the main agenda topics in discussions with Faure, were the Togolese army, political prisoners, Togolese refugees, and an transparent electoral framework. These subjects were passed to Faure but, Olympio said, there had never been a clear response. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ¶9. (C) Tchiakpe said that Elysee Africa Advisor Michel de Bonnecorse was responsible for bringing Burkina Faso President Campaore into current efforts to promote dialogue, and that Bonnecorse's efforts regarding Campaore began on February 1, 2006. Olympio said that he had no objection to Campaore's playing an oversight role in any talks between Olympio and Faure, but he preferred having an on-site mediator/facilitator who would attend and "referee" the talks in a neutral manner. Olympio indicated that at some point UN Secretary-General Annan suggested his Special Advisor, SIPDIS Lakhdar Brahimi, for this role. Olympio said that Brahimi, with his vast experience and excellent reputation, was a perfect choice. It would not be a bad idea, Olympio continued, if the U.S. and EU sent observers to attend the talks, if for no other reason than to counter whatever spin the GOT might employ when providing press briefings on the discussions. ¶10. (C) However, according to Olympio, Faure proceeded to deliberately derail the process. He did so by proposing that Brahimi take on as his deputy someone (whom Olympio did not name or otherwise clearly identify) that Olympio considered to be close to the Faure regime. According to Olympio, Brahimi balked at this suggestion and said that when he accepted an assignment, he carried out the work his way and with a staff, if any, he chose. He then said he would not serve so long as Togo kept on the table the idea of Brahimi's having to accept a deputy, especially one not of his choosing. ¶11. (C) Olympio said that it was thus Lome's fault that there was no national dialogue. He said several times: "I am ready to talk with them anytime -- tomorrow -- if only they would agree to Brahimi (or someone of equal experience and stature) as a mediator or facilitator, and cease making their demands about a 'deputy.'" He cautioned: "Faure and his people will always -- ALWAYS -- do whatever they think is necessary to present themselves in a positive light and to make it look like the opposition is stalling." ¶12. (C) Asked several times about his willingness to talk and what might entice him to engage in dialogue, Olympio said: "It's simple. All they have to do is agree on the mediator issue. Then we can talk. Of course, they are capable of coming up with other obstacles if we overcome this one." ¶13. (C) Olympio said he traveled to Ouagadougou to discuss all of these matters with Campaore, and they met for three hours during the evening of March 17. Olympio said he stressed the Brahimi problem and asked that Campaore, if he were to meet with the other side, try to resolve this problem. Olympio said that Campaore understood the issue and that it was one of the main topics he intended to raise in Lome during his visit there during the week of March 20. VIEWS OF THE FRENCH ¶14. (C) Throughout the conversation, Olympio and Tchiakpe expressed disappointment with France. First, the issue of Eyadema's "friendship" with President Chirac was a very sore point. They both commented on France's tendency to seek stability in its former colonies. If a "strong man" was the best way of achieving stability, France had no qualms about supporting the "strong man." It had done so in Togo for decades. There was a hint of sadness in Olympio's voice when he continued, "and they are doing the same thing now with the boy." He expressed bitterness at what he termed France's perfunctory condemnation of Faure's accession to power and its quick return to "business as usual." ¶15. (C) NOTE: We discussed Togo and Olympio very briefly in a March 21 meeting on Chad with MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Bruno Foucher, commenting, without being more specific, that there was a perception that Olympio was not doing enough to engage in national dialogue with the GOT, thus impeding progress on the EU's 22 conditions. Foucher responded curtly, saying that the GOF had very little to do with Olympio directly. Echoing earlier comments, Foucher said that Olympio really needed to do his part to get the national dialogue going. END NOTE. PARIS 00001919 003.2 OF 003 U.S. AND TOGO ¶16. (C) Olympio offered brief comments when asked what the U.S. might do regarding Togo. He said the U.S. should increase its attention. He noted that "you are very involved in Cote d'Ivoire in the IWG. Perhaps you could play a stronger leadership role in Togo." He also said that the U.S. should remain vigilant in terms of Faure's constant efforts to present himself as reasonable and the opposition as disorganized, unfocused, and ineffective. He noted that U.S. pressure could often be a powerful force for change, and that pressure was something the Faure regime understood. ¶17. (C) COMMENT: Olympio was an engaging interlocutor, quick to identify the thrust and implication of our questions. His discourse, however, was at times difficult to follow because of its lack of precision and chronology and his tendency to speak elliptically. There was a slight air of fatigue and resignation as well, which seemed a product of having seen Eyadema's passing without, so far, being able to profit from it. He was careful at all times to blame the Faure regime for the failure to engage in national dialogue. ¶18. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: It was also evident that Olympio considers himself the only true opposition figure of importance, and he was not shy about name dropping or suggesting that someone like Obasanjo views him as an equal. In his few references to other opposition elements, he tended to dismiss them as inconsequential, not in a mean-spirited manner but rather, in his view, as a matter of fact. END COMMENT. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton