MFA DAS DISCUSSES OFFENSIVE IN CHAD AND UPCOMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001843 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS CD FR SUBJECT: MFA DAS DISCUSSES OFFENSIVE IN CHAD AND UPCOMING ELECTION REF: A. NDJAMENA 431 ¶B. YAMAMOTO/SEMINARA/KANEDA E-MAILS Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b /d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Bruno Foucher on March 21 discussed developments in Chad, notably the GOC's offensive against rebel forces that began early on March 21. Foucher said that, if successful, the offensive could solidify Deby's regime and reduce Sudan's ability to influence events in Chad. Foucher was not receptive to the notion of postponing elections in Chad, stating that such a postponement would not likely lead to a more stable and improved situation in Chad, given the weakness of the political opposition to Deby and the weakness of Chad's political class in general. END SUMMARY. OFFENSIVE AGAINST REBEL FORCES ¶2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Bruno Foucher on March 21 reviewed developments in Chad, beginning with the military campaign launched against rebel forces earlier on March 21. Foucher said he learned about the offensive when he arrived at work on March 21 and said that it had apparently been well-organized in secret prior to its launching. He claimed no prior knowledge of the attack. ¶3. (C) Foucher was atypically upbeat as to the implications of the offensive. The offensive seemed to be going well in its early stages. A number of rebels had been killed. Foucher said information he had received indicated that one of the Erdimi brothers may have been either killed or wounded. Foucher said that if Deby achieved a decisive victory over the rebels, his ability to stabilize Chad and substantially limit Sudan's influence in Chad would increase significantly. ¶4. (C) The offensive was important in other respects, Foucher noted. It indicated that Deby was willing to act against those elements of his own Zaghawa clan in rebellion against him, and thus act in the national, rather than clan, interest. Displaying a clear willingness to act against the Zaghawa rebels would itself strengthen Deby's hand against Sudan and its support for Chad's rebels. ¶5. (C) Foucher did not believe the offensive was tied to the March 14 attempted coup in Chad (ref A). The operation would have taken time to plan and organize and was probably in train before the coup attempt. Foucher again commented on the secrecy with which it had been organized and implemented. Although he did not think the operation was linked to the coup attempt, its launching soon after the aborted coup would probably be viewed as a sign of strength and decisiveness on Deby's part. ¶6. (C) Foucher said that Sudan had two motives in trying to destabilize Chad and replace the Deby regime with one more amenable to Khartoum's policies. The first was that a pro-Sudanese regime in Chad would allow Khartoum a freer hand in dealing with Darfur. The second motive, Foucher observed, was ideological in nature -- he said that one should not underestimate the hopes of Islamists in Sudan who wanted to extend Islam's reach from Sudan farther west and south. A pro-Sudan regime in Chad would almost certainly be pro-Islamist, he commented, and not the kind of Islam favorably disposed to the West. ¶7. (C) Stabilizing northern Chad would allow Deby, in the short-term, to resolve current problems with the World Bank and place Chad's economy on a better footing, something the country desperately needed, Foucher continued. In the longer-term, acting against the northern rebels and acting against members of his own clan could lead to expanding the political dialogue in Chad and broadening Deby's base. ¶8. (C) Foucher said that France has been encouraging Deby to reach out to opposition political groups (the "legal opposition," Foucher commented). The problem, which affected other issues related to Chad's political future, was that the opposition did not consist of what we would consider coherent political parties. Foucher said there were some 70 "political parties" in the south but that these were often small groups or even individuals that did not resemble what would pass for a political party in France or the U.S. There was no "classe politique" deserving of the term in Chad, Foucher stressed. Nonetheless, the GOF believed that Deby had to make an effort to include the opposition in order to increase his base and effectiveness. This might also have the beneficial effect of reducing the possibility of more PARIS 00001843 002 OF 002 coup attempts. Foucher suggested that France and the U.S. work together to convince Deby to adopt a more inclusive policy regarding the opposition. ELECTIONS IN CHAD ¶9. (C) Foucher said that he had received from France's Washington Embassy a copy of the U.S. non-paper on the postponement of the May 3 elections (ref B). He said he was not receptive to the idea. Postponing elections would make sense if we could be confident of a better outcome a year from now, or whenever the elections might take place. He referred again to the lack of a political culture in Chad and the absence of any figure who might be a good successor to Deby. There did not appear to be such a person, he said. It would be better to hold the elections on May 3 as scheduled and at the same time to make clear to Deby the need to hold them in a proper manner. Assuming Deby won, France, the U.S., and others could continue to encourage Deby to work with all elements of Chadian society and thereby expand his base and progressively increase Chad's stability. Postponing elections and holding them a year from now, when circumstances would not appear to be any better than they were now, would not be a positive thing to do, he said. ¶10. (C) Foucher said that France was not now engaged in contingency planning in the event of a complete collapse of the Deby regime, either as a result of a successful coup or some other unforeseen development. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: We were impressed by the degree to which the new military campaign has given Foucher grounds to believe that the Deby regime now has an opportunity to take a decisive step in defeating the rebels and stabilizing the country. It was equally clear that the French, if Foucher is a representative example, continue to base much of their thinking (and perhaps their hopes) on Deby's staying power. END COMMENT. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton