SUDAN: FRANCE TO CONSIDER WAYS OF ENCOURAGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001721 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO SOCI SU FR SUBJECT: SUDAN: FRANCE TO CONSIDER WAYS OF ENCOURAGING AMIS RE-HATTING REF: STATE 43008 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, for reas ons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF PDAS Elisabeth Barbier said on March 17 that France would consider whether and how best to encourage other countries to support a rapid conversion of AMIS into a UN operation for Sudan. She agreed with us that the AU decision to transition AMIS to a UN mission was not conditioned on fulfillment of the other AU decisions taken on March 10. That said, in the GOF analysis, there will need to be some progress in the Abuja talks for the entire package of decisions (including the AMIS-UN transition) to be implemented. There are positive signs from Abuja, with the gathering there of credible negotiators, particularly on the rebel side. IO Political Affairs DAS-equivalent Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel echoed Barbier in stressing the importance of progress in the Abuja talks as a practical matter to ensure that deployments can occur, but did not commit as to whether and how France might encourage others. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Political M/C carried out reftel demarche on March 17 with MFA PDAS for Africa Elisabeth Barbier, who expressed general agreement with our goals regarding AMIS and a UN mission for Sudan. Deputy Polcouns heard a similar message from IO Political Affairs DAS-equivalent Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel. ¶3. (C) Barbier agreed with USG analysis that the four decisions contained in the AU's March 10 communique on AMIS and the UN were not conditional or interlinked. She noted that as far as the Africans were concerned, progress in the Abuja talks would nevertheless be needed for the package of decisions to be implemented. Such progress was crucial to gaining broad-based acceptance of a UN mission for Sudan to replace AMIS. Simon-Michel echoed Barbier in stressing the practical importance of progress on the ground -- either a peace agreement or a better-implemented ceasefire -- as a precondition for deploying a possible new UN mission. ¶4. (C) Barbier expressed some optimism about progress in Abuja, based on her understanding that "real" negotiators, i.e., those who might be able to move the negotiations forward, now seemed to be gathering there, in particular, representatives of the rebel side, who had not previously been credibly represented. She deemed this a boost for AU Special Envoy Salim Salim, who had expressed hope in this regard during the Sudan talks that took place in Brussels and Paris the week of March 6-10. Simon-Michel was more circumspect on this point, owing no doubt to less familiarity with the latest state of play. ¶5. (C) Barbier said the GOF would consider whether and how best to approach other countries to encourage them to support the effort to transform AMIS into a UN operation. At her request, we drew from reftel talking points and provided her a non-paper, in order to help her focus GOF thinking. Simon-Michel echoed Barbier in stating that the GOF would need to consider the questions raised reftel, and he undertook to study the non-paper in detail. Embassy will report on further GOF reaction. PARIS 00001721 002 OF 002 Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton