PARIS-BASED HARIRI ADVISOR ON LEBANON INTERNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001428 SIPDIS NOTE: BY CIB:"DO NOT/NOT PROCESS, GIVE TO EAO FOR GUIDANCE." SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY LE EG SA FR SUBJECT: PARIS-BASED HARIRI ADVISOR ON LEBANON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS FOR LAHOUD RESIGNATION REF: A. PARIS 1188 (EXDIS) ¶B. PARIS 327 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During a recent discussion, Basile Yared, a leading Paris-based advisor to Sa'ad Hariri, praised the Secretary for delivering the right message in Beirut on the SIPDIS need for a peaceful, constitutional presidential transition in Lebanon. Yared speculated that it would take two to three months before President Lahoud can be replaced, and advocated seeking a Lahoud resignation as a "less costly" option than seeking the support of Hizballah or Michel Aoun to amend the constitution. Yared stressed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt could play a useful role in convincing Damascus to ask Lahoud to step down. He conceded that Syria would likely seek political and financial incentives from Saudi Arabia in return for withdrawing support for Lahoud, but he claimed, unconvincingly, that such gestures would not diminish international pressure on Syria to comply with its UN obligations. While reiterating total opposition to an Aoun presidency, Yared suggested that seeking Aoun's support for amending the constitution might be the second-best option, if Lahoud refused to resign. Yared opined that Aoun's support within the Christian community would diminish, if he was increasingly viewed as blocking the democratic process to replace Lahoud, and that Aoun could eventually accept someone else being President if his party secured a bigger role in the GoL. Yared praised Sa'ad Hariri as a force for Sunni moderates in Lebanon with potential to reassure Christians, and criticized PM Siniora for not tackling economic reform and security issues quickly enough. Yared expressed confidence that GoF support for Lebanon would continue after Chirac's presidential term ends in 2007, and cited strong public backing in France for Lebanese sovereignty. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a discussion with poloff February 24, Paris-based Hariri family advisor Basile Yared praised the Secretary's February 23 visit to Beirut for passing exactly SIPDIS the right messages on the need for a Lebanese-led, peaceful and constitutional process to replace President Lahoud. Yared commented that Walid Jumblatt needed to hear this message most; although Sa'ad Hariri was still trying to "push Lahoud against a wall" publicly, in order to get him to soften, he had become more measured in his approach. Yared judged it a mistake for Hariri to set a March 14 deadline for dumping Lahoud, and judged it would take two to three months for the process to reach its conclusion. LAHOUD RESIGNATION, WITH SAUDI, EGYPTIAN, AND SYRIAN HELP -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Yared saw three options to replace Lahoud: a Lahoud resignation, or Hizballah or Aoun providing the votes to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the constitution. Of the three options, Yared saw a Lahoud resignation as the "least costly." To convince Lahoud to resign, Yared judged that Lahoud needed guarantees that Syria won't kill him," and promises of immunity for corruption cases. Yared agreed that it was out of the question to offer Lahoud immunity for the Hariri assassination, but speculated further that Lahoud would never ask, since such a request would implicate him. Yared expressed his personal hunch that Lahoud was not an active participant in the Hariri assassination plot, though, after the fact he thwarted the investigation. ¶4. (C) In Yared's view, the best way to facilitate a Lahoud resignation would be to convince Bashar al Asad to tell Lahoud to step down -- an area where Saudi Arabia and Egypt could play a helpful role. In Yared's view, the Saudis and Egyptians should, without U.S. or French involvement, try and convince Bashar that it was in his interest to dump Lahoud, in order to have a more stable relationship with Lebanon. The March 28-29 Arab League summit would be an opportunity for a Saudi-Egyptian approach to Bashar. Asked what the Syrians might demand in return, Yared speculated that the SARG would seek political contact as well as financial incentives, which Saudi Arabia should be willing to offer. When poloff, in response, observed that such incentives ran contrary to U.S.-French-led efforts to isolate Syria, Yared stressed his view that this would be the "least bad" option and that France and the U.S. need not be associated with the Saudi-Egyptian efforts. He added that Syria would likely seek assurances that the next Lebanese president would not seek to destabilize Syria, and said this could be doable, without giving Syria a say in who the next president should be. SECOND BEST OPTION: GETTING AOUN'S SUPPORT -------------- ¶5. (C) Yared observed that the price for securing Hizballah support for dumping Lahoud would be too high -- Hizballah's exemption from 1559. He concluded that the next best option, if resignation did not work, was securing Aoun's support. Yared described an Aoun presidency as an unacceptable option, citing Aoun's February 6 understanding with Hizballah as an example of Aoun's treachery and long track record of bad judgment calls. Although Aoun, up to now, had remained inflexible in his insistence on the Presidency, Yared speculated that if Aoun continued to block replacement of Lahoud as momentum grew throughout Lebanon for a new President, Aoun would risk losing his support in the Christian community. This in turn could compel Aoun to renounce his claim on the presidency, and to support Lahoud's removal in exchange for a bigger ministerial presence and role in the GOL for his supporters. HOW A NEW PRESIDENT COULD HELP DISARM HIZBALLAH -------------- -- ¶6. (C) On disarming Hizballah, Yared noted that forcible disarmament by the LAF or foreign forces was not an option. He cited a breakthrough on Sheb'a farms as a remote possibility worth pursuing, noting that an Israeli withdrawal, with sufficient security guarantees, would remove Hizballah justification for being armed. He also noted that removal of Lahoud would be an important step towards 1559 implementation, as Hizballah had reached its peak of influence and military capacity under Lahoud. If Lebanon had a new president, the more cohesive GOL could move towards targeting sources of Hizballah financing, via enforcement of existing money laundering laws on the books. Yared stressed that curbing financing was essential, and key to this would be strengthening Lebanon's judicial capacity, for instance investigative magistrates and their staffs. He cited the judicial sector as a good target for U.S. aid, and noted that Lebanon needed more than guns. Yared was not enthused about a possible arms embargo targeting Hizballah, and questioned what means of enforcement were available. COMPARING SA'AD HARIRI AND PM SINIORA -------------- ¶7. (C) Yared commented that the February 5 mob demonstrations in Ashrafiyeh left Lebanon's Christian community in shock, due to the large presence of Lebanese Sunni extremists. He described Sa'ad Hariri's return to Lebanon as having calmed the situation, and stressed that Sa'ad represented an important pole for moderation and respect for Lebanese Christians, who felt increasingly surrounded by both Shi'a and Sunni extremists. In contrast, Yared criticized PM Siniora for moving too slowly at the outset of his mandate to launch economic reforms and address security problems, while downplaying the obstacles put in Siniora's place by Lahoud and others. Yared concluded that the GOL needed a "second wind," but implied that Siniora would not be the one to provide it. ¶8. (C) On French internal politics, Yared remained confident that the end of Chirac's presidency in 2007 would not diminish French engagement in Lebanon. He described the French public and political class as emotionally attached to Lebanon's quest for independence. At the same time, he judged the Socialists and center-right/Gaullists as having different orientations in the NEA region. The socialists, historically, gave emphasis to France's strategic relations with the Maghreb, and, in Yared's view, were afraid of "burning their fingers" in the Middle East (defined as Levant/Arabian Gulf). Chirac's center-right party, on the other hand, put an emphasis on maintaining a French foothold in the Middle East to project French influence throughout the region -- hence the importance of Lebanon to Chirac's Middle East policy. COMMENT: -------------- ¶9. (C) Yared's emphasis on the need to secure SARG support for a Lahoud resignation contrasts with the uncompromisingly tough stance on Damascus he evinced in our first meeting (ref b). We did not find convincing his assertions that possible Saudi-Egyptian incentives to Damascus for a Lahoud resignation would not dilute international pressure on Syria. At the same time, while his logic may be flawed, Yared clearly seems to be a privileged interlocutor for the GOL and the Elysee, and echoed Elysee lines to an uncanny degree (ref a) on the need to enlist Saudi and Egyptian support for replacing Lahoud. End comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton