Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1347
2006-03-03 13:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

2/27 STRAW - DOUSTE-BLAZY MEETING: MAINLY MIDDLE

Tags:  PREL KPAL IS IR PARM ECON PINR UK AF FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001347 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IR PARM ECON PINR UK AF FR
SUBJECT: 2/27 STRAW - DOUSTE-BLAZY MEETING: MAINLY MIDDLE
EAST

REF: PARIS 1304

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001347 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IR PARM ECON PINR UK AF FR SUBJECT: 2/27 STRAW - DOUSTE-BLAZY MEETING: MAINLY MIDDLE EAST REF: PARIS 1304 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: UK embassy contacts described the February 27 Straw-Douste-Blazy working dinner as focused primarily on the two ministers' planned joint trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories, with no agreement on timing. Douste-Blazy wants the trip to take place before Israeli elections, reportedly against the advice of MFA advisors, while the UK prefers an April/May timeframe. UK contacts confirmed UK-French agreement on the need to insist on the Quartet conditions for the new PA government, while being "creative" on how the EU implements this policy. Other topics of discussion included Iran, with both Straw and Douste-Blazy voicing skepticism on Russian negotiating efforts, and Afghanistan, with the UK side pressing for a greater French contribution. UK contacts offered interesting tidbits on the atmospherics of the visit, describing tensions between Douste-Blazy and his MFA staff, logistical problems in finalizing the visit, and GoF pique over UK representation at a Chirac-hosted development conference. End Summary. JOINT TRIP TIMING TBD -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) UK Embassy First Secretary Tom Fletcher (strictly protect throughout),in a March 1 discussion with poloff, described the February 27 working dinner between FS Straw and FM Douste-Blazy as a success, but not quite the bonding session his embassy had hoped for. Fletcher commented that the dinner was shorter than expected, lasting just over one hour, and not allowing time to cover a wide range of topics. Discussion focused almost entirely on the Middle East, mainly a proposed joint Straw/Douste-Blazy trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Douste-Blazy was insistent that the trip should take place before the Israeli elections, while Straw advocated a late April/May timeframe, a position Fletcher said is supported by FM Douste-Blazy's MFA advisors. Fletcher reported that his ambassador (sole embassy participant in the dinner) described Douste-Blazy's senior advisors -- including MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Jean-Francois Thibault and Cabinet Middle East/UN advisor Christophe Guilhou -- as appearing visibly dismayed as Douste-Blazy spoke, in contrast to their att
entive nodding in response to points by FS Straw. Fletcher concluded that though both sides agreed to leave the trip timing open, the UK will inform the GoF in a few days that the joint trip will have to take place after the March 28 Israeli vote. Fletcher speculated that it remained possible Douste-Blazy may decide to do the trip on his own before the Israeli election; in that case, Straw and Douste-Blazy would likely pick another destination for a joint visit, possibly Afghanistan. Fletcher concluded that the HMG viewed Douste-Blazy's desire to go before Israeli elections as mainly public relations-driven. COMMON APPROACH ON HAMAS -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) According to Fletcher, Straw and Douste-Blazy reviewed the EU General Affairs Council (GAERC) discussion of Hamas which had taken place earlier that day, at which the GoF and UK took similar positions. Both sides agreed that the GAERC should have considered a full release of pending assistance to the interim PA, rather than a partial release of funds. On EU funding for Palestinians after formation of Hamas-led government, Fletcher commented that specific options weren't discussed in detail. Both sides agreed on the need to be "relentless" in insisting on the three Quartet conditions, while being "creative" in deciding on how the EU should implement this policy. Straw and Douste-Blazy agreed on the need to be creative on Hamas contacts, with Straw floating the idea of having eventual contact with Hamas-affiliated ministers who are not Hamas members (similar to Hizballah-affiliated, Lebanese FM Salloukh). UK Ambassador Holmes, at FS Straw's request, briefed the group on how the UK had sustained contact with parties in the Northern Ireland peace process. (In an aside, Fletcher commented that, based on his participation in a pre-brief for Straw prior to the Douste-Blazy dinner, he viewed his Foreign Secretary as more forward leaning on the Hamas contact issue SIPDIS than 10 Downing Street.) Fletcher concluded that neither the UK nor the GoF was contemplating contact with Hamas, though they agreed on the utility of others (especially Egypt) doing so; Straw and Douste-Blazy agreed on the need to avoid any gestures which might impact Israeli elections. (Note: In a separate discussion with Pol M/C after the Straw visit, French MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Jean-Francois Thibault described France and the UK as "on the same line" on Hamas. End note.) IRAN -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) In a brief exchange on Iran, Fletcher reported that Douste-Blazy and Straw focused on how to work the issue in the Security Council, specifically how to garner Russian and Chinese support. No specific sanctions options were discussed. According to Fletcher, Douste-Blazy and Straw expressed skepticism on Russian intentions, but agreed that the certain failure of the Russian negotiating effort would be a good prelude to moving to the SC. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) On Afghanistan, Straw urged France to contribute more to ISAF and reconstruction efforts. Fletcher reported that Douste-Blazy responded in a cursory fashion, by citing a GoF hospital project with the Aga Khan Foundation. In an aside, Fletcher commented that Douste-Blazy had departed the January London conference on Afghanistan early for unexplained reasons, making it necessary for the French MFA spokesman to deliver the minister's speech and for the MFA political director to represent France in the group picture with Karzai, PM Blair and others. Fletcher added that it was rumored that Douste-Blazy left the meeting because he had wanted to announce the Aga Khan initiative in a press conference, but the initiative was not ready yet, so the press conference was scrapped. Working-level MFA officers were later unable to give Fletcher an explanation for Douste-Blazy's early departure from the London conference, and suggested it was a bad decision on the part of the FM. ATMOSPHERICS, DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Fletcher conceded that logistics for the Straw visit were last-minute and not easy. The UK embassy had hoped for a PM Villepin meeting, which was canceled due to the PM's visit to Reunion to deal with the chikungunya epidemic. The UK side had also sought to arrange a principals plus spouses dinner with Douste-Blazy, which was discouraged by the MFA cabinet. Another complicating factor in the backdrop of the Straw visit was GoF pique over UK representation at the Chirac-hosted "Conference on Innovative Financing for Development" February 28 (reftel),for which Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown did not confirm his participation until late February 27, after the Straw dinner. According to Fletcher, the French Ambassador in London had warned the FCO that Blair's non-attendance would be a serious blow to bilateral relations. Fletcher noted that Brown attended in the end, but was stood up for an expected February 28 meeting with French Economy/Finance Minister Thierry Breton, who left him waiting and went to a last-minute parliamentary engagement, without sending anyone to receive him. ¶7. (C/NF) Comment: The conventional wisdom here is that there is a disconnect between Douste-Blazy and his career MFA staff, but nevertheless, the Elysee views Douste-Blazy as a loyal supporter and will keep him on board through the end of Chirac's term in 2007. End comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton

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