Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1344
2006-03-03 12:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

UNESCO: THE WAY AHEAD

Tags:  SCUL KPAO AORC UNESCO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001344 

SIPDIS

FROM USMISSION UNESCO PARIS

SENSITIVE

FOR IO/UNESCO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SCUL KPAO AORC UNESCO
SUBJECT: UNESCO: THE WAY AHEAD


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001344 SIPDIS FROM USMISSION UNESCO PARIS SENSITIVE FOR IO/UNESCO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SCUL KPAO AORC UNESCO SUBJECT: UNESCO: THE WAY AHEAD ¶1. (SBU) My staff and I held an off-site meeting February 14 to review the past two years of our engagement with UNESCO and to offer suggestions for the path ahead. We all agreed that we need to achieve tangible results for the USG by the October 2007 General Conference. That requires a realistic assessment of the problems and opportunities at UNESCO for the USG. The following will discuss what we face on the ground at UNESCO, USG re-engagement for the past two years, and Mission ideas on three possible scenarios for USG future engagement at UNESCO. What We Face on the Ground at UNESCO -------------- ¶2. (SBU) One problem we face is the misguided idea held by many in the Secretariat that the way to increase UNESCO's influence in the international community is ever-more new initiatives and programs, when there are other agencies responsible for those issues within the UN system. That leads to UNESCO's desire to enlarge its role in issues like sustainable development, climate, health, human rights, human security, migration, and potentially WSIS issues. It also means that UNESCO accepts all proposed extra-budgetary projects, regardless of whether or not they are related to its priorities, in order to expand its activities without having to pay for them. The same thing is true for UNESCO prizes, affiliated institutes, and centers, an increasing number of which use the UNESCO name without UNESCO financing or significant oversight. The result has been a proliferation of unfocused, ineffective, poor quality UNESCO programs, and the creation of various national institutes that try to increase their prestige by loosely associating themselves with UNESCO. ¶3. (SBU) A second problem within the Secretariat is the presence of a certain number of long-term staffers who are clearly anti-American, and who orchestrate such things as giving UNESCO's Marti prize to Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Many of these individuals work in the Social and Human Science Sector, but there are some in the other sectors as well. Other UNESCO staffers may not be explicitly anti- American, but they are anti-globalization, anti-free trade, pro-environmental regulations, pro-international law, and pro-resource transfer in the name of equity and fairness. The cultural diversity convention got a great deal of internal suppor
t from these individuals who believe that UNESCO's normative instruments can help constrain U.S. power and influence, particularly in the area of trade. ¶4. (SBU) The USG also has to deal with the multiple agendas of UNESCO's member states, many of which use UNESCO as a strategic tool to advance their own national interests through a combination of extra-budgetary support and sympathetic members of the staff. Japan and China use it to enhance their international credentials (a Japanese DG and a Chinese Chairman of the Executive Board). The UK uses it to promote its development agenda, particularly in Africa (its delegation is primarily responsible to the Department for International Development (DFID). Italy gives large extra- budgetary contributions for culture, the Nordic countries for education, and the French for cultural protectionism. Brazil wants to protect biodiversity, Hungary to promote ethics, and India to develop a UNESCO convention on broadcasting. Groups of countries also have their own agendas, such as the desire of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to use UNESCO to deal with the so- called cartoon issue. Although much of UNESCO's work is done at the technical and expert level, it is in fact a highly political organization, thanks to the activities and interests of its member states. ¶5. (SBU) Politics also drives many of the decisions of the DG. Funds are often allocated to field offices on the basis of where they are located, frequently before any work plan has been agreed on. This was true of the 11 countries chosen for the first phase of the LIFE program, the 23 countries chosen for the teacher-training program, and the countries chosen for the US-funded endangered movable objects program. Although the DG tries to be sensitive to the concerns of the U.S., he is equally sensitive to the political concerns of other countries and is therefore reluctant to exert strong leadership or take public stands that might become controversial. That problem may become worse as the DG approaches the end of his term and starts to think about his legacy. U.S. Re-engagement for the Past two Years -------------- ¶6. (SBU) When I left DC in March 2004, my primary instructions were that UNESCO should "do no harm". Unfortunately, we had to negotiate three normative instruments during our first two years at UNESCO. Despite being a young Mission with no on-site lawyer, the bioethics declaration and the anti-doping convention did no harm. We also had one major failure, the cultural diversity convention, partly because it was a top foreign policy goal for a number of UNESCO's most active member states, especially the EU led by France, and not a high priority for the USG. ¶7. (SBU) Since the USG's re-engagement with UNESCO, the Mission has also actively promoted our reform agenda. We have promoted key concepts such as programmatic coherence, and institutional transparency and accountability with both the Secretariat and Member States. We've also tried to persuade Member States that the way to gain influence and respect is not through adding new initiatives or passing conventions, but by strengthening the quality of UNESCO's programs. In addition, we've talked about the need to identify UNESCO's comparative advantage, and to avoid unintended consequences that may result from poorly thought- out programs or controversial initiatives that do not enjoy broad-based support from member states. ¶8. (SBU) Despite all the problems and challenges that exist at UNESCO, there have been some positive results during the past two years. These include an increased focus on long term sustainable results through capacity building, a mother- child focused program in literacy, cultural preservation in endangered movable objects, and leadership in the expansion of the tsunami warning system. It also includes holding the line on a zero nominal budget, positive input on the next medium term strategy, preventing normative instruments in cross-border education guidelines and traditional games and sports, and establishing an appropriate framework for UNESCO's ongoing involvement in the WSIS implementation. In addition, the USG has played a key role in enabling UNESCO to expand its programmatic work in the Middle East by brokering consensus resolutions on education and culture for Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. ¶9. (SBU) Additional positive results include the USG's election to the World Heritage Committee, its reelection to the IOC Inter-governmental Council, and its election as the Vice-President of the Executive Board. Also, more American citizens are being hired, with Peter Smith and Jim Kukilowski in key full-time positions. USG experts involved with UNESCO programs include Midge Decter on COMEST, Benita Somerfield on the Literacy Advisory Board, John Moore on the IBSP board, and Kathie Olsen on the Science Review panel. Marta de la Torre has been hired as a consultant to help provide oversight to the endangered movable objects program. ¶10. (SBU) A more detailed report has been prepared on the first two years of the USG's re-engagement with UNESCO. Additional papers are being prepared on other issues involving the USG and UNESCO. These documents should provide the background for strategic decisions that should be made as soon as possible regarding the USG's priorities for the next two years. Possible Scenarios for Future U.S. Engagement at UNESCO -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) One option might be to build on what has been accomplished since the USG's return to UNESCO. That would include a continued focus on damage control, with a particular emphasis on trying to prevent the development of new instruments, continued attempts to promote administrative and management reform, and continued efforts to strengthen selected programs, focusing on education, particularly literacy, and the opportunities that may come from the review of the two science sectors. Even with the Mission's limited resources, we could have some successes, though they would probably not significantly advance the Secretary's goal of transformational diplomacy. SIPDIS ¶12. (SBU) Another option might be to expand UNESCO's efforts in education in the Arab world, particularly in the BMENA countries. For example, UNESCO's current program in teacher training is entirely directed to sub-Saharan African countries. Yet not only is teacher training critical for post-conflict countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, it could also be the mechanism to deal with the resistance in the Arab world to efforts to change curriculum. Given the sensitivities in the Arab world on curriculum, working through UNESCO might be more effective then expanding existing bi-lateral programs in this area, especially since we have a supportive ADG for Education. The same argument could be made for programs that promote gender parity. In order to be successful with this option, the Mission would have to work closely with both the BMENA and MEPI initiatives. ¶13. (SBU) A bolder and more aggressive approach to UNESCO should also be considered, which would be to use UNESCO as a vehicle to explicitly promote a pro-democracy agenda. This strategy would tie together democracy and development, similar to what has been done with the President's Millennium Challenge initiative. We hear little about democracy at UNESCO, but much about development. By linking the two ideas, we could create a cross-cutting initiative that would encompass all sectors. It would involve reviving the education for democracy section in the education Sector, with a particular focus on curriculum, and revamping the democracy section in SHS, assuming that the Sector still exists after the Science review and that it has new leadership. It would also include incorporating the basic democracy-building work of communications and information into this democratic framework with an emphasis on programs like the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). Perhaps there could also be a focus on democracy in some of the culture sector's programs that promote inter-cultural dialogue. By stressing the positive role that democracy plays in promoting development, we might be able to change the discussion at UNESCO away from its current anti-globalization, anti-free market, and implicitly anti-American rhetoric. It could appeal to the self- interests of many of UNESCO's member states, such as the G77, and take advantage of UNESCO's leadership role in education which is fundamental to building strong democracies and strong economies. ¶14. (SBU) If there is support for this idea, we would propose the following actions: a. Use the weeks leading up to the Executive Board to shape this idea and find allies b. Establish a Community of Democracies group at UNESCO by identifying an enthusiastic member of that group who could convene a meeting c. Introduce a resolution at the Ex Board calling for a cross-cutting initiative in democracy and development, similar to what was done last year in capacity building d. Work in the coming months to give this initiative a central place in the next medium-term strategy e. Develop reinforcing projects, such as a major UNESCO conference on Education, Democracy, and Development, or making the International Centre for Democratic transition in Budapest into a UNESCO Institute f. Work closely with the National Commission to take advantage of the expertise and contacts of many of the Commissioners ¶15. (SBU) It is important that this not be seen as a strictly U.S. initiative, and we would thus propose to use the Community of Democracies (CoD) as a vehicle, possibly even asking the Malian Ambassador to take the lead since Mali has just hosted the 2006 Ministerial meeting for the CoD. Some of the other active CoD participants with strong Ambassadors at UNESCO include Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. India is a very strong presence at UNESCO and might be willing to play a role, particularly after the President's trip. Although a CoD group at UNESCO could play a critical role in helping to advance a USG pro-democracy agenda, it should not be seen as a substitute for active USG leadership in this area. ¶16. (SBU) Though we recognize that UNESCO is still a somewhat dysfunctional organization, and that there is always the possibility of serious unexpected problems, we think that now would be a good time to consider a more robust USG engagement at UNESCO. There is a lot of concern at UNESCO, both in the Secretariat and among member states, that USG enthusiasm and support for UNESCO may have been hurt by the unpleasant atmosphere resulting from the negotiation of the cultural diversity convention, and by the more recent Marti prize. Therefore, there seems to be a desire to find ways to work constructively with the U.S. Although one never knows how serious the expressions of good will are, there is no reason not to test the depth of the many expressions of support that we have received over the past several months. Moreover, although the DG may not be as strong and supportive as we would like, we do have a very good relationship with him, and we do not know who will replace him in less than four years. Finally, if we are going to want to do anything serious at UNESCO in the foreseeable future, it must be done now so that we can get our ideas and initiatives incorporated into the next medium term strategy. ¶17. (SBU) If it is decided that the USG should try to use UNESCO as a strategic tool for transformational diplomacy, it will require a close working relationship between Paris and Washington, as well as additional resources, particularly in the area of targeted extra-budgetary funding. Possible USG secondments to UNESCO staff should also be considered, along with consultants and interns. A pro-democracy agenda would also imply a more aggressive reaction to UNESCO statements, publications, and conferences that undermine democratic principles. A more active and effective UNESCO is only a positive achievement if the organization promotes programs and ideas that can be supported by the USG. It is said that the best defense is a good offense. If we do not promote our ideas, values, and principles more aggressively at UNESCO, we will continue to find ourselves playing defense most of the time, and sooner or later, USG patience with UNESCO will end. ¶18. (SBU) We do understand that there are serious budget issues in the U.S., and that there are other compelling priorities that must be dealt with by the USG. If it is not possible to strengthen USG engagement at UNESCO at this time, we will continue to do as much as we can to advance USG strategic interests at UNESCO. If that is the case, however, we should be realistic about what we can and cannot achieve at this organization. Oliver

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