Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1113
2006-02-23 12:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

UDF LEADER FRANCOIS BAYROU REVIEWS HIS CENTRIST

Tags:  PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001113 

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: UDF LEADER FRANCOIS BAYROU REVIEWS HIS CENTRIST
STRATEGY WITH AMBASSADOR STAPLETON

REF: A. A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01FEB06

B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 30JAN06

C. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 26JAN06

D. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 11JAN06

E. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 15DEC05

F. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01DEC05

G. (G) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 25NOV05

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001113 SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, AND EB DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON SUBJECT: UDF LEADER FRANCOIS BAYROU REVIEWS HIS CENTRIST STRATEGY WITH AMBASSADOR STAPLETON REF: A. A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01FEB06 ¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 30JAN06 ¶C. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 26JAN06 ¶D. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 11JAN06 ¶E. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 15DEC05 ¶F. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 01DEC05 ¶G. (G) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR 25NOV05 Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: At a meeting with Ambassador Stapleton on February 16, Union for French Democracy (UDF) leader Francois Bayrou reaffirmed "that France needs a centrist alternative" (ref B). He admitted, however, that the French persist in thinking in terms of "right and left," making it unlikely that voters in large numbers will desert the center-right and center-left parties for the center. Even so, Bayrou remains optimistic that, in the first round of the 2007 presidential election, he can do markedly better than his fourth place, 7-percent showing in the 2002 election. Bayrou pointed out that he would be the only respectable candidate (that is, not of extreme left nor extreme right) in 2007 who has "already presented himself" to the voters in a presidential contest, and said that that familiarity should count in his favor. He dismissed Poitou-Charentes region president Segolene Royal (who continues to lead in popularity polls) as "having no political influence", and predicted that the "Segolene bubble" would soon burst. He said that unless Interior Minister Sarkozy "self-destructs" (which Bayrou said,"has happened before"),Sarkozy will not be dislodged as standard-bearer of the center-right by Prime Minister de Villepin. Bayrou said that, driven by reaction to the recent urban unrest and mounting anti-Western feeling among Muslims throughout the world, potential support for Jean-Marie Le Pen (leader of extreme right National Front (FN) party) is "stronger than estimated." Bayrou said that France was "searching for its place" in both an expanded Europe (he said the rejected EU constitutional treaty was indeed "a vote against Europe") and an economically integrated world. He called the French a "political" people, as opposed to an "economic" one, with a need for a vision and leader
ship. Bayrou did not define such a vision, although he said he would be doing so in coming days. Bayrou compared France to the U.S., saying both projected "universal values while seeing themselves as unique." Although accurate in his diagnosis of French society, Bayrou was less persuasive in presenting himself as the leader capable of taking France forward. End summary. TRAVAILS OF THE CENTER -------------- ¶2. (C) Saying that "it was very difficult to make the French listen to something different," Bayrou acknowledged the difficulties facing him as he continues to pursue his longstanding dream of articulating a centrist political vision that attracts enough support to win (ref B). He was optimistic for the future, however, noting that he had just been to Israel and citing the success of the centrist Kadima party as a model. In the first round of the 2002 presidential election, Bayrou placed fourth, garnering 7 percent of the vote. Bayrou expressed determination to do just as well, if not better, in the next elections. Unfortunately, he said, French voters still identify themselves as being of the left or of the right rather than of the center. Moreover, he implied, this "crystallization" of political identification is heightened at election time, notwithstanding public opinion surveys showing that a third of the electorate in principle (32 percent) favors centrist policies over leftist (33 percent) or rightist (25 percent) policies. Bayrou said he was convinced that the French were "yearning for renewal," which would allow him to do better this time than he did last time (ref D). In addition, Bayrou asserted that the new five-year presidential term, with the presidential election followed closely by legislative elections, should produce a new electoral dynamic, one more favorable to centrist candidates with centrist policy prescriptions. EXPERIENCE A BIG ASSET -------------- ¶3. (C) Excluding the far left and the extreme right, Bayrou called himself the "only other" candidate in 2007 who will have previously competed in a presidential election. He called presidential elections in France "savage," saying press and public feel they have the right to "dismember you." At the same time, having undergone this "initiation" was necessary for achieving the status of credible contender in the eyes of the electorate. Bayrou made clear that his "having been there before," along with the electorate's possible openness to a centrist third way, should help him in the first round of the 2007 presidential election, whereas it would tend to work against the "new" presidential candidates on the center-right and center-left. (Comment: While Interior Minister Sarkozy has a long political history with which the French electorate is familiar, PM de Villepin, who has never held elective office, is viewed by some as not yet having earned his spurs. On the center-left, only former PM Lionel Jospin has run for the presidency in the past, whereas current poll leader Segolene Royal is still seen as untested. End Comment.) FIRST TIMERS WON'T GO FAR -------------- ¶4. (C) Bayrou was unequivocal in dismissing any possibility that Socialist Segolene Royal, President of the Poitou-Charentes regional council and darling of current popularity polls, might seriously compete for the presidency. He said of her that "she has no political influence;" indeed, he went so far as to say that she had "no worthwhile opinions", and that her highly-touted candidacy was backed by nothing beyond "photos." He was nearly as unequivocal about Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin's chances of dislodging Interior Minister Sarkozy as the standard-bearer of the center-right. Bayou observed that "unless Sarkozy implodes" -- to which Bayrou added, "which has happened before" (Bayrou cited as an example his defeat of Sarkozy in an early European parliamentary election) -- Sarkozy's control of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party virtually guarantees him a place in the race. (Comment: It is the conventional wisdom in contemporary French presidential politics that first-time candidates don't win. Bayrou did not comment on the chances of former prime minister Lionel Jospin, should Jospin enter the race. 2007 would be Jospin's third presidential contest. End comment.) STRENGTH OF LE PEN NOT TO BE UNDERESTIMATED -------------- ¶5. (C) Bayrou said that potential support for extreme right National Front (FN) leader (and veteran presidential candidate) Jean-Marie Le Pen was "stronger than estimated." Bayrou said that last Fall's weeks of urban unrest, involving largely immigrant, urban youths of Muslim descent, along with the current wave of anti-western feeling gripping the Muslim world and continuing economic turmoil and uncertainty, could swell the ranks of Le Pen supporters well beyond what might be admitted to pollsters. (Note and comment: A number of other experienced observers -- most recently and notably former prime minister Raymond Barre at a meeting with Ambassador on February 21 -- have also noted that Le Pen, if he qualifies to run, stays healthy, and faces conventional, lackluster establishment opponents could, as in 2002, do much better than polls might predict. End note and comment.) STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENT IS KEY REFORM -------------- ¶6. (C) Bayrou has long been among the National Assembly's most eloquent and out-spoken defenders of parliament's prerogatives against the executive. In recent weeks, Bayrou has led opposition to the Villepin government's recourse to Article 49-3 of the French Constitution, which permits the government to "engage its responsibility," absent the passage of a no-confidence vote, to put an end to parliamentary debate of its most recent package of labor reform measures(ref A). Bayrou told Ambassador Stapleton he favored a mandatory three-month deliberation period before any vote on legislation. Bayrou asserted that the Constitution needs to be amended to give parliament more of a balancing role against the executive, including a stronger role in foreign affairs issues, particularly European issues. He advocated a bicameral system, similar to the U.S., in which some of the seats would be awarded on a proportional basis. Bayou stopped well short of calling for a parliamentary system, however. He insisted that the presidency should stay as is, an office elected by universal suffrage, with the president accountable directly to the people, not to the parliament. FRENCH ALIENATED AND FRANCE WITHOUT DIRECTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Bayrou said that the popular mood was edgy and suspicious -- "the French don't believe in much anymore" -- and that this heightened the attractions of the "answers" proposed by the far left and the extreme right. He added that France was "searching for its place" in both an expanded Europe and an economically integrated world. Bayrou observed that the French, as manifested in their rejection of the proposed EU constitution last May, had "lost confidence in Europe," seeing the European project not as a source of hope, but as representing feared globalization. Notwithstanding what many pundits were saying, Bayrou also insisted that the failed referendum was in fact a vote against Europe. "France was a nation first, not a European member state," Bayrou observed. Bayrou mused that, in the past, France saw Europe as more or less synonymous with its own interests, but that that was no longer the case in the wake of successive enlargements. He castigated current French ideas for a "directoire" of larger countries. FEARS OF ISLAM AND "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" -------------- ¶8. (C) Bayrou touched on burgeoning tensions among France's different ethnic and religious groups and placed them in the context of a larger "clash of civilizations." In Bayrou's view, the war in Iraq ("a catastrophe the devil himself could not have better conceived") is largely to blame for polarizing the Muslim world against the West. The feeling that a hostile civilization is pressing in on them tempts the French to fall back on their traditional, societal values. Bayrou wondered aloud if the values of Islam and Europe were compatible, speculating that Islamic societies placed religious conformity, as represented in the Koran, over the aspirations of ordinary people. He said he feared that the chasm between those who put man first, and those who saw God above all, was unbridgeable. THE FRENCH ARE A POLITICAL PEOPLE -------------- ¶9. (C) As he often does, Bayrou insisted that the French have been exceptionally shaped by their highly conflictive history. In Bayrou's view, this has made them a pre-eminently "political people," not satisfied with mere co-existence in a national economy, but rather, intent on articulating a "project for society," founded on universal values that overcome their differences. He drew out a similarity between the U.S. and France from this, pointing out that only the Americans and French claim "universality" for their social and political ideals, while also seeing themselves as unique. He also perceived a similar French need to show leadership and be led by strong leaders. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) In his demeanor and analyses, Bayrou displayed all the stolid determination and wily cunning that have kept him in the game of French presidential politics, albeit as a perennial also-ran. His opponents, President Chirac foremost among them, along with the establishments of the center-left PS and the center right UMP would mightily like to write off Bayrou and the UDF as marginal -- and they can't quite do so. A volatile electorate, Bayrou's familiarity and effectiveness as a candidate, and his centrist (indeed, radically centrist) policy proposals could conspire, depending on who also runs in the first round of the 2007 election, to swell his 7 percent of the vote into double digits -- not enough for him to make the second round, but enough to make Bayrou's support essential for winning the second round if the two second round contenders are evenly matched. ¶11. (C) Bayrou has not yet articulated a compelling and understandable political vision for France; he must do so if he is to make himself a credible contender for the presidency. While Bayrou showed himself a remarkably astute and articulate observer of the political scene, and largely accurate in his diagnoses of the ills of French society, he was less convincing when it came to proposing what to do. When queried on the vision of France's future that he planned to put before the electorate, he merely invited the Ambassodor to pay close attention to his speeches in coming weeks. Similarly, when asked if his strategy for a centrist alternative was geared toward winning the next election or directed more toward the future, Bayrou responded that his strategy was "short-, mid- and long-term." Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Hofmann

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