MUBARAK VISIT LEAVES GOF REASSURED OF EGYPT'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/4/2016
TAGS: PREL SY LE EG KPAL IS IR IZ FR
SUBJECT: MUBARAK VISIT LEAVES GOF REASSURED OF EGYPT'S
SUPPORT ON SYRIA/LEBANON

REF: PARIS 40

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In the wake of the January 4 Mubarak-Chirac
meeting, GoF contacts described Chirac and Mubarak as on the
"same line" on Syria/Lebanon, and concluded that Egypt
remains firm in its commitment to press Syria to cooperate
with UNIIIC. Mubarak and Chirac agreed that Bashar al-Asad
must comply with the UNIIIC interview request, though he may
be given "special accommodation" based on his head of state
status. (Such accommodations, according to MFA and Elysee
contacts, could involve the interview taking place in
Damascus, or Asad answering questions in writing, subject to
UNIIIC approval.) Mubarak confirmed Egyptian willingness to
consider a GOL request to help reorganize the Lebanese
security services; EGIS Chief Solaiman will travel to
Damascus shortly to inform the SARG before traveling to
Beirut to explore options. Chirac cautioned Solaiman not to
give the impression in Beirut that he is acting as an
intermediary for Syria and make clear GOE support for Lebanon
and PM Siniora. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, EGIS Chief
Solaiman reviewed challenges facing PA President Abbas, while
Chirac called for Fatah to improve its corrupt image in
Europe by embracing reform. Mubarak was extremely negative
on Iraq with President Chirac, and even more so during a
separate January 4 meeting with PM Villepin, whom the
Egyptian president praised for his UNSC Iraq stance in 2003.
Mubarak also addressed Iran with the French PM, advising
continued patience and negotiations, and warning against
direct confrontation with Tehran. The Villepin discussion
also addressed Israeli-Palestinian issues, with Mubarak
offering praise for PM Sharon (before his illness),and
briefly addressed Darfur, about which Mubarak criticized U.S.
and UK policy. MFA contacts confirmed that the GoF did not
raise the Ayman Nour case during the Mubarak discussions,
describing this as a human rights concern not rising to the
level of a presidential visit. End summary.


2. (C) Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited Paris January
4-5, and met separately with President Chirac and PM Villepin
January 4. We discussed the visit from MFA-DAS equivalent
for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot January 5 and with
Presidential Middle East advisor Dominique Boche January 6.
The Mubarak-Chirac meeting, as expected (reftel),focused
principally on Syria/Lebanon and began with a one-on-one
discussion, for which our GoF contacts had no readout. In a
larger group working lunch which included the French and
Egyptian FM's and EGIS Chief Omar Solaiman, Chirac and
Mubarak further addressed Syria/Lebanon, as well as
Israeli-Palestinian issues, Iraq, and the 2004 Sharm al
Sheikh charter plane crash in which 133 French tourists
perished. The Villepin meeting, which came at Mubarak's
request, addressed Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Iran,
and briefly touched on Darfur. The following reports
discussions by topic:

COMMON FRENCH-EGYPTIAN APPROACH ON SYRIA/LEBANON
-------------- ---


3. (C) According to Besancenot, Chirac emerged from the
tete-a-tete with Mubarak and declared that he and Mubarak
were "on the same line" on Syria/Lebanon: the international
community must help UNIIIC complete its mission and punish
those guilty of the Hariri assassination. Chirac and Mubarak
agreed that Bashar al-Asad must comply with UNIIIC's request
for questioning, though, as a head of state, Bashar could be
afforded "different treatment," i.e. an interview in
Damascus, and should be considered a witness, not suspect at
this point. (Elysee Advisor Boche offered a slightly
different interpretation of "different treatment," which he
said could involve having Bashar answer UNIIIC questions in
writing, vice a personal interview, subject to UNIIIC's
approval.)


4. (C) Besancenot reported that Mubarak confirmed Egyptian
willingness to consider a Lebanese request to help reorganize
the Lebanese security services, conveyed during a
Mubarak-Siniora meeting on the margins of the December OIC
summit in Riyadh. Within the coming days, EGIS Chief
Solaiman would go to Damascus to explain the potential
Egyptian involvement; shortly thereafter, Solaiman would go
to Beirut to begin discussing options. In response, Chirac
cautioned Solaiman to be careful during his Beirut trip, to
closely coordinate with Siniora, and to be clear that he was
there to help the GOL, not act as an intermediary for
Damascus. Chirac added that the Lebanese public remained in
a very fragile state of mind and would follow Solaiman's
visit with great attention; while the Lebanese remained
supportive of UNIIIC, they felt that the accountability
process was proceeding too slowly while Syria continued to
act with impunity, in the face of international indifference.
As a result, Egypt must make clear its intention to support
the Siniora government and help Lebanon. Presidential
Advisor Boche welcomed the potential Egyptian assistance as a
positive development, given that the Lebanese security
capacity remained totally stripped of its capacity, in the
wake of its long-standing subservience to Syria.


5. (C) Besancenot concluded that Mubarak was very clear and
firm on Syria/Lebanon and was maintaining a line "very close"
to that of the GoF. Mubarak remained fixated on stability,
and stressed opposition to Syrian regime change. Chirac, in
response, agreed that stability was important, as was getting
to the truth of Hariri's assassination.
The GoF's priority remained making sure that its "Arab
brothers" impressed upon Bashar that he had no alternative
but to cooperate; according to Besancenot and Boche, Mubarak
reassured Chirac that he'll continue to do so.


ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN ISSUES
--------------


6. (C) Besancenot noted that EGIS Chief Solaiman led the
Chirac-Mubarak group discussion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues. Solaiman described PA President Abbas as facing
three major problems: 1) divisions in Fatah, which are
leading to security chaos and the rise of Hamas, which Egypt
was trying to keep as limited as possible; 2) the financial
crisis, linked to the interruption in World Bank and EU
programs; and 3) total absence of gestures from the Israeli
side. Chirac responded that Fatah suffered from a corrupt
image in Europe and must work to overcome this through
reform. In the separate Villepin meeting, Mubarak described
PM Sharon as a "real leader," who speaks frankly and acts
decisively. (Discussion took place before Sharon's January 4
hospitalization.) Besacenot added that Mubarak credited
Sharon with Gaza withdrawal, as well as Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon, a surprising historical slip. Mubarak also
appealed to Villepin for greater European assistance and
investment in the Palestinian territories.

DEEP PESSIMISM ON IRAQ
--------------


7. (C) Besancenot and Boche described Mubarak as uniformly
negative on Iraq. According to Besancenot, Mubarak told
Chirac he saw no solution to the Iraq crisis and predicted
that the Arab League reconciliation effort would not succeed.
Boche explained that Mubarak's pessimism on the Arab League
reconciliation effort was due in large part to his view of
the preparatory meeting in Cairo, at which Mubarak said he
had to intervene personally to press the parties to reach
minor agreements. Mubarak further advised Chirac that a
continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq would increase
terrorism and disorder, while a U.S. pullout would spur chaos
and give Iran an open door to implant itself further in Iraq.
Besancenot described Mubarak as harsher on Iraq with PM
Villepin, whom the Egyptian president commended for his 2003
UNSC speech, which he said made Villepin "a hero" in the Arab
world. Mubarak told Villepin he saw Iraq deteriorating into
a Somalia-like situation, which it was too late to reverse.
The Egyptian president further criticized the U.S. for
failure to understand Iraqi history and excessive focus on
fulfilling an artificial democratic process; Iraq needed a
harsh, just leader, not a "democratic facade." (Comment:
Neither Besancenot or Boche offered much detail on how Chirac
or Villepin responded to Mubarak on Iraq; the Elysee press
release on the visit struck a relatively constructive tone,
and noted Chirac's (not Mubarak's) view that, "despite
difficulties, the national reconciliation process must
continue." End Comment.)


DON'T CONFRONT IRAN
--------------

8. (C) Besancenot reported that Mubarak cautioned Villepin
that the international community should not confront Iran
directly, due to Iran's capacity to create problems in Syria
and Lebanon. Mubarak warned further against acting
militarily against Iran, which he said will provoke an
Iranian terrorist backlash. The best approach for the EU-3,
in the GOE view, was to remain patient and continue
negotiating with Tehran.

ANTI-U.S./UK DIG ON DARFUR
--------------


9. (C) Besancenot added that the Villepin-Mubarak discussion
briefly touched on Darfur, after the French PM asked Mubarak
to assess North Africa developments. Mubarak responded by
criticizing the U.S. and UK positions on Darfur, which he
viewed as further destabilizing the situation in Sudan.

NO AYMAN NOUR DISCUSSION
--------------


10. (C) Besancenot confirmed that the GoF did not raise the
Ayman Nour case with Mubarak. Besancenot explained that
human the GoF maintained a distinction between its human
rights concerns and political agenda with the GOE, concluding
that the issue did not raise to the level of a presidential
visit. During a Chirac-Mubarak discussion in 2005,
Besancenot recounted, Mubarak expressed annoyance with
Western support for Nour, whom Chirac admitted he had never
heard of. Besancenot, who served most recently as the French
DCM in Cairo, added that although the GoF had concerns about
the length and conditions of Nour's detention, it had
"doubts" about Nour's character, notably his questionable
finances, past fraud accusations, and murky base of Islamist
support. Besancenot concluded that there were other secular,
"new generation" oppositionists whom the GoF found much
preferable to Nour, such as figures in the Wafd party and
"Tajammu" movement.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The Mubarak visit fulfilled the GOF's priority
objective on Syria/Lebanon: keeping Arab governments (namely
Egypt and Saudi Arabia) on board and at the forefront of
international efforts to compel Syrian cooperation with its
UN obligations. The downside of such a consensus-driven
approach by the GoF remains a tendency to water down more
forceful UN action, as was observed during the negotiations
of UNSCR 1644. On non-Lebanon issues, we were struck by the
depth of Mubarak's pessimism on Iraq, which GoF contacts told
us was consistent with past GOF-GoE exchanges. The degree to
which the GoF continues to receive accolades from Arab
governments for its unhelpful past positions on Iraq may make
it all the more difficult to press France towards greater
engagement in Iraq. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Hofmann