DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES

S E C R E T PARAMARIBO 000399 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR INR DEPT FOR WHA/CAR-LUFTIG E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2016 TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PREL PGOV GY NS SUBJECT: DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED ROGER KHAN ACTIVITIES (C-AL6-00586) REF: A. SECSTATE 92995 ¶B. PARAMARIBO 039 ¶C. PARAMARIBO 043 ¶D. PARAMARIBO 285 ¶E. 05 PARAMARIBO 751 ¶F. PARAMARIBO 090 ¶G. PARAMARIBO 135 CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARSHA E. BARNES, REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d). Post presents response to reftel A. In light of the recent arrest of Shaheed "Roger" Khan, Post notes the state of flux in relationship between Khan and Desi Bouterse. ¶1. (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF DESI BOUTERSE AND SHAHEED "ROGER" KHAN'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP? Khan and Bouterse are partners in the drug trade, according to sensitive sourcing. The police suspect that Surinamese citizen Steven Douglas, the owner of local fishing and hunting store "Tacklebox"," has served as the intermediary between the two. ¶2. (S/NF) HOW AND THROUGH WHAT MEANS DOES KHAN SUPPORT BOUTERSE? WHAT CAN OR DOES BOUTERSE OFFER IN RETURN? Khan is believed to help Bouterse's financial situation by giving him the means to supplement his income through narcotics trafficking. According to a senior Surinamese law enforcement official, the dismantling of several criminal rings by the GOS through seizures, arrests, and convictions over the last two years hurt Bouterse financially and forced him to reach out to new partners, such as Khan. According to the scenario outlined by the Attorney General to the Ambassador in January, Khan had planned to support Bouterse's efforts to avoid jail time via the creation of civil unrest and possible assassination attempts. (See refs B and C). It is not clear what Bouterse can provide in return, but he likely offered Khan access to Surinamese criminal elements and structures, eased access to regular shipping to Europe for drug movement, and protection while in Suriname. Just after his arrest, Khan engaged one of Suriname's leading criminal defense lawyers, Irwin Kanhai, who is also defending Bouterse in the December 1982 murder trial. ¶3. (S/NF) IS KHAN ACTIVE IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE, AND IF SO, WHICH DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS DOES HE DEAL WITH? DOES HE MAINTAIN TIES TO ANY OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS, SUCH AS TERRORIST OR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS? WHAT FINANCES AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY DOES HE HAVE AT HIS DISPOSAL? 
 As reported in INSCR, Khan is the head of a major drug trafficking organization based in Guyana. In this capacity, he has dealt directly with Columbia drug cartels and criminal groups in the U.S. and Suriname. According to Minister of Justice and Police Chan Santokhi, Khan has conducted arms-for-drugs deals with FARC. According to sensitive sourcing, Bouterse still has connections to Eduardo Beltran, who is a major regional narcotics logistics/transportation handler currently operating out of Venezuela. Beltran reportedly travels to Suriname on a monthly basis. At the time of Khan's arrest, he was found with 33 cell phones, 2 satellite phones, and a powerful laptop, which would suggest technical sophistication. Embassy Georgetown would be better able to address his financial situation. ¶4. (S/NF) HOW OFTEN, AND WHERE, DOES BOUTERSE TRAVEL TO GUYANA? REF C INDICATES KHAN WAS LAST IN SURINAME IN JANUARY 2006, BUT ANALYSTS WOULD WELCOME INFORMATION ON HOW OFTEN HE TRAVELS TO SURINAME. According to Bouterse's public admission he travels to Guyana on a regular basis, but "keeps his travels quiet so as not to cause problems for friends." (See ref D). Over the course of the past a year, Surinamese police know of three separate occasions in which Bouterse went to Guyana. The last known Bouterse trip to Guyana was the first week of May. Bouterse has also admitted to regular travel to Brazil. According to Minister Santokhi, Khan has traveled to Suriname on a "regular basis" over the last year; police know of two Khan visits to Paramaribo in the last year. Police know that Khan has also visited Bouterse's property located near Wasjabo, a village that sits on the Corantijn River not far from the town of Apoera on the Guyanese- Surinamese border, but do not know of dates or times. Out of Washabo is likely where Bouterse crosses into Guyana, as there are no border controls in the isolated location. According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has also met with Khan in the western town of Nickerie at a property owned by NDP Parliamentarian Mohamed Rashied Doekhie. ¶5. (S) OTHER THAN THROUGH VIOLENCE, DO BOUTERSE OR KHAN HAVE ANY PLANS TO CREATE CIVIL UNREST THROUGH PROPAGANDA, RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR POLITICAL LEADERS, OR STIRRING RACIAL OR SOCIOECONOMIC TENSIONS? As the leader of Suriname's largest single opposition party (NDP),Bouterse takes full advantage of his well-organized political apparatus to publicly harangue and provoke government leaders through public speeches, protests, and parliamentary antics, often-generating significant public discussion. In fall 2005, Bouterse led a series of ineffectual political street protests demanding the government step down. (See ref E). Since then, Bouterse's NDP party has conducted a concerted and aggressive campaign to undermine the fragile majority of the governing coalitions, force new elections and form a government. (See ref F). In the context of the upcoming December murder trial, these actions are likely an extension of Bouterse's suspected efforts to create a critical mass of unrest and instability in order to force the government to end his criminal trial. Some observers portray Bouterse as a spent force, however, who would be unable to muster enough domestic support to create the level of unrest required to end the trial. There are also indications of splits within Bouterse's NDP (See ref G). These observations combined with reported cash flow problems may explain Bouterse's reported outreach to Khan for support. A few months ago, Bouterse asserted that President Ronald Venetiaan's nephew and head of Suriname's intelligence services (CIVD) Col. Johan Ceder was involved in arms-for- drugs trade with Brazilian criminal organizations. However, in this small society with its large informal sector, drug trafficking and money laundering, it is not far fetched to think that there may be a kernel of truth at root of smear campaign. According to the Attorney General, Bouterse has put out the word in an NDP neighborhood that former Minister of Trade and Industry Siegfried Gilds had brought Khan into the country to assassinate the Minister of Justice and Police and Attorney General. Gilds is under investigation for money laundering. The Attorney General categorically dismissed this possibility. For Bouterse, such a disinformation campaign serves to shift the blame and distance himself from Khan, while settling old political scores against the man who removed him as head of the armed forces in the early 1990's. If the GOS hands over Khan to the US, Bouterse may try to garner support by portraying the current government as a puppet of the US. This plan is less than likely to occur, however, as public opinion for the most part supports a Khan departure from Su riname and would backfire for Bouterse. ¶6. (C) HOW CAPABLE ARE THE SURINAMESE MILITARY AND POLICE TO QUARANTINE ANY DISTURBANCES? HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES BOUTERSE HAVE ON SURINAME'S MILITARY AND POLICE? The police are capable of containing disturbances of short- term duration and minimal scope within Paramaribo city limits. However, any large-scale disturbance involving simultaneous events around the city would likely spin out of control, with even those not aligned with Bouterse taking advantage of the situation to loot and riot. This would necessitate military intervention, but it would take significant time for police and military together to restore order in a sustained disruption scenario. There is also a history of political arson in Suriname, which places Paramaribo's many historic downtown wooden structures at risk. For events taking place outside the city, i.e. the interior, police would be unable to handle a disturbance of any significance and require immediate military assistance. It is highly questionable whether the CIVD would play a constructive role in quelling a disturbance. The CIVD has nominal responsibility for national security but is in fact used primarily for domestic political intelligence, and it is comprised of thugs and shady characters with ambiguous loyalties. That officers in the CIVD serve as a protective force for senior GOS officials is disquieting. The President and his cabinet have a habit of slow, uncoordinated public reaction to adverse events, signaling that in the midst of a significant disturbance, there could be a security vacuum as the populace vainly looks towards a plodding government for reassurance that order will be restored. Bouterse still appears to have a degree of support in the military, but it is difficult to measure. A group of roughly 10 lower ranking persons in uniform attended a Bouterse led NDP rally in late 2005 to show their support. The Commander of the Armed Forces was reportedly extremely angry at this, as members of the military members are restricted from political involvement while in uniform; the commander handed down subsequent disciplinary actions. In 2004 a Bouterse crony, LTC Hans Jannasch, was sentenced to eight years in prison by a Surinamese judge for running an ecstasy lab; Jannasch was still on the military payroll at the time, but was not active. According to the commander of the land forces, senior officers are always vigilant and watchful for the potential for growing support for Bouterse. Bouterse has little direct influence within the Surinamese police force, but his past as a two-time military coup leader and his alleged links to organized crime still intimidate police, who would plan any operations against him with utmost care. French police have recently trained the police Arrest Team on making arrest under difficult circumstances in preparation for a possible Bouterse arrest. Police and military are currently conducting joint training exercises in preparation for the December murder trial. The head of the Military Police recently requested US military police protective service training in August to train a 40-60 person military police force assigned to conduct security for the trial. ¶7. (S) WHAT IS BOUTERSE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RULING PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE PARTY (PPP) IN GUYANA? IS THE PPP SUPPORTING BOUTERSE'S EFFORTS? Post is not aware of any significant links between Bouterse and the PPP, but there have been past connections between Bouterse and the Guyanese opposition PNCR. Despite both being in the opposition at the time, in June 2004 Bouterse's NDP party and the PNCR signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) calling for a urgent and peaceful resolution to the border dispute between Guyana and Suriname. According to PNCR leader Robert Corbin, the signing was at the initiative of Bouterse. MOU discussions took place in Georgetown and in Nickerie in western Suriname. ¶8. (S) WILL EITHER GUYANA OR VENEZUELA GRANT BOUTERSE ASYLUM OR PROVIDE HIM WITH OTHER SUPPORT? IF SO, WHY WOULD THEY DO SO? Post defers to Georgetown and Caracas. ¶9. (S) DOES BOUTERSE HAVE TIES TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT MAY CONSIDER OFFERING HIM ASYLUM OR OTHER SUPPORT? It is unlikely that Bouterse would receive asylum from other governments. However, Dutch Embassy contacts maintain that Bouterse owns isolated property in northern Brazil that could be a possible hideaway. ¶10. (C) WHAT IS KHAN'S ABILITY TO HELP DESTABILIZE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE ELECTIONS? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. ¶11. (S/NF) IS THERE EVIDENCE, BEYOND POSSIBLE CONJECTURE, THAT KHAN ENJOYS SOME LEVEL OF POLITICAL PROTECTION FROM SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT AND, IF SO, FROM WHOM? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. ¶12. (S/NF) WHAT ARE THE GUYANESE GOVERNMENT'S OPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, ASSUMING THERE IS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO SO, FOR, AT A MINIMUM, CONTAINING KHAN AND HIS ACTIVITIES OR, AT BEST, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING HIM? Post defers to Embassy Georgetown. BARNES