ENGAGING NORWAY ON PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF EAID CE SU CO HA RP SO NO
SUBJECT: ENGAGING NORWAY ON PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
WORLDWIDE

REF: OSLO 1352

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4
b and d


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 31, the DCM and Pol/Econ
officers met with Tore Hattrem, Director General of the MFA's
Peace and Reconciliation Section and other members of his
team. The meeting began and intensified a dialogue on
Norwegian peace efforts in several global hot spots: Sri
Lanka, Philippines, Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan.
Norwegians provided updates in these regions and shared their
philosophical approaches to transformational diplomacy. They
welcome ever-close cooperation with us on peace and
reconciliation efforts and are particularly interested to
learn more about State's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization. END SUMMARY

A NEW OFFICE FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
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2. (SBU) The MFA's Peace and Reconciliation Section (PRS)
was formed to concentrate and apply the experience that
Norwegian officials have gained from facilitating peace
negotiation processes around the world. PRS is loosely
organized along regional lines with two to three person
groups focused on specific conflicts such as Sri Lanka,
Philippines, Colombia, Haiti, and Somalia. Due to the large
Norwegian commitment in the Sudan, work on that conflict is
kept within the regional Africa bureau (with its members
consulting regularly with their PRS colleagues). The
determination of which countries are handled more by PRS or
more by regional bureaus is made on an ad hoc basis.


3. (C) Norwegians feel that as a small country they can
often play a key role in areas where the UN or major powers
cannot easily work (or where such parties may not be
welcomed). Factors contributing to Norway' decision to
assist with conflict resolution include the targeted parties'
willingness to negotiate, a request for Norwegian assistance,
and an understanding of how Norwegian assistance will help.
The degree of involvement is dependent on where Norwegians
believe they can be most effective. For example, in Sri
Lanka and the Philippines, Norway is the lead facilitator of
peace negotiations. Alternatively, in Sudan and Colombia,
Norway is one of several co-ordinating countries. While in
Haiti and Somalia, Norway plays a supporting role providing
political reconciliation, humanitarian, and civil society
assistance.

WANTING TO WORK WITH THE U.S.
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4. (C) The PRS said they strongly value U.S. engagement,
describing the combination of Norwegian quiet diplomacy and
U.S. influence as an effective tool. They see us as having
similar values and often working in the same places. PRS
Director General Tore Hattrem noted that the U.S. and Norway
played key roles in bringing the Sudan peace agreement to
fruition and that we should continue to find areas for close
cooperation. He was particularly interested in the
development of the SCRS and the parallels between U.S.
efforts to implement transformational diplomacy and Norway's
similar approach. (Note: Other Norwegian officials also
stress that whatever our differences, both the U.S. and
Norway are transformational rather than "status quo" nations.
End Note) The MFA also works closely with other members of
the international community (including the UN, regional
multi-lateral organizations, and NGOs) on humanitarian and
development projects to facilitate peace agreement
implementation.

NORWAY'S COUNTRY SPECIFIC EFFORTS
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5. (C) SRI LANKA: Norway had hoped to leave the most recent
Geneva talks with firm dates for further discussions.
However, for several reasons (including the parties pursuit
of divergent negotiating strategies and the GSL's internal
divisions),no progress resulted. Post-Geneva, Special Envoy
Jon Hanssen-Bauer believes that violence will continue but
not lead to all out war. Norway will carefully look at GSL
and LTTE follow-on actions as they consider their next steps
(See reftel).


6. (C) PHILIPPINES: Norway has led negotiations between the
Philippine government (GRP) and the Maoist New People's Army
(NPA) since 2001. Talks are now suspended following NPA
withdrawal from a non-paper agreement. Norway is circumspect
about re-entering negotiations without commitments from both
sides. The NPA in particular needs to realize that
pre-conditions such as a change in their status as a U.S.
listed terrorist organization are not deliverable by the GRP,
and should not be used as conditions for a resumption of
negotiations.


7. (C) COLOMBIA: Norwegians are party to negotiations
between the Colombian government and the guerrilla group
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). Along with
Switzerland and Spain, Norway coordinated recent discussions
in Havana which Norwegians viewed as "disappointing" since
the parties did not seriously delve into contentious issues.
Despite coordinators prompting discussions on broad topics of
civil society participation and creating the right
environment for a peace process (i.e. halting kidnappings),
little progress was made. Coordinators agreed on a mechanism
to fund process costs and to bring in international experts
on specific issues without violating financial sanctions
resulting from the ELN being placed on the U.S terrorist
sanctions list. Norway noted Venezuela's possible desire to
play an increased role in the talks, perhaps at Cuba's
expense.


8. (C) HAITI: In Haiti, Norway's main focus has been on
political reconciliation, including strengthening political
parties. PRS emphasized that they are not a major donor or
facilitator and that Norway was concentrating its efforts in
areas where Norway may offer special expertise such as
working for constitutional reform and encouraging political
process programs to forge consensus among political forces on
how to behave in a democracy. However, they recently decided
to compliment their political reconciliation efforts with
some assistance through a Brazilian NGO working in the slums.
Norway believes stability and reconciliation requires
development deliverables among those most likely to threaten
the fragile system - slum dwellers - and is making a new,
modest contribution.


9. (C) SOMALIA: Norwegians see talks in Khartoum between
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) and the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) as positive. However, PRS expressed
pessimism over near term prospects for peace, wondering how
the international community can continue to work with this
failed state. Nonetheless, Norway plans to increase contact
with Islamists as they see the ICU developing a nationalist
agenda that may force the TFI to strike a political deal,
thereby providing some governing stability in the country.
They also plan to increase engagement with Eritrea and
Ethiopia as they see the potential for the conflict to spread
across borders through proxy armies or direct intervention.


10. (C) SUDAN: Norway is working to broaden the Darfur
Peace Agreement and support U.S. efforts to hold a
non-signatories conference. In addition to humanitarian and
long-term development assistance for the South, Norwegians
are advising the government in Khartoum and the Government of
South Sudan on capacity building to better use oil revenues.
Norway is also interested in coordinating aid and development
programs in East Sudan in support of the recent peace
agreement between East Sudanese rebel groups and the

government in Khartoum. The Ambassador will host a separate
meeting on Sudan with NGO and MFA representatives on November

16. He met separately with Development Minister Solheim to
discuss Sri Lanka and other areas on October 30.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Norwegians are active in conflict resolution around
the world and seem prepared to engage on more fronts
(provided they are invited to do so). They are also eager to
maintain close cooperation and coordination with us in areas
where we work together such as East Africa, Sudan, and Haiti.
One immediate result of our discussions was to facilitate a
phone conversation on November 3 between Norwegian
Development Minister Solheim and U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Andrew Natsios, prior to the Minister's visit to Sudan later
this month. The PRS is also interested in our philosophical
approach to conflict areas and in identifying ways to
reinforce each other's efforts. As part of this, PRS wants
to learn more about how SCRS works and would like to meet
Ambassador Herbst and SCRS either in Washington or Oslo.

Johnson