DIET MEMBER CHUMA ON LDP ELECTION: RACE IS OPEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSAKA KOBE 000332 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. PASS TO USTR/WENDY CUTLER, MICHAEL BEEMAN PASS TO INR/B COMMERCE FOR OFFICE OF JAPAN/MELCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: DIET MEMBER CHUMA ON LDP ELECTION: RACE IS OPEN Classified By: CG Daniel Russel, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cabinet Minister Koki Chuma described several scenarios for the upcoming LDP Presidential election, including one in which local LDP city and prefectural assemblymen play a deciding role in who will succeed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Chuma claimed that front-runners Abe and Fukuda, both from the LDP Mori faction, are engaged in intense politicking behind the scenes to improve their odds. Chuma said the role of the so-called Koizumi children would be greatest in a runoff in an open session of the Diet, but that FM Aso still had a chance to act as a kingmaker by throwing his weight behind either of the front-runners. Chuma was nuanced in his personal support but he characterized Abe as the candidate most likely to follow through on Koizumi's reforms. Chuma downplayed the importance of the Yasukuni issue on the PM race. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At a one-on-one lunch in Osaka June 21, Mr. Koki Chuma, Minister of State for Administrative and Regulatory Reform and LDP Dietmember from Osaka, told the Consul General that there are several scenarios for how the LDP presidency race will play out. Fukuda remains a real contender, and even Aso cannot be ruled out in the event the election goes to a parliamentary runoff. ¶3. (C) Faction leader and former PM Mori and Fukuda himself until recently held out hope that Abe could be brought along to accept the package deal whereby Fukuda, as "sempai" would serve first then yield to Abe after the 2007 Upper House elections. Now that it is clear Abe will run there is intense behind the scenes politicking within the Mori faction. Fukuda is a careful, traditionalist, methodical politician and is moving slowly while gauging his support. His personality, experience, and credentials as a veteran make him quite attractive to many LDP politicians. There is a chance he will drop out of the race, although Chuma tended to think he would stay in. Chuma confirmed that Fukuda very much wants to become PM. ¶4. (C) Chuma warned me not to underestimate the influence of the mainstream LDP veteran politicians--especially the Prefectural and City Assemblymen who act as local political fixers and have significant clout. Local LDP members will generally vote according to the "recommendations" of their local political leaders. Since Fukuda is respected by many of these LDP veterans as a reliable and steady hand, he may do well in the party election. The freshmen "children" on the other hand have virtually no influence in their districts and won't deliver many votes for Abe. Now that Mori has gotten Koizumi to agree not to come out publicly in support of Abe, the PM's influence in the party-wide election will be somewhat muted. ¶5. (C) If the vote goes to a runoff in the Diet, as seems likely, then Koizumi's "children's" votes will count heavily. In this scenario Aso's interests are served well because he has a chance to act as a "kingmaker" between Abe and Fukuda. Chuma also entertained the scenario in which Fukuda pulled out at this point but threw his weight behind Aso, who Chuma claims is respected for his business experience. Since many Fukuda followers resent Abe, and many other factions are wary of the Mori group getting a third consecutive prime ministership, this scenario is less far-fetched than it might sound, according to Chuma. Comment: Since Chuma is friends with Aso and from the same Kono faction, Chuma's comments should be taken with a grain of salt. End Comment. ¶6. (C) Koizumi definitely backs Abe, but he is not going to become a puppet-master like previous prime ministers. He himself gained power by flouting the traditional backroom deal system and is not going to play it himself. (Note: Chuma's close connection with Koizumi and cabinet positions stem from having been one of the earliest backers to encourage Koizumi to challenge Hashimoto Ryutaro for the LDP presidency in the mid '90s. End Note.) ¶7. (C) Chuma said he felt that Abe was far more likely to follow through on the reforms that Koizumi has launched (and Chuma has helped implement). He felt strongly that this was only the OSAKA KOBE 00000332 002 OF 002 beginning and the important and hard work of implementing real reforms lay ahead. At the same time he emphasized how important good Sino-Japanese relations were and was clear that under Abe the process would be harder and slower. China has gone from an economic threat to Japan (the challenger that was stealing markets and customers) to become Japan's most important market. For commercial reasons it was important to improve Sino-Japanese relations. It was also important for strategic reasons to prevent the Chinese leadership from using Japan as an external enemy and an excuse to resist reforms and democratization. That said, Abe would be able to improve relations with Beijing over time. ¶8. (C) He dismissed the Yasukuni Shrine as an issue, saying it has been "solved." When pressed for an explanation, he said that the WWII survivors group, whose votes Koizumi had sought when he initially promised to regularly visit Yasukuni, has atrophied and now has very little political clout. There is no need for the LDP to woo them. Chuma said a plan was well in the works for a secular war memorial in keeping with the Constitutional separation of church and state. Yasukuni would not be an issue for Abe, he insisted. RUSSEL