MAURITANIA WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO UNIFIL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 001003

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PTER MOPS UN UNSC IS LE MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO UNIFIL,
BUT WANTS HELP DOING SO


Classified By: AMB JLEBARON, REASONS 1.4 (b),(d)

--------------
(C) Key Points
--------------

-- In Ambassador's farewell call on junta-leader Fal August
17, Col. Fal told Ambassador that Mauritania would be
prepared to send a "symbolic contingent" as peacekeepers to
Lebanon under UNIFIL. But Mauritania would need a "sponsor"
to help train, equip, and deploy the troops.

-- Fal confirmed there would be no change in Mauritania's
Middle East policy, including maintaining diplomatic
relations with Israel, no change, that is, until the new
government came into power next year. After that, all bets
were off, Fal indicated.

-- Fal said the Israel-Palestine issue was the root problem
in the Middle East, and that its resolution could only come
through dialogue, not violence.

--------------
(C) Comments
--------------

-- Ambassador, in his three years here, has never seen a
foreign policy issue so exercise the Mauritanian mass public
as has the recent fighting in Lebanon. There is a new,
pervasive anger towards the USG and its Middle East policies,
especially among Arab Mauritanians. Afro-Mauritanians are
far less wrought up, however.

-- To counter this, Embassy has worked to explain and defend
USG policy to key Mauritanians, and in his meeting with Fal,
Ambassador praised the courage and steadfastness of
Mauritania for maintaining full diplomatic relations with
Israel.

-- The transitional government has been active, too, in
responding to this rising tide of sentiment. It recently
sent humanitarian supplies to Lebanon, and Fal made a highly
publicized telephone call to Palestinian Authority president
Abbas.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (U) On August 17, Ambassador paid a farewell call on Col.
Fal, at which the two discussed Mauritanian policy on the
situation in Lebanon and the transition to democracy
(septel). Also present were FM Ahmed Ould Sid'Ahmed and DCM
(notetaker).


2. (C) Ambassador asked Col. Fal his views on the conflict in
Lebanon. Fal responded at length, prefacing his remarks by
saying "we want to tell our friends exactly what we think, so
there is no misunderstanding."


3. (C) According to Fal, the basic conflict is
Israel-Palestine. The problem must be resolved by
negotiation; it cannot be resolved by violence, "either
inter-state or intra-state." Once all parties recognize the
only solution is a two-state solution "we are half way
there."


4. (C) The next step is to decide on borders, which once
again cannot be resolved by violence but through negotiation.
"Each square kilometer, each square meter, each zone" must
be negotiated separately if need be.


5. (C) However, the two sides cannot resolve the dispute by
themselves. They need the help of the international
community, especially the United States, but also the EU, and
Arab countries.

6. (C) All the other conflicts in the region are
"collateral", including the Lebanon conflict, to the
Israel-Palestine conflict. None of these conflicts can help
in the basic problem but can only aggravate the situation.
And fr"ces that do not have a direct interest in the cenrral

NOUAKCHOTT 00001003 002 OF 002


issue, especially Iran, will use the situation for its own
ends. However, if the Israel-Palestine issue were resolved,
the extremist groups and their backers would have no more
cards to play. However, there are no winners in this latest
conflict, neither Israel nor Lebanon or for the Arabs or for
the allies.


7. (C) Ambassador then asked if Mauritania was planning to
offer troops to UNIFIL (Note: this was rumored recently in
the press). Fal answered that in principle, Mauritania is
willing to send a "symbolic contingent" to Lebanon, but does
not have the capacity to train, equip, and deploy the troops
on its own. It would need a "sponsor" to do so.


8. (C) FM Sid'Ahmed seemed to be particularly interested in
this point, leaning forward to hear exactly how the junta
leader would respond. He did not broach the matter during
the Ambassador's follow on farewell call to him later that
day. He did say, however, that he intended to call Israeli FM
Tzipi Livni in the next few days.


9. (C) He reiterated the transitional government's
determination to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.
He added that this issue would no doubt be an early subject
of discussion for "the new democratic government," adding
that, while it is easy to criticize when one is in the
opposition, once in power, these matters become harder to
resolve.
LeBaron