TURKISH CYPRIOT OWN GOAL: TRADE IN POTATOES

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000977 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USAID/E&E STUDZINSKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016 TAGS: ETRD EAID PREL PGOV ECON CY SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT OWN GOAL: TRADE IN POTATOES THROUGH LIMASSOL BLOCKED BY "TRNC" AUTHORITIES, TURKEY Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SCHLICHER. REASONS 1.4. (B) AND (D). ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 3 and 9. Summary and Comment -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Turkish Cypriot authorities and Turkey intervened June 23 (two days before important local elections) to kill a USAID contractor-facilitated deal that would have sent 2,000 tons of Turkish Cypriot potatoes to a European buyer through the Greek Cypriot port of Limassol, apparently out of misplaced concern that trade through the south would undermine efforts to get the EU to remove restrictions on the use of Turkish Cypriot ports. The deal, had it gone through, would have opened up a new lucrative market, permitting Turkish Cypriots to sell their entire stock of surplus potatoes at nearly three times the price currently available, and possibly pre-sell all of next year's crop. In February, Turkish Cypriot authorities acted to block a more modest "test" shipment of valencia oranges. (Note: the EU Green Line Regulation does not permit Turkish Cypriot citrus or potatoes to enter the EU if shipped from Turkish Cypriot ports. End note.) Turkey has reportedly promised to compensate the Turkish Cypriots for the loss of sale of the entire potato and citrus crops (much of the citrus had simply been left to rot on the trees for lack of buyers),although presumably at below full market price. The GoC Presidential Administration, which bent over backward to make the deal go through, can be expected to exploit this development to argue that Greek Cypriot ports could fully meet Turkish Cypriot needs if only given the chance and to stress that the Turkish Cypriots are motivated by a separatist political agenda. ¶3. (C) The Turkish/Turkish Cypriot action is a gross miscalculation that will only play into the GoC,s propaganda machine and serve to further isolate the Turkish Cypriot community. It will also slow down efforts by the EU to expand the scope of new products, such as fish and honey, allowed across the Green Line. While we have learned never to underestimate the Turkish Cypriots, ability to shoot themselves in the foot, this example is especially egregious. It fits a pattern of refusing to take small (or in this case large) positive steps unless all their political demands are met and focusing not on the actual merits of a case, but what the Greek Cypriot reaction to it might be. Post recommends that the Department ask Embassy Ankara to intervene with key GoT interlocutors to urge them to butt out and allow this and similar deals to go through and to encourage the Turkish Cypriots not to pursue a policy of self-isolation. End summary and comment. Citrus Deal Killed in February -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In February, after protests by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, Famagusta port workers and the Turkish Cypriot Truck Drivers Union, Turkish Cypriot authorities instructed the "semi-state" Cipruvex citrus packing house to refuse to pack a small "test" shipment of Valencia oranges bound for the UK via the Greek Cypriot port of Limassol. The deal was being facilitated by a USAID contractor that had identified the buyer as part of its efforts to find new markets for Turkish Cypriot products. While Turkish Cypriot citrus cannot legally be exported to the EU if shipped from Turkish Cypriot ports, Turkish middlemen frequently buy it on the cheap, re-label it as Turkish and sell it to the EU at a hefty premium. Shipping citrus through Limassol would mean that Turkish Cypriots would eliminate the Turkish middlemen and keep most of the profit for themselves. It would also significantly increase overall sales. Despite our repeated demarches on the benefits of opening new markets, no new deals could be worked out before the end of citrus season, leaving thousands of tons of citrus to rot on the trees for lack of buyers. You say Potato... -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Since different varieties of potatoes are grown in Cyprus and Turkey, the only way to sell Turkish Cypriot potatoes to the EU is through Greek Cypriot ports (i.e., it is much more difficult to get away with labeling Turkish Cypriot potatoes as Turkish). Cypriot potatoes are also attractive in Europe because the harvest in Cyprus is several weeks before the European harvest, creating a brief window during which Cypriot potatoes command prices almost three times the level that Turkish Cypriot producers can get in Turkey. Potato production in north Cyprus has also declined in past years because of lack of buyers, meaning that production could be quickly increased to fulfill new demand. As a result, two Turkish Cypriot businessmen, one with the help of the USAID contractor and one with the help of a Greek Cypriot partner, were able to identify European customers willing to purchase the entire surplus Turkish Cypriot production. This year the north produced around 9,000-10,000 tons of potatoes, around 4,000-5,000 of which were consumed domestically. According to the USAID contractor, if the quality of the potatoes proved acceptable, the buyers were willing to pre-purchase entire future harvests. ¶6. (C) In early June, the Turkish Cypriot "Council of Ministers" decided to provide export subsidies for sale of potatoes regardless of whether Greek Cypriot ports were used (although the subsidy would be even higher if the potatoes were shipped through Famagusta or Kyrenia). On June 17, however, Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce President Erdil Nami, who is close to the "government", mobilized opposition to the deals by reporting their existence to the press and claiming (inaccurately) that only Greek Cypriot trucks would be used. (Note: under EU rules, the Chamber must issue certificates of origin for any goods crossing the Green Line. End note). Two members of the Chamber's board, including a Vice President, led a small protest (around 18 people) which temporarily stopped all work at the potato packing house. As a result, the sellers came under intense pressure from nationalist groups to stop the deals, and reportedly even received death threats. On June 21, one seller reported to us that he had received a phone call from "Agricultural Minister" Oztoprak asking him to delay the shipment until after the June 25 local elections, to which he agreed. On June 23, however, Oztoprak called him back to report that he had just received a call from "AnkQa" asking him to kill the deals. In return, Turkey would compensate the Turkish Cypriots for the potatoes and citrus it had been unable to sell. As a result, the seller decided not to go forward. We were unable to reach the second Turkish Cypriot businessman but understand that he has also dropped his plans to export potatoes to Europe but may still be trying to find a Greek Cypriot buyer. ¶7. (SBU) For its part, the GoC Presidential Administration went uncharacteristically out of its way to help make the deal go through. It was willing to make an exception to its politically-motivated restrictions on the use of Turkish Cypriot commercial vehicles to enable the potatoes to be transported to Limassol in Turkish Cypriot trucks. It was also willing to expedite inspections at the checkpoints and permit the use of the unauthorized Strovilia crossing point to cut down the distance the trucks needed to travel. Whether the GoC would honor its commitments, however, was never tested. Costs to Turkish Cypriots High -------------- ¶8. (C) The costs to the Turkish Cypriot community of blocking such deals are high. The Turkish Cypriots lose: -- Commercially. Important new commercial opportunities have been lost, at least for now. The period that Cypriot potatoes can demand high prices in Europe ends this week. The Turkish Cypriot community remains dependent on Turkey and Turkish middlemen for its exports of citrus and potatoes. The amount of money they receive from Turkey will assuredly be only a fraction of what Turkish Cypriot businesspeople could earn by selling their products directly to Europe. The Turkish Cypriots also lose any chance that the EU will expedite approval for new products such as fish or honey to cross the Green Line. This is especially damaging in the case of fish, where demand in the south is high. Gaining approval for these products is time consuming and labor intensive and the EC does not want to go forward if the Turkish Cypriots are likely to prevent full trade in these goods. Stopping this trade also hurts Turkish Cypriot traders' reputation in Europe, making it harder for them to find buyers in the future, should trade in potatoes and citrus (or other products) not be blocked. -- Politically. The main rationale for killing the deal appears to be a fear that using Greek Cypriot ports will undermine the viability of Turkish Cypriot ports and Turkish/Turkish Cypriot efforts to convince the EU to eliminate all restrictions imposed on the use of ports in the north. The EU, however, is well aware that the Turks and Turkish Cypriots themselves blocked the deal and not the Greek Cypriots, and the European Commission plans to report this in its July public report on implementation of the Green Line Regulation. Rather than convincing the EU that it should act to approve its long-delayed "direct trade" measures, blocking these deals is only convincing previous sympathetic European Commission officials that the Turkish Cypriots are not worth bothering with. By blocking trade, the Turkish Cypriots are perversely supporting GoC claims that Turkish Cypriot isolation is self-imposed and that Greek Cypriot ports could satisfy all of the Turkish Cypriot community's needs, if just given the chance. Action Request -------------- ¶9. (C) We will continue to press the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and Turkish Cypriot officials, encouraging them not to isolate themselves or hinder our efforts to foster their economic development by finding new markets for their products. Post recommends that the Department ask Embassy Ankara to make similar demarches to their interlocutors, adding the point that playing such games on Turkish Cypriot trade issues is also likely to further sour the atmosphere of this fall's review of progress in Turkey's EU accession process. SCHLICHER