TURKISH CYPRIOTS SCHLEP TOWARD JUNE 25 ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000935

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UN TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOTS SCHLEP TOWARD JUNE 25 ELECTIONS

REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 1869


B. NICOSIA 203

C. LIBBY-INGMANSON EMAIL (5/8/06)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Turkish Cypriots go to the polls on June 25
to elect "mayors" and councils in all 26 of the north's
municipalities -- and to fill two empty seats in the "TRNC
Parliament." Having been to the polls four times since 2003,
however, most voters are unenthusiastic about these
elections. Those who bother to vote at all will likely base
their choices more on parochial concerns such as traffic and
local governance than on grand political questions like the
Cyprus problem. Still, some observers expect this election
could serve as a referendum on the policies of the ruling
coalition, lead by the CTP of "President" Talat and "PM"
Soyer. This could be bad news for pro-settlement forces,
whose post-Annan referendum honeymoon is definitely over, and
whose record on many bread-and-butter issues is decidedly
mixed. Although there is a theoretical possibility that the
CTP could lose its majority in the legislature, it faces a
fractious and lackluster opposition -- and therefore seems
likely to hold its own, or even improve its standing
"nationally" and locally. Although a strong CTP showing
could prompt a reshuffle of "government" agencies or
"cabinet" portfolios, these elections are unlikely to produce
any significant changes in the Turkish Cypriot approach to
the Cyprus problem, which is increasingly informed by public
frustration and anger, and increasingly less concentrated on
public expressions of support for the reunification agenda.
END SUMMARY.

ELECTION FATIGUE
--------------


2. (SBU) The "TRNC" will hold elections for all 26 of the
north's municipalities on June 25. At the same time, voters
in Nicosia and Kyrenia will select "MPs" for two empty seats
in the "TRNC" legislature -- one which was left vacant by
Mehmet Ali Talat when he was elevated to the "presidency" in
April 2005, and another which has been empty since the death
of Kyrenia "MP" and leading opposition figure Salih Miroglu
later that year (ref a).


3. (C) Having gone to the polls four times since 2003 (twice
for "parliamentary" elections, once to select a "president,"
and once to vote on the Annan Plan),most Turkish Cypriot
voters are uninterested in the current campaign. Local
observers expect turnout to be low as a result. Party
activists from all sides agree, adding that the current sense
of deadlock on the Cyprus problem and resignation over the
north's continued "isolation" has sapped most of the
enthusiasm from the Turkish Cypriot body politic.


4. (C) Nonetheless, the three largest parties (the ruling CTP
of Talat and Soyer, the opposition nationalist UBP, and the
junior coalition partner DP of "FM" Serdar Denktash) are
trying to energize their supporters and woo undecided voters
with campaign rallies, get-out-the vote events, and
advertisements and debates in the mass media. Most smaller
parties are either too cash-strapped to field any candidates,
or are focusing their efforts on dark-horse hopefuls in
specific districts. Only the CTP, DP, and UBP are thought to
be serious contenders in these polls.

THE PLAYERS
--------------


5. (C) The CTP, which is in a strong position in the current
parliament and controls the three largest municipalities,
hopes to by pick up both parliamentary seats and win control
of some medium-sized and rural municipalities, where the
party has traditionally done poorly. To do so, it will have
to contend with more than just frustration over the apparent
Cyprus problem stalemate -- a frustration that has deepened
since the strong showing of "hard-line" forces allied to
President Papadopoulos in ROC elections last month, and that
could deepen further with the looming the EU-Turkey showdown
expected later this fall. The CTP also faces general
dissatisfaction over its performance on bread-and-butter
issues of daily governance. The depreciating Turkish lira,
continued labor unrest in the public sector, unpopular
education reform, poor public services, rumors of cronyism
among certain CTP officials, and even the high rate of
gruesome traffic deaths on "TRNC" roads have combined to put
a definite end to the honeymoon the CTP enjoyed in the
afterglow of the Annan Referendum and Talat's election as
"president." CTP insiders are confident that they have the
best slate of candidates and the strongest policy platform,
but nonetheless worry that if the elections are perceived as
a referendum on their performance, they may suffer.

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6. (C) The opposition UBP -- which controls a majority of
"TRNC" municipalities and has 17 "MPs" -- is the north's
second largest party. UBP leaders smell blood, but may be
unable to take advantage of CTP's weaknesses. The party's
fresh-faced new leader Huseyin Ozgurgun (ref b) has not
stirred popular imagination as his political patrons in the
party machine had hoped. The UBP has been unable to erase
its image of incompetent cronyism, earned through decades of
government under Rauf Denktash. Ideologically, the UBP
offers little beyond general platitudes about the need for a
"center-right, liberal, patriotic" alternative -- and
constant criticism of Talat for his inability to solve the
Cyprus problem. Finally, the party no longer enjoys much
moral or financial support from Turkey, whose AKP government
is reportedly furious at the UBP (ref c) for opposing the
"TRNC's" new property compensation and restitution scheme.


7. (C) Serdar's DP, while officially in coalition with the
CTP, is running its own candidates for parliament and in most
municipalities. While the party is thought to have little
chance of improving its current standing, DP still hopes to
outperform the much-larger UBP and emerge from these
elections as the ascendant power on the political right.
Most observers dismiss this as a fantasy, however, since the
party's ideological vision is even fuzzier than that of the
UBP. Furthermore, the public's tendency to associate the
party with the personal ambitions of Serdar Denktash makes it
difficult for the DP to raise money, develop a proper
grassroots infrastructure, or appeal to a broader range of
voters.

THE BATTLEGROUNDS
--------------

Nicosia


8. (C) The race for Nicosia "mayor" has turned out to be the
tightest, most high-stakes campaign this year. The "mayor"
is not only the boss of the north's largest city and capital;
he is also the only Turkish Cypriot elected official (besides
Talat) who enjoys any institutional recognition abroad.
Since the "Nicosia Turkish Municipality" predates the 1974
war, the "mayor" enjoys the grudging acceptance of ROC
officials (who have worked with him and his predecessors in
joint UN- and U.S.-sponsored projects such as the Nicosia
Master Plan) and a generally higher profile than most other
Turkish Cypriot politicians. Incumbent CTP "Mayor" Kutlay
Erk has taken advantage of this position to develop his own
image as a globe-trotting statesman. He serves as his
party's foreign affairs spokesman and travels abroad
frequently, especially to key European capitals. Indeed, he
has in effect become a rival "foreign minister" to Serdar
(whom Talat and Soyer only trust with symbolic policy table
scraps like OIC meetings and relations with Azerbaijan or the
Gambia).


9. (C) Erk's rivals have taken advantage of the widespread
perception that he is uninterested in the day-to-day aspects
of his job; they have criticized the abysmal state of
municipal trash removal, the increasingly frequent traffic
jams, and the city's underdeveloped infrastructure. Erk's
efforts to woo voters (by installing bizarre and expensive
public sculptures, ordering a last-minute frenzy of street
improvements, or giving tea sets to elderly ladies on
Mother's Day) have been widely ridiculed, and not just by his
opponents. CTP members, including Erk himself, acknowledge
that he faces the toughest race of any major CTP candidate.
Although Turkish Cypriot polls are notoriously partisan, the
best data available suggests Erk will probably squeak through
to victory. But with his support hovering around 40 percent
and his rivals gaining on him, this is not a sure thing.


10. (C) Erk's hopes for victory rest on the assumption that
his two most serious challengers will split the Erk-hating
right (as well as more apolitical mainstream voters who want
a change) down the middle. Erk's closest challenger, former
UBP Mayor Semi Bora (whom Erk beat by only a few hundred
votes in 2002),is a familiar face to most voters. But polls
suggest that has failed to ignite much enthusiasm, with the
most reliable figures showing his support in the low thirties.


11. (C) DP candidate Cemal Bulutogullari is a more colorful
figure with a colossal ego. Currently polling in the
mid-twenties, he is nonetheless gaining fast on both Bora and
Erk. Bulutogullari is well known from his time as chairman
of the popular Cetinkaya football side, and is pouring
significant amounts of his own personal wealth into the
campaign. (He is in the construction and asphalt business,
but is rumored to have many dirty dealings on the side --
including some with Serdar). His outrageously expensive
campaign promises strain credulity, however, and his shady

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image is a liability in the eyes of many voters. Although
some Turkish Cypriots think Bulutogullari could enjoy a
last-miunte surge and be first past the post, most observers
feel that only a last-minute withdrawal could unify the
anti-Erk vote. Since neither of the rival parties on the
right seem ready to bow out in favor of the other, however,
Erk appears to be headed for an underwhelming victory.

Famagusta, Kyrenia and Elsewhere


12. (C) CTP incumbents in the north's second and third
cities, Famagusta and Kyrenia, are set for more comfortable
victories, according to most polls. Famagusta "Mayor" Oktay
Kayalp enjoys a reputation for competent governance, and his
city has been riding a wave of prosperity thanks to
remittances from residents working in the south (and
therefore finally paying their taxes and water bills) -- and
to the ripple effects of skyrocketing enrollment at
Famagusta's Eastern Mediterranean University. Kayalp's
surprisingly good relations with the Greek Cypriot refugee
community (he has facilitated the celebration of Orthodox
religious ceremonies in Famagusta),visible love for his job,
and apparent lack of higher ambition make him a clear
favorite over the lackluster no-names running for UBP and DP.


13. (C) Kyrenia "Mayor" Sumer Aygin is far less popular than
Kayalp, and at one point the CTP considered dumping him as
their candidate in the city. Under Aygin, the Kyrenia
municipality has done a poor job at keeping up with the
demands of the north's recent property boom -- which has been
largely concentrated in and around the city, and placed an
unbearable strain on municipal water, waste, and traffic
infrastructure. Aygin has also suffered from several
hare-brained initiatives, including his decision to import
dozens of expensive date palms from Egypt to decorate one of
the city's main thoroughfares. Victims of some kind of
date-palm alopecia, the leafless trees are forlornly
scattered along the highway and serve as a focal point for
dissatisfaction with Aygin. Nonetheless, Aygin is still
favored to win thanks to his anemic competition. With all of
their best local talent either already in "parliament" or
dead, neither the UBP nor DP appear able to pluck what should
have been low-hanging fruit in Kyrenia.


14. (C) Outside the biggest three cities, however, the right
wing is likely to do much better. In addition to enjoying
the benefits of incumbency (the UBP controls the vast
majority of small- and mid-sized municipalities),rural and
small-town voters are generally thought to be more receptive
to the nationalist message of the UBP and DP. The "mayors"
of Morphou and Lefke are both popular -- and considered
competent managers -- who enjoy the added benefit of not
being associated with Talat's disappointing performance. CTP
will be happy to "hold its own" in constituencies like these,
according to one party insider, who anticipates trouble
making much progress against incumbents in the hinterland.

Parliament


15. (C) With 23 out of 50 "MPs," the CTP is hoping for a
clean sweep in both open seats. This would theoretically
enable the party to ditch Serdar in favor of a smaller
coalition with the more solidly pro-solution, pro-EU BDH, a
one-man show currently represented in "parliament" by the
erratic Mustafa Akinci. It might also allow CTP the option of
forming a "government" alone, with the support of defectors
from the UBP or DP. (At least a handful of members from both
parties can always be relied on to bolt if offered sufficient
rewards, such as a cabinet slot). A less likely scenario
would involve either the UBP or DP winning at least one seat
-- opening up the mathematical possibility of a shaky
coalition against a 24- or 23-member CTP.


16. (C) The latter scenario seems unlikely, however, since
polls show the CTP poised to win both seats. "Minister" of
Youth and Sports Ozkan Yorgancioglu is representing the party
for Talat's old Nicosia seat. His most notable competition
is the former Chamber of Industry President, Salih Tunar, who
is running on the DP ticket as a technocratic outsider. An
otherwise pleasant fellow with pragmatic, center-right,
pro-business instincts, Tunar is nonetheless running behind
in the polls. He lacks the ambition and charisma to win the
race, and the DP party infrastructure that supports him
cannot compete with the CTP's well-financed campaign machine.
In Kyrenia, the CTP's Gulboy Beydagli faces even less
serious competition from underfinanced UBP and DP challengers.

MINOR RESHUFFLE POSSIBLE, EARTHQUAKE UNLIKELY
--------------


17. (C) In the highly-centralized "TRNC," municipalities
have limited power of their own, and are largely reliant on

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financial transfers from the "state" and mainland Turkish
project assistance. Whoever wins at the local level, the
CTP-DP "government" will continue to call the shots on most
important questions. For the opposition, this election is
mainly about bragging rights; the UBP and DP are at least as
eager to best each other as they are to beat CTP. Their
rivalry for preeminence on the political right is deepened by
the personal hatred between Serdar and the neophyte Ozgurgun
(who was in the DP until he divorced Serdar's sister-in-law).
It appears unlikely that the parties will decide to join
forces -- either in the last moments of the campaign or in
"parliament" afterwards. Although an electoral defeat this
year would not oust Serdar as leader of the DP, it could
prompt an eventual leadership change in the UBP.


18. (C) In any case, a continuation of the current coalition
is the least bad option for both CTP and DP. No matter who
wins the two open seats, the CTP-DP duo will remain a
mathematically stable majority of at least 30, and the CTP
and DP are more "comfortable" with each other than with any
other possible partners. Despite the frequent public
flare-ups between "PM" Soyer and "DPM" Serdar involving
theological differences over the Cyprus problem, the two men
have developed a "live-and-let-live" approach to government.
CTP insiders admit that in exchange for giving Serdar the
prestigious posts of "Foreign Minister" and "DPM" (as well as
allowing him to control the lucrative casino licensing and
regulatory authorities under the "Ministry of Economy and
Tourism"),the CTP enjoys a free hand in all other matters of
government.

19 (C) Assuming they win both open seats, however, sources
close to Soyer say he is contemplating a re-negotiation of
the current coalition deal to reflect CTP's increased
advantage over Serdar. CTP might try to take over one of the
DP's three "cabinet ministries," said one CTP member. Serdar
is unlikely to give up either "Foreign Affairs" or "Economy
and Tourism" -- especially since he is rumored to have
promised Tunar stewardship of the latter as a reward for his
quixotic run for "parliament." This leaves the "Agriculture
Ministry" as a possible bargaining chip. More likely,
according to some CTP insiders, is a reshuffle of sub-cabinet
agencies -- for example, giving CTP control of the
electricity authority, which is currently supervised by the
DP "Minister" of Agriculture.

COMMENT
--------------


20. (C) These elections should have little immediate impact
on U.S. interests, although there are some areas we will
watch closely. Should CTP lose control of Nicosia to a more
nationalistic "mayor," USG-supported programs such as the
Nicosia Master Plan could run into difficulties. Other
initiatives like the stalled Ledra Street crossing might be
put on ice for good. CTP victories in "parliament" could be
good news, especially if the (presumably) less corrupt and
obstreperous CTP uses its new strength to take control of
some "ministries," offices, or regulatory bodies currently
run by the DP.


21. (C) Although local issues seem to have dominated the
campaign thus far, the election will nonetheless be a
mini-referendum on Talat's Cyprus policy. Talat always keeps
one nervous eye on his increasingly frustrated voters when
deciding how flexible to be in his dealings with the EU and
UN. This insecurity in recent months has led him to focus
publicly not on the vision of reunification, but on more
nationalistic themes and the "blame game" vis-a-vis
Papadopoulos and the Greek Cypriot community. Punishment in
these elections could undermine his ability to stand up to
Ankara, which has reportedly pressed him to take a harder
line on EU aid and UN-brokered technical talks. An electoral
setback may also discourage him from showing the creative
flexibility he will need in the longer term if settlement
talks resume in earnest. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER