EUR/SE DEPUTY DIRECTOR BAXTER HUNT'S MAY 8-9

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000766 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016 TAGS: PROG SUBJECT: EUR/SE DEPUTY DIRECTOR BAXTER HUNT'S MAY 8-9 CYPRUS VISIT REF: A. A. NICOSIA 352 ¶B. B. NICOSIA 113 ¶C. C. NICOISA 476 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. EUR/SE Deputy Director Baxter Hunt visited Nicosia May 7-9 and held meetings with key Cypriot POLITICAL and business figures in both the north and the south. On the Greek Cypriot side, AKEL Spokesman and Foreign RELATIONS Secretary Andros Kyprianou and DISY Deputy Leader Averof SIPDIS Neophytou predicted strong showings for their respective parties in the May 21 parliamentary elections. Both outlined specific shortcomings of the Annan Plan and made clear that even referring to the Plan in public was politically dangerous given the "demonization of the term by the Papadopoulos administration." With his Greek Cypriot interlocutors, Hunt stressed the need to strengthen the economy of the north in order to help the Turkish Cypriot community distance itself economically and politically from Ankara. Kyprianou and MFA Cyprus Question and EU Affairs Director Ambassador Erato Marcoullis agreed, but rejected any effort in this direction that amounted to "advancing the economy of a state." ¶2. (C) In the north, "President" Talat's Undersecretary Rasit Pertev stressed Turkish Cypriot disappointment at the lack of progress towards a solution as well as growing reservations about the UN's role. Erkut Sahali, Private Secretary to the "TRNC Prime Minister" predicted that SIPDIS municipal and parliamentary bi-elections in June would not undermine the ruling CTP's pro-settlement policies or its grip on power. Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industry expressed frustration with trade restrictions on the north's economy and called on the United States to take the lead in easing Turkish Cypriot economic isolation. End Summary. ROC Elections and Beyond ¶3. (C) AKEL spokesman Andros Kyprianou began by outlining the party's expectations for the May 21 parliamentary elections. AKEL considered winning at least 30 percent of the vote "to be of vital importance." DISY and DIKO, of course, would use "all means necessary" to improve their positions. This was particularly true for DISY, who want to increase their numbers to form a government coalition to exert pressure on the President and alienate AKEL. Even so, Kyprianou expected AKEL to maintain its position and again win the largest percentage of the vote. Kyprianou noted that even in a campaign focused largely on domestic issues, the parties would seek to use their handling of the Cyprus issue to build support. AKEL, for example, was basing its campaign largely on its advocacy for a Cyprus settlement. The party firmly backed the technical talks agreed to in Paris by President Papadopoulos and UNSYG Annan, but believed the parties should discuss issues of POLITICAL significance as well as matters of daily life. Kyprianou noted that after the elections, AKEL planned to focus on preparing the ground for the beginning of negotiations by 1) continuing its dialogue with the north's ruling CTP party and 2) increasing its sponsorship of and participation in bicommunal events. Improving strained RELATIONS with CTP was particularly important. ¶4. (C) DISY deputy leader Averof Neophytou was more careful in speculating on the election outcome. DISY was prepared to take an electoral hit if it meant advancing the prospects for reunification. AKEL, in contrast, was prepared to set back efforts to negotiate a settlement in pursuit of votes. Neophytou noted his party's disappointment at the way in which President Papadopoulos "used the international community" and "misleadingly represented the February Paris talks as an initiative towards the island's unification, when in actuality the talks did not serve the ROC's interests." Neophytou also expressed his party's hopes that new efforts towards a settlement would begin after the election. The future of the settlement was, he maintained, directly linked to the outcome of the May 21 vote. Annan Plan: In ROC, Guilt By Association ¶5. (C) All of our Greek Cypriot interlocutors outlined their main objections to the Annan Plan, including: security, property, the number of settlers who would be allowed to remain, the failure of the guarantor system, the right of return, and the lack of clear, enforceable assurances that the plan would be implemented as agreed. Still, the MFA's Cyprus Question Division Director Erato Marcoullis began her meeting with Hunt by expressing her optimism with regard to the future of the Cyprus issue. Marcoullis was strongly critical, however, of the UN's handling of the last round of negotiations and the UNSYG's "misuse" of his arbitration authority. Because of the way in which the negotiations were handled, the Greek Cypriot public came to see the Annan Plan as an imposed solution analogous to the 1960 treaties of guarantee that established the discredited guarantor system. ¶6. (C) Neophytou pointed out that his party had suffered dearly for its "Yes" vote in the Annan Plan referendum. DISY supporters had been labeled "traitors" and had been accused of forming a coalition with the "Anglo-Americans" and Turkey. For this reason, he noted, his party "cannot publicly support the Annan Plan." Although he is willing to acknowledge privately that the Plan remained the only viable basis for reunification, Neophytou observed that President Papadopoulos and his supporters had successfully demonized the Plan to the point where it was now POLITICAL poison. In terms of future settlement efforts, Neophytou recommended that: 1) the "Annan" name should be removed from any plan; 2) there should be no future "Yes/No" referenda, and 3) the Greek Cypriot public should be reassured that the EU was playing a central role, even if it was not. He explained that Greek Cypriots have a tendency to show defiance to the international community as a symbol of patriotism, and majority "No" votes in such scenarios are generally viewed as a national triumph. The power and purity of "NO" or "OXI" was deeply ingrained in the Greek psyche, witness the national celebration every October 28 of Metaxas' rejection of Mussolini's ultimatum on "OXI" Day. Economic Development for Turkish Cypriots, But Not "TRNC" ¶7. (C) With his Greek Cypriot interlocutors, Hunt stressed the importance of building up the Turkish Cypriot economy and enabling Turkish Cypriots to distance themselves politically and economically from Ankara. Kyprianou was quick to point out AKEL's support of the 259 million euro EU aid package for the Turkish Cypriot side. AKEL would, however, insist that any international trade with Turkish Cypriot firms be conducted through "legal harbors" (in the south). The Greek Cypriots also had a "sensible" proposal on the table that would legitimate trade through Famagusta. While expressing his support for Turkish Cypriot economic development, he also underscored AKEL's concern that if the north became economically self-sufficient, the Turkish Cypriot side would lose interest in a solution. ¶8. (C) Marcoullis articulated the GOC view that Talat and the Turkish Cypriots were simply not in control in the north and this was the most serious drag on efforts to reach agreement on a Cyprus settlement. According to Marcoullis, it was the Turkish military that exercises effective control over the Cyprus issue. Expressing sympathy for the Turkish Cypriots' position and their "deprivation suffered as a function of Turkey's military occupation of one-third of Cyprus," Marcoullis also endorsed "the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community." She made a point to distinguish this, however, from programs or policies aimed at "boosting the economy of a separate state." Marcoullis also credited the ROC with offering Turkish Cypriots a range of benefits since the opening of the crossing points in April ¶2003. Turkish Cypriots were entitled to free medical care in the south. They could (and did) claim ROC passports and the benefits of EU citizenship. Turkish Cypriot income had effectively doubled in the three years since the crossing points opened, largely because of Greek Cypriot generosity, she claimed. UN "Disappoints" the North ¶9. (C) "President" Talat's Undersecretary, Rasit Pertev, told Hunt that there were "worrying signals" that the Greek Cypriot POLITICAL leadership was trying to "annihilate the Annan Plan." The UN had repeatedly failed to take a strong stance in its dealings with Greek Cypriots and had inexplicably backed off its previous (and in his view, correct) insistence that the Annan Plan be used as the basis for further settlement talks. Pertev agreed with Hunt that the Plan had been effectively "demonized" on the Greek Cypriot side. Hunt suggested that the Turkish Cypriot side be flexible in its terminology and not lock itself in to the name "Annan." It was important, Hunt added, for the Turkish Cypriots to retain the moral high ground and keep from doing harm to the pro-solution image they had earned in the international community. Pertev said the Turkish Cypriots could be flexible with regard to use of the term "Annan Plan," but expressed worry over President Papadopoulos' apparent rejection of a bicommunal, bizonal solution in a May 9 interview the French publication "L'Express." This cast doubt over Greek Cypriot commitment to the long-standing and universally accepted goal of a shared federation, and was "extremely troubling for the Turkish Cypriots," who were still trying to overcome the negative fallout from the February 28 Paris meeting between Annan and Papadopoulos. ¶10. (C) Pertev maintained that the Turkish Cypriot side was disadvantaged in its dealings with the Greek Cypriots because UN SRSG Michael Moeller was not an impartial mediator. Moeller spent more time on the Greek side, used Greek Cypriot sources for information, was fluent in the Greek language, and had internalized the Greek Cypriot point of view with regard to the Cyprus issue. Because of the general Turkish Cypriot perception that "UN sympathies lie with the Greek Cypriots," Pertev asserted that the Turkish Cypriot leadership needed to increase its efforts to familiarize Moeller with their positions, perspectives, and sensitivities. The Turkish Cypriots would try to set up meetings in the weeks ahead between Moeller and representatives of the north's civil society, business community, and POLITICAL parties. Pertev hoped this would result in more evenhanded dealings on the part of the UN. Pertev feared that UNSYG Annan, with only six months left in office, was unwilling to address any issue that would fail to result in a "guaranteed victory" for his Good Offices Mission. This, he asserted, was why U/SYG Gambari had been so reluctant to visit the island. Little Change Expected After "TRNC" June Elections ¶11. (C) Erkut Sahali, Private Secretary to "TRNC PM" Soyer, predicted that June 25 municipal and parliamentary by-elections would not shake the pro-settlement CTP's grip on power in the north. Because the opposition was so disorganized and demoralized, the CTP would probably even consolidate its dominant POLITICAL position by winning both vacant "parliamentary" seats and increasing the number of municipalities it controlled. He suggested that after the elections, the CTP would probably seize the initiative and reorganize several "state" agencies. For example, the electricity authority "KIBTEK," currently located in the "Ministry of Agriculture" (and therefore controlled by the TP's nationalist junior partner, the DP of Serdar Denktash) would move to the CTP-run "Ministry of Finance." Sahali said these changes were designed to streamline the functioning of the "state," however, and not to boost CTP's patronage power. He pointed out that other planned shifts would either be zero-sum swaps (with Serdar retaining control of the "Office of the Environment" as it moved from the DP-run "Ministry of the Economy" to "Agriculture") or losses for the CTP (with the public citrus company "CIPRUVEX" moving from "Finance" to "Agriculture"). He was less clear whether any "cabinet"-level reshuffles were in the works, but stressed that none of the anticipated changes would derail the Turkish Cypriots' broad pro-settlement policy orientation. Economic Optimism, but Global Isolation ¶12. (C) Outgoing President of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industry Salih Tunar (who had resigned from his position the day before his meeting with Hunt to run as a DP candidate in the June parliamentary Elections) joined incoming chamber president Musa Sonmezler and chamber secretary Galip Yuksel in stressing the paramount importance of economic development in the Turkish Cypriot community. Sonmezler outlined the expansion of the "TRNC" economy during the last two years, citing tourism, construction, and the influx of students as the key growth factors. He added that the "TRNC" was enjoying low inflation coupled with low interest rates, but stressed that international economic isolation remained the significant barrier to real, sustainable economic growth. Absent this isolation, Sonmezler was confident the Turkish Cypriots could "catch up with" their Greek Cypriot neighbors in a few short years. According to Sonmezler, however, Greek Cypriots continued to insist on unjustly isolating the Turkish Cypriots. Even as they insisted all the north's trade pass through the ROC-controlled south, he added, the Greek Cypriots had not overcome their POLITICAL and psychological barriers to trading with Turkish Cypriots. These continued to be the most significant obstacles to north-south trade. ¶13. (C) All of Hunt's Turkish Cypriot interlocutors expressed satisfaction with the Austrian Ambassador's May 8 "Europe Day" speech in the north in which she said that the EU would seek to restore the 120 million euros of aid that had been lost when the parties had failed to reach agreement on the modalities of implementation before a key deadline (ref c). Even so, Sonmezler and Yuksel said that they anticipated the Greek Cypriots would "create difficulties" by imposing serious restrictions on Turkish Cypriot access to -- and use of -- EU aid. Hunt's interlocutors were unanimous in predicting that Turkey's implementation of the Ankara Protocol (the opening of Turkish ports and airports of Cyprus-flagged vessels) would be a "disaster" for the Turkish Cypriot economy. Turkey was currently the north's only conduit for external trade. According to Sonmezler, if that door were opened to Greek Cypriots, "it would be closed to Turkish Cypriots." As an example, he described how the Greek Cypriots have been able to block McDonalds from opening franchises in the north by threatening to withdraw concession licenses in the south. Sonmezler urged the United States to set an example to the international community by supporting the north's economic development and taking "more concrete steps to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation." Yuksel outlined plans by foreign investors to expand and diversify the tourism sector through the construction of nine new hotels in the Karpass region, increasing the "TRNC's" current hotel bed capacity to approximately 30,000 by the end of 2007. SCHLICHER