AVOIDING A TRAIN WRECK OVER SHIPS AND PLANES IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000698 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV CY SUBJECT: AVOIDING A TRAIN WRECK OVER SHIPS AND PLANES IN THE FALL PROGRESS REPORT ON TURKEY REF: NICOSIA 352 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As things stand, Turkey and the EU seem headed towards a confrontation at some point in the fall over Ankara's failure to open its ports and airports to Cypriot-registered traffic. While President Papadopoulos does not want Turkey's EU accession process to fail, he does want to use the October progress report to leverage real concessions out of Turkey. Ankara, for its part, has made clear that it will not implement the customs union protocol without meaningful progress in easing the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. For a range of reasons, and barring an unexpected change of position in Ankara, the proposed deal on Famagusta-Varosha is in itself not a viable way out of this dilemma. The return of Varosha to Greek Cypriot control is a bridge to far. We should encourage Ankara to come forward with a serious proposal for the opening of Famagusta that would -- at a minimum -- wrong-foot Papadopoulos and thus shift responsibility for the Cyprus deadlock back onto the Greek Cypriot side. This will not, of course, solve the problem, but it may at least buy us some valuable time. End Summary. Planes, Trains and Automobiles -------------- ¶2. (C) Just about everyone working for a resolution of the long-standing Cyprus dispute agrees on at least one point. The best metaphor for the looming confrontation between Turkey and the EU regarding access to Turkish ports and airports for Greek Cypriot registered ships and planes is a "train wreck". Mixed metaphors aside, there is a real problem before us, the solution to which will require both goodwill and creative thinking. Much of this will have to be generated by us and the EU, as the parties themselves seem to be in desperately short supply. One point in our favor is that, while Cypriot President Papadopoulos sees tension between Turkey and the EU as a point of leverage in Cyprus' favor, he does not want Ankara's EU accession process to run off the rails. Papadopoulos is smart enough (and then some) to understand that a melt-down in the accession talks would eliminate whatever incentives might now exist for Turkey to adopt a more accommodating position with respect to the Cyprus dispute. The Cypriot President will want to get what he can out of the fall progress report on Turkey, but he is aware of the real risks inherent in the ROC over-playing its hand. It is for this very reason that he and the Greeks have been urging their EU partners to express support for Turkey's eventual full accession to the EU rather than such lesser ideas as "privileged partnership." Varosha-Famagusta: Don't Expect Too Much -------------- ¶3. (C) Much of the thinking over how to avoid a real disaster in the October review has centered around a possible deal for the opening of Famagusta port for direct trade with the EU and the return of the fenced area of Varosha to its former (largely Greek Cypriot) inhabitants. In theory, this agreement would give Turkey the political cover its needs to fulfill its EU obligations and open its ports to Cypriot traffic. For a range of reasons, however attractive the idea is in many respects, we see such a deal as highly unlikely. Here's why: -- Turkey seems intent on holding onto Varosha until the end-game of final settlement negotiations, and reportedly has reminded the Turkish Cypriots that this is Ankara's position. We have seen no indications from senior Turkish political figures -- let alone from someone in authority in the TGS -- that Varosha was even on the table for discussion. -- The Turkish Cypriot leadership might be willing to entertain at least opening up Varosha for resettlement, but would almost certainly balk at returning the fenced-area to Greek Cypriot control. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots would insist on including direct flights into Ercan airport as part of a separate deal on Varosha, something the Greek Cypriot side has made clear it will never agree to do. -- Papadopoulos has laid down clear markers about Famagusta. Varosha is the quid for the port opening quo. No return of Varosha; no "direct" trade with the European Union. As near as we can tell, there is little enthusiasm in EU circles for re-visiting the idea of direct trade without the support of Nicosia. Some in EU circles here have floated the idea of "limited" direct trade for the Turkish Cypriots: allowing exports but not imports, restricting the volume or types of goods that could be traded, or something along these lines. Turkish Cypriots describe this possibility in apocalyptic language and would almost certainly reject a "half-a-loaf" offer on direct trade. -- The Turkish military will have a hard time agreeing to any foreign role in running the Famagusta port. The collective administration of the port by Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and the EU would be a particularly hard sell. Famagusta is the only real deep water port in the north and it would be extremely difficult to separate commercial and military operations there. Using Kyrenia for exports instead of Famagusta is not a viable option. The much smaller Kyrenia port is little more than a glorified ferry-boat marina. There are no cranes or warehouses, and no berths suitable for container ships. The wave-breakers at Kyrenia are inadequate and the port closes frequently in bad weather. Keeping the Train on the Rails -------------- ¶4. (C) While it is possible that the parties will reach some 11th hour agreement under pressure from the European Union, we should be thinking now about what we can do to keep Turkey's EU accession process on track without the cover of a Varosha-Famagusta agreement. We have already proposed one possible way forward (reftel). If Ankara took the initiative to put a broad-based and challenging package on the table -- including the return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots, full implementation of the Ankara Agreement and an end to the blackballing of Cyprus in international organizations in exchange for the ROC's agreement to direct trade through Famagusta and direct flights to Ercan airport -- it would wrong-foot Papadopoulos and ease building pressure in the EU for a negative report on Turkey in the fall. At a minimum, it would likely provide enough fodder for Turkey's supporters in the EU to push off for at least a few months any kind of decision on freezing the opening of selected chapters or even suspending talks altogether. It could also have the effect of helping the UN jump-start a serious effort at negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement. ¶5. (C) Another possible approach would be to separate the issues of Famagusta port and the status of Varosha and try for a different kind of package. We might suggest to Turkey, for example, that it offer to open the doors to Cypriot membership in the full range of international organizations (including potentially PfP) in exchange for direct trade through Famagusta port. Without directly linking this deal to implementation of the Ankara Protocol, Turkey could then open its own ports and airports to Cypriot traffic without having to defend a humiliating climb-down. Papadopoulos will be reluctant to drop Varosha, but a combination of EU pressure and his own reluctance to see Turkey's EU aspirations thwarted prematurely might be enough to persuade him to go along. There are other variations on a theme that we might consider. The return of Varosha to Greek Cypriot control, however, is the kind of high-level "concession" that could only be balanced by a similarly onerous move by the ROC. The only thing that would come close, in our view, is Ercan airport. We would note, however, that pressing for movement on Ercan would raise a host of related and complicated questions, such as who, precisely, controls the Flight Information Region. The Way Ahead -------------- ¶6. (C) We should not count on Papadopoulos to put any new ideas in play. He is absolutely secure in his political position and may well calculate that he can contain the fallout from a major break between Turkey and the EU over the implementation of the Ankara Agreement. Some in Nicosia are already talking about restricting the ROC's demands in the fall to limited areas of the EU-Turkey agenda (i.e., chapters on transportation, the free movement of goods or external relations) rather than adopting a more global approach. ¶7. (C) For our purposes, it would be best for a new idea to come out of Ankara; Gul's January proposal, which to many EU observers contained nothing new, simply did not have the resonance to get Turkey and the EU through the looming crisis successfully. Our goal is not to open the Famagusta port (although that would be nice); it is to forestall a major and foreseeable blow-out between Turkey and the EU. If Ankara is seen as the constructive party and Papadopoulos as the unreasonable maximalist, it will go a long way towards countering the ROC's argument that the EU need do nothing to facilitate Turkey's implementing the customs union protocol. Traditionally, the Cyprus issue has been played as game of blame-shifting. Turkey and Talat have been on the losing end of that game since last October. Forcing Papadopoulos to say "OXI" (or "no") to a reasonable, serious offer should help rectify that. SCHLICHER