TURKISH CYPRIOT CENSUS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE MUCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000643 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT CENSUS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE MUCH CLARITY Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although authorities enforced a strict 13-hour curfew to improve prospects for an accurate count, lingering questions about the reliability of the Turkish Cypriot census on April 30 are likely to undercut the utility of what was -- by local standards -- an enormously complex undertaking. The most serious problem seems to have been the relative inexperience of the 5,800 census takers, many of them college students hired for the one-day event. The Director of the "State Planning Organization" (SPO) admitted to us that her office would need to develop a system for counting those who had been overlooked in the April 30 count. The big question, of course, is whether anyone outside of the "TRNC" will accept the results of the census as accurate and legitimate. Greek Cypriot officials got out of the blocks early in publicly dismissing the value of the Turkish Cypriot census. Having taken this step, however, it will be extremely difficult for Turkish Cypriot authorities to agree -- as the Greek Cypriot side is demanding -- that the question of a census should be included on the agenda for UN-sponsored technical talks. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) As planned, Turkish Cypriot authorities enforced a strict curfew from 5:00 am until 6:00 pm on April 30 so that the "State Planning Organization" (SPO) could conduct a general census. Police charged at least 21 people with violating the mandatory curfew. Approximately 5,800 staff (mostly college students) fanned out across the "TRNC" with the goal of an actual count of all those present in the north. Even tourists were restricted to their hotels so that they could be included in the count. In addition to the raw numbers, SPO census takers had a list of 61 questions, with each staff member required to survey approximately 20 homes. Preliminary results should be available within a few days, but "Prime Minister" Ferdi Soyer told diplomats at an April 26 briefing that it would take at least six months to prepare a thorough analysis of the data. ¶3. (C) It is already clear, however, that execution of the census survey was far from flawless. Turkish Cypriot newspapers reported that the SPO failed to find a substantial (but unknown) number of people, even though it had extended the count beyond the 6:00 pm deadline. Some residents of Nicosia and Famagusta reportedly called the SPO offices to complain that they had not been counted. SPO Director Busa Erozan admitted to us on May 2 that there had been some problems, but she expected that there would be some announcement as early as May 3 regarding special procedures for those overlooked in the initial count. Erozan also noted that SPO had not yet counted the Turkish military forces present in Cyprus. This would likely take another couple of days. ¶4. (C) Soyer's Private Secretary, Erkut Sahali, downplayed the problems reported in the press. Organizers, he insisted, had allowed for a margin-of-error of 0.2%. Most of the error rate could be attributed to the construction of new residences that had not yet been recorded in the municipal records. Ozlem Oguz, the Central Census Controller for the Morphou region, agreed that the final results would be fairly accurate, at least with respect to establishing the total number of Turkish Cypriots and the number of Turkish settlers. Other statistical data collected may not prove as useful, however, as the inexperienced census officers often did not handle the questionnaires professionally. There were not enough census takers to handle the volume. For this reason, she believed, the SPO had missed a significant number of houses and had failed to solicit the kind of detailed information necessary for the forms to be truly useful. Moreover, the "TRNC's" tardy request for the Council of Europe to provide observers for the census exercise could even serve to emphasize the procedural shortcomings on display. ¶5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots were quick to reject the exercise altogether. Government Spokesman Yiorgos Lillikas maintained that the Turkish Cypriot census was of no value. The Greek Cypriot side, he noted, wanted this issue to be discussed at the technical talks being organized under UN auspices. To be valid, the census itself would have to be conducted in the presence of observers from the EU and other international organizations. House President and AKEL leader Christofias criticized the Turkish Cypriot refusal to hold the census under UN auspices and dismissed the April 30 count as "unreliable." In their editorials, Greek Cypriot newspapers charged that the Turkish Cypriot census was primarily aimed at legitimizing the presence of Turkish settlers. ¶6. (C) Comment: Although it seems a simple enough exercise, the idea of a census on the Turkish Cypriot side is politically-charged and inherently controversial. The big question is whether outsiders -- and in particular Greek Cypriots, the UN, and the EU -- will be ready to accept the results of the April 30 count as representing a legitimate and reasonably accurate approximation of the north's population. This seems highly unlikely. Having taken this step, however, it will be equally difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to agree that there is a need to put the question of a census onto the agenda for the technical committees. Their argument is likely to be that the April 30 headcount makes this a moot point. We would not expect the Greek Cypriot side to agree, and it will be very difficult for third parties to say that the exercise was so credible that the questions attendant to demographics in the north have been resolved by the census. SCHLICHER