Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NICOSIA593
2006-04-20 13:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY 
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DE RUEHNC #0593/01 1101307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201307Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5895
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0983
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0526
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000593 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY
SUBJECT: READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS
ABOUT LIVING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS, CYPRUS PROBLEM

REF: A. SIPNET DAILY REPORT (04/13/06)


B. 04 NICOSIA 2997

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000593 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI EUN CY SUBJECT: READING TEA LEAVES: POLLS SHOW MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT LIVING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS, CYPRUS PROBLEM REF: A. SIPNET DAILY REPORT (04/13/06) ¶B. 04 NICOSIA 2997 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A recent CyBC poll suggesting that only 45 percent of Greek Cypriots are willing to live together with Turkish Cypriots (down from 67 percent when the Green Line checkpoints opened in 2003) has raised serious questions in the minds of many local pundits over whether a solution to the Cyprus problem may be increasingly out of reach. A more nuanced reading of the poll suggests, however, that this apparent Greek Cypriot animosity toward the Turkish Cypriots is neither as severe or clear-cut as it appears at first glance. Survey results indicating that Greek Cypriots are content with Papadopoulos's strategic foot-dragging on the Cyprus issue are more worrying, however, and suggest that most voters in the south see no urgent need for their government to engage in the difficult give-and-take that will be required if a comprehensive settlement is to be reached. END SUMMARY. NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD WEEK -------------- ¶2. (SBU) With May 21 legislative elections drawing closer, Greek Cypriot media is awash with public opinion polling. Although most polls focus squarely on the likely outcome of the elections (and suggest little change is imminent in the Greek Cypriot political landscape),a lengthy survey published April 3 and 4 by the state-run CyBC has drawn particular attention. The most eye-catching claim made by the poll was that 48 percent of the Greek Cypriots did not want to "live together" with Turkish Cypriots. This represents a twenty percent rise in negative opinion since the 2003 opening of the Green Line checkpoints. At that time, polling data suggested that a majority (67 percent) of Greek Cypriots were willing to live together with Turkish Cypriots (ref a). According to CyBC, the number of Greek Cypriots now in favor of living together with Turkish Cypriots has dropped to 45 percent. ¶3. (SBU) The CyBC poll has dominated conversation among chattering classes on both sides of the Green Line for the past two weeks. A Greek Cypriot bi-communal activist lamented in one paper that his compatriots were "settling into the partition of the island geographically, emotionally, &#x
000A;psychologically, politically, and sociologically," and suggested that the poll results indicated an overall drop in support for the reunification of Cyprus. ¶4. (SBU) One particular cause for worry is the fact that Greek Cypriot youth appear to have the most reservations about living with Turkish Cypriots. The CyBC poll confirms earlier research showing decreased support among younger Greek Cypriots for living together. Those under the age of 35 were most wary, with 63 percent of the 18-24 year-olds and 59 percent of 24-34-year-olds saying they would rather not live with Turkish Cypriots. The 35-55 age group, many of whom have clear memories of the 1974 war, were split 50-50. Only those over 55 were clearly in favor of living side by side with Turkish Cypriots. ¶5. (C) The apparent dislike many Greek Cypriot youth feel toward Turkish Cypriots is not news; pro-settlement observers have long wondered "what's the matter with kids today?" (ref b). Critics of President Papadopoulos lay the blame squarely on the current administration. One publicly accused the president of "failing to promote a vision of reunification," and "creating a hostile climate for Greek Cypriot youth." It is probably an exaggeration to lay all the blame on Papadopoulos's doorstep, however, even though his hard line certainly resonates with many Greek Cypriots. The poll nonetheless supports the idea that the uncompromising attitude of younger Greek Cypriots (who have no memory of bi-communal co-existence and have been fed a regular diet of Turcophobia at school) is growing more dominant with the passage of time. YOU SAY POTATO, I SAY BIZONAL -------------- ¶6. (C) Not all observers agree, however, that the CyBC poll represents a major shift away from public support for reunification -- even if it might suggest a decrease in sympathy for Turkish Cypriots. Former Attorney General Alecos Markides was one of many who pointed out to us the ambiguity of the survey's questions about living together. It was not clear whether "living together means in the same NICOSIA 00000593 002 OF 003 bed, the same flat, the same village, or what," he said. Turkish Cypriot journalist Simon Bahceli agreed, noting that everyone who supported the long-standing goal of a bizonal, bicommunal federation accepted the idea that the two communities would be segregated to some degree. "Not wanting to live together does not mean being against a solution," he insisted, since living apart is implicit in the idea of bizonality. According to Markides, the "naughty" CyBC poll did not get at the real meat of Greek Cypriot attitudes toward coexistence because it asked "absurd questions." ¶7. (C) Other survey responses were equally ambiguous, suggesting that Markides is right to criticize CyBC for sloppy questioning. For example, one question asked "how much do you like" Turkish Cypriots (with 41 percent saying a little, 33 percent saying moderately, and 26 percent saying a lot),but offered no option to express dislike. Another question asked Greek Cypriots about their opinion of Turkish Cypriots since the opening of the checkpoints. 18 percent of respondents said their opinions of Turkish Cypriots had improved, 17 percent said they had worsened, and 61 percent said they had "stayed the same" -- although no indication was given of the pro- and anti-Turkish breakdown within this 61-percent majority. Survey results showing that only 55 percent of Greek Cypriots have crossed north suggest that some in the south are happy to keep their distance from Turkish Cypriots, and it is common knowledge that many Greek Cypriots do not cross the Green Line because they do not want to show their ID papers to officials of the "occupation regime." But the CyBC survey offered no follow-on data to quantify these feelings; it remains unclear how many of those 45 percent who do not cross are motivated by antipathy -- or just plain apathy. GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH THE STATUS QUO? -------------- ¶8. (C) Less noticed, but perhaps more significant, was a series of other questions in the CyBC survey reflecting not so much a dislike of Turkish Cypriots as a Greek Cypriot willingness to tolerate the status quo and/or support the GOC's current foot-dragging on its strategic bottom line of reunification of the island. In response to one question, 78 percent of Greek Cypriots felt that their community's position in the international arena had either held steady or improved over the past year. Responding to a question on the EU, 66 percent said they were opposed to Turkish accession. In a private conversation with the Ambassador, DISY leader Nicos Anastassiades expressed concern that (should Turkey continue to slow-roll on implementing its EU obligations) such strong popular opposition to Turkish EU membership might eventually force Papadopoulos to exercise his threatened veto. This could snuff out any hope of a Cyprus settlement. ¶9. (C) Especially worrying are results showing that, while 56 percent of Greek Cypriots feel that they are not getting any closer to a Cyprus solution, a nearly equal majority (61 percent) support President Papadopoulos's current Cyprus policy. As one observer pointed out, these apparently contradictory results only make sense if most Greek Cypriots are happy with the status quo. WE TOLD YOU THEY HATE US -------------- ¶10. (C) The CyBC poll has received prominent press coverage in the north, where commentators generally view it as confirmation that Greek Cypriots are neither particularly eager for a settlement nor particularly fond of Turkish Cypriots -- a belief that has been gaining currency since the rejection of the Annan Plan in the south. While many in the north initially blamed Papadopoulos for his community's "no" vote, it is increasingly common to hear Turkish Cypriots complain that the "problem" (i.e., hatred of Turks) runs deep in the Greek Cypriot national psyche and is not the fault of just one man. Perhaps as a result of this, a recent survey in the northern city of Guzelyurt (Morphou) confirmed a serious deterioration in support for the Annan Plan among Turkish Cypriots there, while other polling suggests that Turkish Cypriots elsewhere are increasingly skeptical that the two sides could live together. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) That many Greek Cypriots neither particularly like Turkish Cypriots nor want to live with them is nothing new -- and surveys in the north taken since the Annan Plan suggest that for many Turkish Cypriots, the feeling is mutual. If bizonality is accepted by most people on each side, however, NICOSIA 00000593 003 OF 003 this need not be an impediment to a settlement deal. As one AmCit resident of Cyprus quipped: "Afterall, how many New Yorkers want to live among Texans?" ¶12. (C) What is remarkable about the CyBC survey are the questions it poses about just how eager Greek Cypriots are to see their government engage in the real give-and-take negotiations required for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Although 80 percent still say the division of the island is their top political concern, the poll gives little indication that Greek Cypriots feel any sense of urgency on the matter -- while the 66 percent who oppose Turkish EU membership do not appear to see a link between progress toward Turkey's accession and a potential Cyprus settlement. Former UN Cyprus envoy Hugo Gobi reportedly once said that "the drama of Cyprus is the absence of drama." This appears to be truer than ever. Absent any dramatic change in the geopolitical landscape, most Greek Cypriots seem content to nod approvingly at their president's policy of slow-motion EU brinksmanship with Turkey -- and then get back to their generally pleasant, prosperous daily lives. END COMMENT. SCHLICHER

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