SRSG "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TECHNICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000529 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC CY SUBJECT: SRSG "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR TECHNICAL TALKS; GOC EXCEPTIONALLY CAGEY REF: A. NICOSIA 503 ¶B. NICOSIA 1585 (2005) Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador Schlicher on April 7 that he was optimistic the technical talks process would succeed in galvanizing movement on the Cyprus issue. The atmosphere in the talks was positive, even "effusive," and the principals had readily agreed to a total news blackout. The parties were closer than they realized, or at least closer than they wanted to admit. The most significant hurdle was not the nature of the technical committees, but rather the Turkish Cypriot side's insistence (at Ankara's behest, Moeller believed) that the Annan Plan should be the sole basis for settlement negotiations. Moeller recognized that he still had a credibility problem with Ankara, though he does say that there has been some improvement. He asked that we weigh-in with the Turkish Mission to the UN to underscore that the P-5 supported both the SRSG personally and the technical talks process. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot participant in the technical talks -- Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis -- told DCM that his side would not agree to limit the discussion to issues of day-to-day concern. The process should be aimed at both building trust between the two sides and preparing the ground for the resumption of full settlement negotiations. "Technical talks" was a euphemism for political dialogue below the leaders level. President Papadopoulos was prepared to meet Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons, but it was probably too early to resume full-blown negotiations. The gap between the two sides was simply too great. End summary. Moeller Typically Optimistic -------------- ¶2. (C) UNFICYP COM and SRSG Michael Moeller told Ambassador Schlicher on April 7 that the "technical talks" had gotten off to a good start and he was "still optimistic" about the direction in which things were moving. Moeller had so far hosted two sessions for a total of eight hours of conversation. A third meeting was tentatively scheduled for April 10. Both sides had agreed to a complete news blackout on the process. There would be no statements and -- it was agreed -- no leaks. UNFICYP spokesman Brian Kelley would be the only one authorized to speak authoritatively about the process. Turkish Cypriot representative Rasit Pertev and Greek Cypriot representative Tasos Tzionis got on quite well personally and so far the atmosphere in the talks was, as Moeller described it, "effusive." The two sides were closer than they realized, or at least closer than they wanted to admit. Both Pertev and Tzionis were sensitive to the time factor and the need to get something moving on an urgent basis. Both sides had complained to Moeller that he was bending over backwards to accommodate the other party, which he took as a good sign. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked if the two sides had agreed that the technical committees could begin working. Moeller replied that the Greek Cypriot side was not yet on board. The real stumbling block, however, was not the concept of the committees but rather the Annan Plan. Pertev clearly had instructions -- from Ankara, Moeller believed -- to emphasize the Annan Plan as the sole basis for settlement negotiations. The Greek Cypriots supported a very different approach and, in fact, did not want any reference to the Annan Plan at all. It was clear, Moeller observed, that the phrase "The Annan Plan" was problematic and needed to be jettisoned. Moeller himself preferred "The Cyprus Plan" as a convenient label for the objective of new negotiations. ¶4. (C) Moeller anticipated that managing Ankara would be an important but difficult part of the process. The SRSG recognized that, while he thought that the situation for him had eased over the past two or three weeks, he still had a credibility problem with Turkey and he asked for our support. In particular, it would be helpful if we could deliver a message to the Turkish PermRep to the UN that the P-5 backed both Moeller personally and the technical talks process he was trying to jump-start. The Turkish PermRep had evidently been expressing considerable skepticism about this in his conversations in New York. It was important that Turkey understand it was getting something out of this process, and Moeller believed that might be some expression of openness to the Gul Proposal from January. The SYG had not yet responded formally to the proposal. When he did so, he was likely to make two points: first, that Turkey should fulfill its obligations to the European Union, but also that the issues specific to Cyprus can and should be addressed in a parallel process. ¶5. (C) Moeller believed it would be better if the number of high-level envoys on the Cyprus issue could be kept to a minimum. Senior UK officials had already assured him that London had no plans to appoint a replacement for David Hannay. Moeller noted that he intended to travel to New York at some point soon and wondered whether it might be useful to visit Washington as well. The Ambassador agreed that this would be a good idea. Moeller mused that, if he did this, he would likely have to travel to London, Paris and Moscow as well to make clear that he was being even-handed. (Note: He made no mention of a possible visit to Beijing.) Tzionis Typically Cautious -------------- ¶6. (C) Holding true to the spirit of his agreement with Moeller and Pertev, Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis refused to discuss the specific details of the technical talks process in an April 7 conversation with DCM. He was, however, willing to discuss the Greek Cypriot position. Tzionis stressed that his side was not prepared to countenance a process that would be limited to a discussion of day-to-day concerns. This would succeed only in normalizing an abnormal and unacceptable situation. The talks would also have to address issues of substance. The aim of the process under discussion was two-fold: First, to build trust between the parties, and second to prepare the ground for the resumption of full negotiations on a settlement. This could not be done through limited discussions on waste management. The discussions should also include issues specific to a solution of the Cyprus problem. Tzionis cited cooperation on energy issues as one topic his side wanted to explore. The GOC decision to provide electricity to the north during the Turkish Cypriot energy crisis in January was a one-off, ad hoc decision. It was important to consider how energy generation and distribution would be handled within a federal arrangement. ¶7. (C) DCM asked Tzionis if the Greek Cypriot side was really ready for the resumption of full negotiations. Tzionis replied that it would probably be a mistake to move on this too soon. If Papadopoulos and Talat met now, for example, it would only highlight the sizable gap between their respective positions. The gap is there, he acknowledged, and we shouldn't fool ourselves about this. The concept of "technical talks" was clearly something of a misnomer. Tzionis himself was representing President Papadopoulos and Pertev was there as Talat's representative. They were not technicians and the talks themselves were inherently political. "Technical talks" really meant simply dialogue below the level of leaders. Indeed, on April 10, Moeller noted that, instead of discussing "technical committees" or "day-to-day issues," he preferred the process to be phrased in terms of "issues that the parties have determined should be handled at the technical level." The Greek Cypriot side was ready, however, to go ahead with a Papadopoulos-Talat meeting in the context of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). This was an opportunity to be practical, and the leaders could showcase their commitment to progress on this important humanitarian concern and perhaps agree on a joint call for international funding. Since the Turkish Cypriot side as of April 10 had not agreed to the appointment of the CMP's third member, Moeller judges that the meeting of the Leaders likely will not happen before early June. ¶8. (C) Tzionis stressed that as far as the Greek Cypriot side was concerned, the technical talks process needed to do more than simply produce "movement." The talks should be focused on getting to "yes" on a settlement. Otherwise, there was a real risk of Turkey simply using the fact of a dialogue process as an alibi with the EU for not meeting its obligations to Cyprus and the 24 other member states. "We don't want to be hostage to Turkey again," he concluded. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Moeller seems to be underestimating the difficulties he will face in moving the technical talks process forward. There is still a fundamental disconnect between the two sides as to what this process is supposed to be. We think Moeller is absolutely right, however, about the need to play-down our collective support for "The Annan Plan" as such and by name (ref B). The "A-word" is a red flag to the bull for the Greek Cypriot side. Moreover, our repeated public endorsements of a plan that only encourages the Turkish Cypriot side to resist the concept of negotiating meaningful changes, which in turn Papadopoulos used as a justification to avoid serious engagement. We would also endorse Moeller's request that we weigh-in with the Turkish mission in New York to underscore our support -- and the support of the P-5 more broadly -- for both the SRSG and the technical talks process. For the time being, this is the only game in town and it is important that the parties demonstrate that they can engage and succeed. SCHLICHER