TURKISH CYPRIOTS UNDERWHELMED BY FIRST UN-BROKERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000503

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU EUN UN CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOTS UNDERWHELMED BY FIRST UN-BROKERED
"TECHNICAL" MEETING

REF: A. NICOSIA 454


B. NICOSIA 352

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The Turkish Cypriots were "disappointed" by the first
UN-brokered meeting to discuss the way ahead on technical
talks, according to "President" Talat's Under Secretary Rasit
Pertev. Held in Nicosia on March 31, the meeting brought
together UNFICYP Chief and SRSG Michael Moeller, ROC
Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Tasos Tzionis, and Pertev.
The three representatives agreed to meet again "as soon as
this week," Pertev told us -- but had promised not to discuss
the March 31 meeting with outside parties.


2. (C) Talat's Private Secretary Asim Akansoy (please
protect) gave us a more extensive "off the record" debrief,
however, reading from what looked like Pertev's report to
Talat. According to Akansoy, the Turkish Cypriots used the
meeting (as well as a March 27 conversation between Talat and
Moeller -- ref A) to underscore their position that
working-level talks on the pre-agreed list of ten "technical"
topics could begin at any time (ref B). But the Turkish
Cypriots would not discuss "substantive" matters related to a
final settlement deal unless the Greek Cypriots presented a
clear and prioritized list of changes they sought in the
Annan Plan, "as the UN and others have been demanding since
2004."


3. (C) Tzionis, however, reportedly insisted on "bottom-up"
negotiations that must/must include "other matters with
political implications" (such as a population count, the
development of Greek Cypriot property in the north, and other
unspecified economic issues). Otherwise, according to
Akansoy, the Greek Cypriots would refuse to engage even in
technical talks. When Pertev pushed back on this point,
Tzionis reportedly reiterated that the Annan Plan was "not on
the table" and that the Greek Cypriots would therefore not
propose any amendments, prioritized or otherwise. Instead,
according to Akansoy, Tzionis had said the parties should
dust off the 1977 "High Level Agreement" as a point of
departure for negotiations. An incredulous Akansoy commented
that this was ridiculous -- the main elements of the 1977
agreement (that a solution should be based on a bizonal,
bicommunal federation) had been accepted by both sides for
decades, while the text of the accord was "too vague on too
many issues" to serve as a realistic settlement blueprint.


4. (C) According to Akansoy, the March 31 meeting broke up
without any agreement on whether to include "political"
issues in the talks -- and therefore without any progress on
the agenda or shape of technical discussions. He reiterated
Talat's "firm position" that there would be no discussion of
any subject beyond the ten agreed technical points until and
unless the Greek Cypriots presented their list of changes to
the Annan Plan. Given Tzionis's apparent unwillingness to do
so, Akansoy noted that Talat was pessimistic that the next
meeting would accomplish much.


5. (C) Although he avoided describing the March 31 meeting in
detail, Pertev nonetheless echoed Akansoy's general pessimism
about the prospects for these talks. He implored the United
States, specifically, to "give a strong message to Moeller"
that the technical talks must go ahead and that the UN should
not allow Papadopoulos to hold these talks "hostage" to
progress on a deadlocked political track. At the same time,
he asked us to reinforce the message that the Turkish
Cypriots would not consent to discuss substance until they
had the list of Greek Cypriot changes to the Annan Plan. "As
long as Papadopoulos is unwilling to do this," Pertev
contended, "it is clear he is not serious about real
negotiations."


6. (C) After giving us his readout, Akansoy went on to
describe the Turkish Cypriots' "continued worries" about SRSG
Moeller's suitability as a mediator, calling into question
his grasp of the complexities of the Cyprus problem. Using a
Turkish proverb, he compared the enthusiastic Moeller to a
child who has bitten off more than he can chew, dirtying his
face and choking on his food in the process. For example,
Moeller supposedly told Talat on two occasions that the Greek
Cypriots "had already given" their desired changes to the
Annan Plan -- insisting that "he had seen somewhere" a much
more specific list than the vague "areas of concern" given by
Tzionis to U/SYG Prendergast in 2005. "This is clearly not
true," Akansoy said, pointing to Tzionis's unwillingness to
discuss the Annan Plan on March 31. "What's he talking
about?" Akansoy asked rhetorically. The Turkish Cypriots had
repeatedly asked Moeller to share the purported list of
changes, he continued, but to no avail.


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7. (C) Akansoy also repeated the Turkish Cypriot suspicion
that Moeller was not an honest broker. As an example, he
noted the claim by GOC Spokesman Lilikas that Papadopoulos
and Talat had agreed to meet to discuss the work of the
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). This was not true,
Akansoy stressed. Pointing out that Talat was willing to see
Papadopoulos "in the context of" the CMP (perhaps at a future
reception to honor the appointment of the UN's third member),
he had "definitely not agreed" to discuss the substance of
the Committee's work with the Greek Cypriot leader. The CMP,
Akansoy said, was the "one thing on this island working well"
so there was "nothing to discuss." According to Akansoy,
Moeller had agreed to issue a press release clarifying what
Talat had actually agreed, but had later "backed down under
Greek Cypriot pressure."


8. (C) Pertev recounted essentially the same story, adding
that any meeting between the two leaders in the context of
the CMP would be a "frosty photo op" devoid of substance.
Pertev added that the Turkish Cypriot side would probably,
however, give its consent to the UN's candidate for the third
member slot on the CMP "in a couple of days."


9. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Schlicher will see SRSG Moeller on
April 6 -- and we are also seeking readouts from Greek
Cypriot sources -- to triangulate a more complete picture of
what happened on March 31 and get a sense of where the
process will go from here. Even considering the
one-sidedness of the Turkish Cypriot readout, it seems clear
that the parties are still far from agreement on even the
most basic procedural issues. For their part, the Greek
Cypriots are still enjoying the sense that they continue to
have momentum created by the February 28 Paris meeting, and
by bumbling Turkish Cypriot reactions thereto. The Turkish
Cypriots would do well to find ways to avoid letting
Papadopoulos paint them into the naysayer's corner. The UN
definitely has its work cut out for it. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER