PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000455 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN CY SUBJECT: PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT THAT UN PROCESS, TURKISH EU ACCESSION, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS ALL GOING HIS WAY Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In one-on-one Sunday lunch, Ambassador Schlicher and President Papadopoulos discussed prospects for moving forward with "technical talks" between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as Turkey's EU accession process and domestic political jockeying in advance of the May 21 Parliamentary elections. Although he seemed somewhat tired, Papadopoulos exuded the confident air of a politician who senses that the game is moving in his direction. Papadopoulos agreed with the Ambassador that the technical committees should begin work as soon as possible, but stressed that issues of substance would also have to be addressed. Papadopoulos expressed generic support for Turkey's EU agenda, but warned that he would defend Cyprus' national interests in the accession process and would not allow Ankara to slough off its obligations. The Ambassador emphasized the need for Cyprus to exercise extreme caution in handling this issue as a derailment of Turkey's EU accession negotiations would almost certainly have immediate and adverse reflections on the Cyprus problem. Papadopoulos noted that there were a number of options available short of killing the process altogether. On elections, Papadopoulos predicted that his own DIKO would improve its position and AKEL would likely retain the title as the single largest party. End Summary. Technical Talks Are Not Enough -------------- ¶2. (C) In a private lunch on March 26 hosted by President Papadopoulos, Ambassador Schlicher stressed the importance of allowing the UN-led "technical committees" to begin their work without conditioning this on an agreement for handling the so-called political issues. We had been giving this same message to the Turkish Cypriot side and the Ambassador noted that he would reinforce this in his March 27 meeting with Talat (septel). Papadopoulos replied that he saw no reason why the technical committees should not start work in those areas where there was clear agreement, but, "as I repeatedly told Annan," he added, "the issues of substance must also be addressed. The Ambassador stressed that the USG also recognized the need for a political track, and the sooner the parties engaged with Moeller and let the technical committees get to work the sooner we would all see how to flesh out such a track. ¶3. (C) Papadopoulos asked, in a largely rhetorical fashion, why the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara had reacted so badly to the Paris meeting when "if they actually read the statement, they would find things in it that Annan intended for them." The Ambassador noted that the Turkish Cypriots seemed to be responding to the government spokesman's spin rather than to the actual communique. Papadopoulos replied that a few days post-Paris he and his government had consciously toned down their reactions. The government's response to the Gambari letter to Talat would be equally circumspect. "There are things in the letter that we do not like and do not consider especially accurate," the President said, adding that this was acceptable if it helped get the parties to the table. It was possible, Papadopoulos mused, that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would try to freeze the technical committees until after the parliamentary elections in May in the hope of damaging the President's party. "This would mean," however, "that they don't understand the politics on this side." EU/Turkey "Club" -------------- ¶4. (C) The President then turned to the issue of Turkey's EU accession process and expressed considerable surprise that Ankara "not even making a pretense that would help in the fall's review." Alluding to a putative statement by Assistant Secretary Fried to Foreign Minister Iacovou that the United States "will not let" Cyprus obstruct Turkey's EU track, Papadopoulos said that "the real question for your government should be whether you are going to allow the Turkish military to obstruct Erdogan." The Ambassador stressed the need for Cyprus to exercise extreme caution in handling this issue since a derailment in Turkey's EU accession process -- in addition to the strategic stakes involved -- would almost certainly have immediate and adverse reflections on the Cyprus problem. Papadopoulos agreed, but noted that, firstly, no one should expect him to compromise on Cyprus' national interests for the sake of facilitating movement in Turkey's negotiations with the EU when Ankara was trying to slough off its obligations. Secondly, Papadopoulos maintained that several EU states -- not only Cyprus -- would be making an anti-Turkey case in the review process. The Ambassador reiterated his warning about the dangers for Cyprus of a breakdown in Turkey's EU accession process. Papadopoulos again agreed, but Turkey had to decide whether it wanted to join the EU "club" or not. The President further mused that there were various potential options short of killing the accession process, including: suspension, postponement, and identifying specific "benchmarks" that could re-start a stalled process. Kids Just Don't Listen -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Papadopoulos for his views on the May 21 parliamentary elections. Papadopoulos noted that he had instructed his ministers to keep their involvement in the campaigning to an absolute minimum, since things said in the heat of political combat could have a negative impact on the post-election task of governing. He believed his DIKO party could improve its position by as many as 5-8 percentage points. AKEL and DISY would both be slightly down. The race between them for the first position would be extremely close, but Papadopoulos felt AKEL would probably retain that distinction. The President believed that his son, Nicholas, a DIKO candidate in Nicosia, was doing reasonably well so far. He claimed, however, to have counseled the 34-year-old that he was moving into electoral politics too quickly. Papadopoulos would have preferred that Nicholas spend more time securing his position in the family law firm before running for office. His political life could now put him at a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis the children of other senior partners in the firm. Papadopoulos suspected that Nicholas' substantial trust fund from his mother's side of the family had undercut his commitment to the law firm. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Papadopoulos seemed tired and somewhat haggard through the conversation, he exuded the air of a politician who sensed the game was going in his direction. Moreover, it seemed clear that -- whether or not the technical talks process ultimately takes off -- the President believes his domestic interests are covered as long as it is the Turkish Cypriot side that is seen as doing the foot-dragging. END COMMENT. SCHLICHER