WHAT NEXT AFTER PARIS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 00352 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV UN CY SUBJECT: WHAT NEXT AFTER PARIS? REF: NICOSIA 294 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Action requested in para 11. ¶2. (C) Summary: One week after the Papadopoulos -Annan meeting in Paris, it is clear that the UN and UNFICYP have considerable fence-mending to do with Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots -- still angry over the communique that seemed to indicate they had agreed to discuss the status of Varosha, demilitarization, and similar hot-button issues in "technical talks" with the Greek Cypriots -- have suspended all communication with the UN until "President" Talat returns from his hospitalization in Istanbul. There is a risk that this freeze on communications could seriously set back UN efforts to appoint a new third member to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is increasingly open in its suspicion of UN SRSG Michael Moller, whom they see as reflexively sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot side. UNFICYP is frustrated with what it sees as unwarranted Greek Cypriot triumphalism and irritated that the Turkish Cypriots are taking their cues from the Greek Cypriot press spin rather than from the UN. In developing our own position on the technical talks, it is quite possible that our interest in supporting the UN and our interest in supporting Ankara's EU-accession process will conflict. Our recommendation in discussing the next steps with UNFICYP and others would be to offer strong support for the talks as long as they are limited to the ten topics agreed to by the Turkish Cypriot side. In terms of the bigger picture, we are concerned that Ankara has lost the initiative on the Cyprus issue and FM Gul's January proposal seems unlikely to relieve Turkey of its Cyprus obligations. We may want to have a frank conversation with Ankara about putting a more serious Cyprus package on the table and thus putting the burden back on Tassos Papadopoulos. End Summary. What Did They Agree To? -------------- ¶3. (C) Turkish Cypriot sources have told us that they -- and Ankara -- are still quite angry about the communique that emerged from the February 28 Paris talks. So far, the UN has been unable to mollify them. FM Gul pointedly refused to see SRSG Michael Moller on his recent visit to Turkey, pawning him off on lower-level officials and speaking directly with the UNSYG by phone to voice his disconQnt with the results of the Paris meeting. Moller's request to meet with Talat in his Istanbul hospital room was similarly rebuffed. Meanwhile -- back on Cyprus -- the Turkish Cypriot authorities are increasingly vocal in their suspicion and hostility towards Moller. The Turkish Cypriots are well aware that Moller spent a part of his childhood in Greece and speaks decent Greek. In and of itself, this warrants enough evidence for the Turkish Cypriots to suspect Moller of being reflexively sympathetic to Greek Cypriot positions. "Presidential Undersecretary" Rasit Pertev, who would likely head up Turkish Cypriot participation in any technical level dialogue, has been particularly vociferous in his criticism of the SRSG. Our British colleagues told us that in their last meeting Pertev had exclaimed, "I trust him (Moller) less than I trust Papadopoulos." ¶4. (C) The Turkish Cypriots still seem somewhat uncertain about how to respond to the challenge posed by the Paris communique and the triumphalist Greek Cypriot spin. The anticipated March 3 meeting to discuss the agenda for the proposed technical-level talks never materialized and Pertev told the UN that the Turkish Cypriots were freezing communications with UNFICYP until Talat returned to the island. The head of civil affairs at UNFICYP, Susan Allee, expressed considerable frustration over the inclination of the Turkish Cypriots to take their cues from the Greek Cypriot press rather than the first-hand UN reporting on the Paris talks. Allee told us that she and Moller had both been taken aback by the Greek Cypriots aggressive spinning of the Paris talks. An objective reading of the communique would make clear that demilitarization, demining and Famagusta/Varosha were not included as agreed agenda items in the technical talks. The UN did not agree with the Greek Cypriot interpretation of the communique, but was still considering how best to respond. ¶5. (C) The Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, continue to muddy the waters. In his most recent statements, President Papadopoulos helpfully "explained" that "there are two parallel procedures; one concerned with the preparation of talks on substantial aspects of the Cyprus problem and the other the creation of a better climate. One course depends on the progress of the other and it is neither proper nor accurate to say that what was agreed in Paris concerned only measures that would make the operation of the Turkish Cypriot regime easier." This interpretation of the Paris talks seems wildly fanciful and does not track at all with the readout we have from Moller (reftel). What Were They Thinking? -------------- ¶6. (C) The Paris meeting represents a significant pre-electoral gift to Tassos Papadopoulos, even though it was likely intended as a vehicle for putting pressure on the Greek Cypriot leader. Michael Moller is smart, experienced, and capable, but he is also eager and ambitious to acquire more turf. The Greek Cypriot leadership senses this eagerness, and Papadopoulos seems clearly to have out-negotiated the UN in preparing the text of the communique. Holding technical-level talks is not a bad idea (nor a new one),but the clumsy handling of the Paris meeting puts the process at an immediate disadvantage. The Turkish Cypriots feel like they have been victimized by some kind of bait-and-switch, further undermining the already dim prospects for these talks to produce much in the way of value and substance. Ankara has also reportedly been sending unambiguous signals to the Turkish Cypriots to toughen up their position on EU aid. Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Industries head Salih Tunar told us that on a recent trip to Ankara, Turkish officials told him and Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce head Erdil Nami to be firm in rejecting any attempt by the EU to impose conditions on the assistance. ¶7. (C) The Turkish Cypriot freeze on communication with the UN threatens to undo the hard work that has gone into identifying a new third member for the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). The Greek Cypriot side has already approved the SYG's choice -- a Swiss national with considerable ICRC experience named Christophe Girod -- but the UN is still waiting for Talat's approval. There is a real risk of losing Girod to another opportunity if the UN is unable to make him a firm offer soon. That would be a serious setback to efforts to reinforce and strengthen the work of the CMP to the point where it can finally begin resolving outstanding cases. What Are We Going To Do About It? -------------- ¶8. (C) Questions of the UN's handling of the Paris talks aside, we do need to decide how activist we want to be in supporting the technical talks. Here there is a real risk that our impulse to support the SYG and his role and our desire to support Ankara will conflict. The Greek Cypriots are already crowing that the Paris communique has supplanted the Gul proposal from January linking Cypriot access to Turkish ports to progress in easing Turkish Cypriot isolation. So far, the UK has been considerably more forward-leaning than we have in welcoming the "agreement" on technical level talks. The UN will naturally be looking to us for support, both in terms of defending Moller's objectivity and professionalism with the Turkish Cypriots and with the talks themselves. UNFICYP has already indicated an interest in what our ACT program could do to support the work of the various committees envisioned in the agreement. We should think carefully about how we are going to respond. ¶9. (C) Our recommendation would be to offer complete and unequivocal support for the technical level talks as they were originally agreed by the Turkish Cypriots. This would mean an agenda limited to the ten topics outlined in the letters exchanged between Moller and Talat before the Paris meeting: health, environment, water management, waste management, money laundering, crime prevention, road safety, immigration and trafficking, crisis management and humanitarian issues. As Pertev explained to us, these are areas where the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots will need to work out modalities of cooperation "even if Cyprus remains divided forever." Our further recommendation is that, when asked about Famagusta/Varosha in the context of the technical-level talks, we say that these talks cannot be a substitute for a political-level process aimed at resolving fundamental security, property, and other issues; we will support the efforts of the UN and the parties to make quick progress on all these fronts. ¶10. (C) At the same time, we believe it is important to have a serious discussion with Turkey about the risks attendant to losing the initiative on the Cyprus issue. Papadopoulos has been relatively successful -- largely because of the EU timetable -- in putting the ball back in Turkey's court without having had to actually return serve. Gul's January proposal has generated little sustained interest and it seems unlikely to relieve Ankara of the burden of the Cyprus issue. We may want to suggest to Ankara the possibility of regaining the initiative in a way that serves its EU-accession interests by putting a serious Cyprus package on the table that would involve painful concessions on the part of all concerned. This should be presented as parallel to the technical talks, rather than a substitute. Both we and Turkey want to maintain the centrality of the UN's role on the Cyprus issue. Our own ideas in this regard would involve something along the following lines: Turkey agrees to: -- Open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic; -- Return Varosha to Greek Cypriot control; and, -- Stop blackballing Cyprus in international organizations. The ROC agrees to: -- Direct trade through the port of Famagusta under the auspices of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and/or of the EU; -- Direct flights out of Ercan airport, with the airport to be under temporary EU administration; and, -- Easing up on the restrictions imposed on the use of EU assistance to the Turkish Cypriots. This is a serious package that would be well received in Europe. It is also highly unlikely that the Greek Cypriot side would agree to this, or any other proposal that would include legitimizing flights to and from Ercan airport. Putting a set of ideas like this on the table, in addition to creating a serious political debate in the Greek Cypriot community, would allow Ankara to reclaim the initiative and reduce the building pressure from the EU for Turkey to meet its customs union obligations without the expectation of further sweeteners. ¶11. (C) Post requests guidance from the Department to use with UNFICYP and others in discussing next steps in the technical committees. SCHLICHER