GOC "INCENSED" BY U.S. MESSAGE ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV EU CY SUBJECT: GOC "INCENSED" BY U.S. MESSAGE ON TURKEY AND CYPRUS REF: SECSTATE 16987 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d ¶1. (C) On March 2, Erato Marcoullis, Director of the MFA's Cyprus Question Division, called in Polchief to complain at considerable length about the message on Cyprus and Turkey that reftel authorized EU posts to deliver as appropriate. The GOC had obtained a copy of a non-paper version of the points from Athens and strongly objected to the content. Marcoullis told Polchief she had instructions to deliver a "strong demarche" to us in response. (Note: We did ask Marcoullis if her MFA had any other kind of demarche.) The GOC, Marcoullis explained, was incensed at the United States' interjecting itself into what was strictly an internal EU affair. The United States reflexively took Turkey's side in any dispute, and Marcoullis herself strongly suspected that the Gul proposal from January 24 had, in fact, been drafted in Washington. ¶2. (C) Marcoullis took particular offense at the language in the U.S. paper noting our belief that "issues related to Cyprus and Turkey, including those directly affecting the EU, will only be resolved via a UN-negotiated comprehensive settlement" It was "offensive" (and Marcoullis used this word quite frequently in our conversation) for the United States to insist that Turkey's EU obligations, and in particular application of the customs union agreement, was in any way an issue for the UN. This was strictly a matter between the EU and Turkey, and the only role for the United States that the ROC would welcome would be in making clear to Ankara that it had no alternative to meeting its obligations. Cyprus intended to make a formal complaint to the EU about U.S. interference. ¶3. (C) Marcoullis further complained about the United States circulating a position paper "behind our backs." At a minimum, we should have provided Cyprus with a courtesy copy of the U.S. position. The United States was always quick to speak out publicly in support of Turkey, but we had been noticeably silent on the issue of the Paris talks between President Papadopoulos and UNSYG Annan. Within an hour of Gul's proposal, the U.S. had been ready with a public endorsement. Why the conspicuous silence on the Paris meeting? ¶4. (C) Polchief stressed that there was nothing in the reftel message on Cyprus and Turkey that we had not said both publicly and privately many times. We had had this same conversation with GOC officials -- including Marcoullis herself -- on numerous occasions. There was nothing sinister in the United States' not providing an advance copy of the message to the GOC. We simply did not believe that such an exercise would have been productive. The charge that the United States had drafted the Gul proposal on the mutual easing of restrictions was baseless. Our public statements had made clear that we were prepared to welcome all creative and original ideas aimed at reinvigorating the Cyprus dialogue. If the GOC did not like the Gul proposal, it should come forward with some ideas of its own. Moreover, we could not accept that the issue of Turkish accession to the EU, was of no interest to the United States. The EU, the ROC, Ankara and the U.S. had a common interest in ensuring that the accession process was productive and ultimately successful. Cyprus could hold a firm, legalistic line on Turkey's implementing the customs union agreement, but this was likely to result in a political crisis at some point in the next year that would serve no one's interest. Alternatively, Cyprus could support a more creative approach aimed at helping Turkey create the political space necessary to fulfill its obligations. This was by far, the wiser course of action. SCHLICHER