"OSMOSIS" AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS: IT'S ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000024 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY SUBJECT: "OSMOSIS" AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS: IT'S ALL GREEK TO ME REF: NICOSIA 2024 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkish Cypriots fear that the Greek Cypriot side is increasingly disinterested in a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution to the Cyprus problem, and is intent on simply absorbing Turkish Cypriots into the ROC through a process of "osmosis." Buoyed by the confidence and real leverage that comes with EU membership, Turkish Cypriots see the current Greek Cypriot leadership as committed to undoing the long-standing consensus on federalism and pursuing a unitary, centralized state in which Turkish Cypriots would be afforded limited, minority rights. Scholarships, ROC passports, free health care, and trade with and through the south are understood as "Trojan carrots" intended as bait to co-opt a desperate Turkish Cypriot public. While President Papadopoulos did, in fact, use the term "osmosis" in his last address to the UNGA, this word seems at least as reflective of Turkish Cypriot anxieties as it does of Greek Cypriot policies. Even paranoids have enemies, however, and there is a long history on this island of the Greek Cypriot majority whittling away at rights and privileges for the Turkish Cypriots that they had previously accepted. Moreover, there are many on the Greek Cypriot side who have fixated on the idea of a "European solution" to the Cyprus problem that bears more than a passing resemblance to the Turkish Cypriots' understanding of "osmosis." Partly as a consequence of this and more directly as a result of the perceived failure by the EU to keep its promises on easing Turkish Cypriot isolation, the Union's standing and credibility in the north has eroded considerably. End Summary. Greek 101: The Genesis of Osmosis...a Study in Hubris -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Increasingly, Turkish Cypriot fears that Greek Cypriots are implacably intent on exercising dominion over the entire island without resort to a bizonal, bicommunal compromise have crystallized around a single Greek word: "osmosis." In his introductory calls on the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Ambassador Schlicher heard this same phraseology from both "President" Talat and "Foreign Minister" Denktash (reftel). Anxiety over "osmosis" is also cropping up regularly in our conversations with Turkish Cypriot academics, journalists and various political strap-hangers. From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, "The Osmotic Solution" (which sounds like either the title for a Robert Ludlum novel or a New Wave band from the 80s) represents an affirmative policy choice on the part of the Greek Cypriot leadership -- and in particular President Papadopoulos -- to force Turkish Cypriots to accommodate themselves to ROC authority and Greek Cypriot dominance. ¶3. (C) In this view, EU membership has so strengthened the Greek Cypriot hand vis-a-vis both the north and Ankara that the leadership in the south no longer feels constrained by the 30-year-old mantra of bicommunal, bizonal federation. Over time, the Turkish Cypriots argue, the Greek Cypriots believe they can co-opt and absorb Turkish Cypriots through economic hegemonism and the strategic use of "Trojan carrots" (our terms, not theirs) such as EU passports, ROC-controlled EU scholarships, subsidized tuition at Greek Cypriot private schools, and managed opportunities for trade with and through the south. Greek Cypriot insistence on maintaining the political and economic isolation of the north are understood by Turkish Cypriots as an effort to close down other outlets and force Turkish Cypriots to engage with the outside world through the "semi-permeable membrane" of the buffer zone. As an added benefit for the Greek Cypriots, Turkish "settlers" are barred from sharing in the spoils of ROC statehood. Enticing the Turkish Cypriot elite to participate more fully in ROC-controlled programs is one more tool available to the Greek Cypriots to differentiate the Turkish Cypriots from Turkish settlers and at least slow the creeping legitimization of the settler community. ¶4. (C) The genesis of "osmosis" as the new term of art in political circles in the north is evidently the last sentence of Papadopoulos' speech to the 60th UNGA in New York last September. The Cypriot President told delegates "we also visualize that, with Cyprus' membership to the European Union taking solid roots, a settlement would encompass an integration of the currently occupied area to the characteristics of a European society and the standards of the acquis communautaire in full harmony and osmosis with the rest of the island." This sentence is no less awkward or ambiguous in the original Greek. "Osmosis" has not been a significant word in the Greek Cypriot lexicon. In fact, the President's UNGA speech is the only reference we can find to a senior Greek Cypriot political figure actually using that word publicly. Even Paranoids Have Enemies -------------- ¶5. (C) Although this single and ambiguous reference to "osmosis" seems like rather thin gruel to outsiders, it resonates with the Turkish Cypriots' understanding of their own history. The Turkish Cypriots can point to numerous Greek Cypriot actions since the founding of the Republic aimed at ensuring the long-term political and economic dominance of the vastly larger Greek Cypriot community. From the very beginning, Turkish Cypriots argue, Greek Cypriots looked at their community as a threat that they needed to both contain and dominate. Early on in the brief history of the ROC, Greek Cypriots refused to allow Turkish Cypriots to establish separate municipalities in the five major cities -- a right they theoretically enjoyed under the constitution -- arguing that these entities would be too small to be economically viable. The thirteen changes to the constitution that Archbishop Makarios introduced in 1963 were pegged to "functionality," but seemed clearly designed to strengthen Greek Cypriot control of the state at the expense of Turkish Cypriot autonomy. The proposal included abolition of veto powers at the executive level, eliminating the requirement for separate majorities in adopting legislation in key areas, and reducing the proportion of Turkish Cypriots employed in the public sector. ¶6. (C) It is relatively easy to draw a straight line from Makarios' thirteen points -- which ultimately precipitated the political crisis and intercommunal violence that led the UNSC to establish the UNFICYP mission in 1964 -- to Papadopoulos' April 2004 speech rejecting the Annan Plan as an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem. A few quotes from that speech are instructive: -- "The Annan Plan does not lead to the reunification of the two communities, but on the contrary promotes the permanent division with restrictions on movement, settlement, the right to acquire property, the exercise of political rights and other divisive elements." -- "(Under the Annan Plan) a separate economy was imposed in the end. There will be no common monetary or fiscal policy and no investments by Greek Cypriot businesses shall be allowed in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state." -- "(With the Annan Plan) the goal of the Turkish Cypriot side for two peoples, with two states living separately and simply cooperating is fully achieved." ¶7. (C) Since 2004, the rhetoric of the Papadopoulos administration has continued to fuel Turkish Cypriot fears that the Greek Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan in reality represent a back-door rejection of the long-standing consensus goal of bizonal, bicommunal federation. In an interview with the influential daily Phileleftheros in November, the President's Diplomatic Advisor, Tasos Tzionis, sharply criticized both the framework of the Annan Plan negotiations and the plan's underlying philosophy. Although Tzionis stressed that this represented simply his "personal views," Turkish Cypriots are convinced that this interview was a deliberate attempt to nudge the settlement goal post back in the direction of an "osmotic," unitary state. The EU as Villain -------------- ¶8. (C) Greek Cypriots do not talk about "osmosis," but many talk about their hopes for a "European Solution" to the Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriots are attracted in particular to the acquis' four freedoms concerning the movement of goods, people, capital and services. Not coincidentally, those advocating a European Solution are also chief among those who argue that the EU should have a significantly greater voice in future Cyprus negotiations. Some, but by no means a majority, are prepared to say that the EU rather than UN should have primary responsibility for the negotiating process. Turkish Cypriots understand the talk of a "European Solution" -- correctly in our view -- as code for a unitary state with majority rule and very limited minority rights for Turkish Cypriots. This is anathema for the leadership in the north. The Turkish Cypriots' greatest fear is that the Greek Cypriots are not (and, in fact, may never have been) serious about a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution, but rather intend to hold out for a controlling stake in any new state that might emerge from negotiations. ¶9. (C) Meanwhile, the EU is sinking ever lower in Turkish Cypriot estimations. The recent fiasco over the aid and trade packages highlights what Turkish Cypriots see as the EU's failure to deliver on its commitments. Among the 25, Turkish Cypriots see only the UK as serious about easing Turkish Cypriot isolation. The majority of member states are seen as disinterested at best and, at worst, slavishly deferential to GOC prerogatives on the Cyprus issue. The decision to appoint a Greek Cypriot to head up the European Commission Office on Cyprus has further undermined both the standing and credibility of the EU in Turkish Cypriot eyes. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Webster's defines "osmosis" as "a gradual, often unconscious process of absorption." It may be more useful, therefore, to think about osmosis in the Cyprus context as a description of what Turkish Cypriots fear is happening to their community rather than a deliberate and fully-conscious Greek Cypriot policy. EU membership has made the carrots available to the ROC significantly more enticing. Many Turkish Cypriots seem prepared to compromise on certain principles if the reward is great enough and the cost seemingly small. Most Turkish Cypriots, for example, have taken the plunge and applied for ROC passports. Rauf Denktash once said that Turkish Cypriots who took this step were traitors to their own people. Now, his own grandson has a ROC passport. Each Turkish Cypriot will draw the line of accommodation in a different place. Some will use the hospitals in the south, but not the schools. Others will exercise the right to a passport but not the right to vote. The fear of at least some in the north is that this will prove a slippery slope and that taking the first step may make it easier, over time, for Turkish Cypriots to accept greater GOC control over their affairs. SCHLICHER