GOVERNMENT OF NIGER (GON) CANCELS MILITARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000864 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDED ADDRESSEES NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR ALLEN EUCOM FOR AMBASSADOR YATES E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL NG SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF NIGER (GON) CANCELS MILITARY EXERCISES POTENTIALLY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY BERNADETTE M. ALLEN, AMBASSADOR, REASONS: 1.4 (A) & (D) ¶1. (S/NF). Summary. Without any prior warning or earlier indications of concern from GON military or civilian officials, GON President Mamadou Tandja cancelled a planned August 15-30, 2006, military exercise on the eve preceding the anticipated arrival of a JCET. To obtain clarity on the reason for the last minute cancellation, Embassy DATT Lt Col Hughes and I met with GON Minister of Defense Hassane Souley on August 14. I also reached by phone GON Minister of Foreign Affairs Aichatou Mindaoudou in Paris (on medical leave for an ulcer) on the night of August 14 to discuss the matter and, subsequently, met with her (unaccompanied) in Niamey on the morning of August 16. FM Mindaoudou stressed that President Tandja is adamant about the GON not going forward with the previously planned exercise at this time, due to the "environmental context", specifically recent events in neighboring Mali. In the separate meetings with the DefMin and FM, both expressed GON concern about the visual of 80 parachutists in a region so near the Mali border and the possible misinterpretationo of the exercise by agitators in the region (creating an unwanted magnet effect). Moreover, Mindaoudou noted (stating that she was doing so in confidence) that Libya exerts pressure as it relates to Niger's military cooperation and that Tandja expressed concern about possible support coming from sources in Libya to agitators if the exercise were to occur at this time. (Note: Libyan Ambassador to Niger Alboukhari Salem HODA is the dean of the diplomatic corps. During my courtesy call on him, I learned that he is not a career diplomat, rather a personal friend of Libyan leader Khaddafi on a political appointment as Ambassador to Niger. End note.) Mindaoudou stated that the cancellation of this exercise is an anomaly, that there remains interest in conducting such an exercise in the long term, but the GON does not see a possibility of conducting such an exercise before the end of the fiscal year. Further, she emphasized that the GON is still a partner in the global war on terrorism (GWOT),values its partnership with the USG and very much wants to continue the outstanding cooperation it has with the USG on military matters and in other domains. (Comment: While no GON official has stated the recent crisis in the Middle East had an effect on the GON's actions, Embassy believes the crisis may have played a role in Tandja's thinking. Local Lebanese restaurants around town have been posting graphic photographs of the situation in Lebanon and local Islamic leaders have held peaceful demonstrations/vigils of support for the Lebanese people, while condemning the actions of Israel. Moreover, GON Prime Minister Hama Amadou, in response to a Lebanon-related foreign policy question he received during a press conference on a range of issues (primarily with a domestic focus),made a point of stating that the GON has no diplomatic relations with Israel and that the GON wanted a cessation of the violence. End comment.) In sum, having U.S. boots on the ground clearly is too uncomfortable for the GON at this time, though Embassy notes that the GON was similarly uncomfortable with another exercise earlier this year, causing a change of venue. Additionally, though neither the DefMin nor FM indicated a long term postponement of military exercises and suggested that activities could resume at a later date, discontented working level contacts in the Defense Ministry informed Embassy DATT that they do not expect to be able to conduct any "boots-related" exercises for the remainder of the calendar year. Embassy will take advantage of Admiral McCraven's imminent visit to further discuss with senior GON officials the possible timeframe for resumption of military exercises in Niger. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Embassy DATT and I met with DefMin Souley (together with GON Col. Garba) concerning the scheduled August 15-30 JCET exercise, as well as the overall mil-to-mil relationship. I expressed USG disappointment that the exercise was cancelled at the last minute, noting the planning time and the tremendous amount of human and material resources that would be lost as a result. I emphasized to Souley that we consider the GON a strong partner in the GWOT, that we believed that the planned exercise would have been extremely beneficial to both partners. Further, I stated that we needed clarity (without the sugar coating) as to why the exercise had been cancelled, that we need to know whether we can count on partners to follow through with proposed activities. I stressed that EUCOM cannot risk planning exercises under a cloud of uncertainty and that a lack of confidence in the partner could lead to resources and training activities being diverted to more certain partners. NIAMEY 00000864 002 OF 003 I added that the USG hoped this was not an indication of the GON moving in a new direction. ¶3. (SBU) DefMin Souley assured me that the GON is not moving in another direction, that the GON remains a partner in the GWOT, as peace and stability is important for the region and the world. He indicated that the &environmental context8 caused the GON to cancel the exercise, as the GON is concerned that agitators in neighboring countries (most notably in Mali) might misread the exercise as a threatening operation and result in Niger receiving unwanted attention. He stated that I could get a more thorough explanation from the FonMin upon her return to the country, and reiterated the GON is not moving in a new direction. Souley asked about the possibility of delaying the exercise a bit and my discussing possible alternative time frames with the FM. He also asked whether the USG could propose annually a plan of activities for GON review. He spoke of other GON military needs (such as repair of its C-130). He also suggested that a signed annual agreement would be binding on the GON and would be consistent with what the GON does with other partners (notably France and Morocco),as opposed to dealing with military packages piece meal. ¶4. (SBU) DATT noted that the Embassy had proposed via diplomatic note that an annual plan be developed and that until today's meeting, the GON had not expressed any interest in such a course of action. He pointed out that the Embassy does provide a list of proposed activities with as much lead time as possible and would prefer to work from an annual or longer duration plan of activities. ¶5. (C) In reply to the DefMin's question about the possibility of delaying the exercise to a later period, the DATT and I indicated that the window to conduct the exercise was extremely short, noting the end of fiscal year and contractual obligations. We stated that we understood contractual obligations must be completed before COB Wednesday, August 16, but that DATT and I would check with the relevant parties whether a few days delay were possible. In response to the DefMin,s expressed interests in more bilateral mil-to-mil cooperation and other assistance (such as the repair of the C-130),I reminded him that Article 98 remains an obstacle. DATT added that we have managed the current level of cooperation under the OEF-TS counterterrorism umbrella, that with an Article 98 a wider range of cooperation would be possible. I closed by noting that it would be useful for both governments to formally outline its respective interests, so that we could compare notes and see what interests we have in common and what is doable, given the constraints of Article 98 and the OEF-TS program parameters. DefMin agreed and suggested that I raise that matter in my discussion with the FonMin. ¶6. (S/NF) I reached GON Foreign Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou (in Paris) by phone on the night of August 14, noting USG disappointment in the GON decision to cancel the exercise. Mindaoudou asked me when the exercise was to take place. (Note: That information had been sent by diplomatic note to the Min. of Defense (MOD) through the Min. of Foreign Affairs (MFA) months ago. End note.) I informed the FonMin that the team was to arrive this week and that I understood that we had a short window to proceed with the exercise due to end of fiscal year obligations, that Wednesday, Aug 16 is the critical date. She asked whether I could look into the possibility of delaying the exercise a few days, that she would have a better sense of things upon return to Niamey. I agreed to her request and we agreed to meet Wednesday, Aug 16 at 9:00am at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that point, Embassy remained optimistic that the exercise could possibly move forward, only slightly delayed. ¶7. (S/NF) In my meeting with FM Mindaoudou this morning (August 16),she informed me that it was President Tandja who called off the exercise due his concerns about the recent events in Mali and concerns that the exercise might attract the wrong kind of attention from agitators in the area. She said the President was particularly nervous about the timing of the exercise so close to the recent attacks on the military base in Kidal and that he was feeling some pressure from Libya. (Comment: Although President Tandja is the President of ECOWAS, Embassy has not seen him use the power of that position to influence matters in the region. End comment.) Mindaoudou indicated that the GON remains interested in this type of exercise, but at a later period down the road. I reminded the FM that this exercise had been programmed some time ago, reiterated the points I made with NIAMEY 00000864 003 OF 003 the DefMin on August 14 about the extensive preparation time and tremendous amount of human and material resources that has been expended to date for the exercise. I stressed that if there were no possibility to conduct the exercise this fiscal year, it would weigh heavily on USG decision making for future GON training requests. I added that I hoped this was not an indication that the GON was going in another direction in the GWOT. I also raised the possibility of including the MFA in informational meetings on the various military activities/programs that might be feasible for the GON, and Mindaoudou responded that her military liaison officer would be available for such meetings. ¶8. (S) The FM (as was the case with the DefMin) also emphasized that President Tandja wanted it made clear that the GON is still a partner in the GWOT and very much wants to continue the outstanding relationship and cooperation it has with the USG. She also noted that President Tandja is aware the Nigerien military is extremely unhappy about the President,s decision to call off the exercise, but that Tandja is adamant that the current timing is not good. She reiterated a hope that the exercise could be revived at some point at a later date, possibly next fiscal year. ¶9. (S/NF) At both the DefMin and FM meetings, we discussed Admiral McCraven,s imminent visit next week, as well as the opportunity the Admiral's visit presents to discuss the US-Nigerien mil-to-mil relationship. I reiterated that it would be useful for the MFA to be represented in some of the military meetings, to ensure there is no breakdown in communication. The FM indicated that her military liaison officer will prepared to attend meetings to which he is invited. She also informed me that she will be in town for the next ten days and available as needed. ¶10. (U) In sum, there appears to be no possibility for the proposed exercise to go forward this fiscal year, and potentially for the remainder of the calendar year. Admiral McCraven,s imminent visit next week is indeed timely and will be useful in our dialogue with the Nigeriens on military matters. ALLEN