NIGER: THE LATEST ON PRIVATIZATION

UNCLAS NIAMEY 000515 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE C O R R E C T E D COPY (CAPTION ADDED) LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EIND EINV PGOV KPRV XA NG SUBJECT: NIGER: THE LATEST ON PRIVATIZATION REF: A.) NIAMEY 1302 NOV 05 ¶1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Econoff Gage met with representatives of the Government of Niger (GON),companies and the World Bank (IBRD) to produce the following status report on privatization in Niger. GON privatization efforts have advanced since 1996, when Niger codified in law the desire to privatize 12 firms with a share held by the state. Four firms remain that have varying levels of ownership by the GON. However, excepting a hotel, these firms are unlikely to be privatized in the near future. Rather than rush to privatize, the two most economically important firms, the national electrical company (NIGELEC) and the petroleum distribution company (SONIDEP) will attempt to restructure, with a reluctant blessing by the World Bank (IBRD). END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In the 1960s, shortly after Niger's independence, a number of companies were created by the GON. These state owned entities functioned effectively, in some individuals' opinions, until the 1980s. However, other allegations of mismanagement and misuse of companies' operating funds were used as justifications to push for privatization, or even liquidation, such as occurred with the Bank of Development of the Republic of Niger (BDRN). From 1993-1994, the GON and the World Bank (IBRD) began targeting the structure of remaining state owned enterprises. In 1996, Niger passed legislation to privatize 12 state owned firms, which occurred at a steady rate through 2002, after which privatization stalled. -------------- WHAT WAS PRIVATIZED -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In 1996 Niger passed legislation formally providing for the privatization of 12 GON owned firms. Not all 12 have been privatized, with one being removed from privatization efforts through legislative mandate, another being liquidated and, as listed previously, others not attracting sufficient outside interest. Also, other firms were added to the legislative list for privatization subsequent to 1996. Ten years after Niger formalized via law the concept of privatizing several enterprises with a share held by the GON the following firms have been successfully privatized. a) Cement Company (Societe Nigerienne de Cimenterie - SNC) b) Milk Company (Office du Lait du Niger - OLANI) c) Public Works Company (Societe de Location de Material des Travaux Publics - SLMTP) d) Textile Company (Societe Nigerienne de Textiles - SONITEXTIL) e) Phone Company (Societe Nigerienne des Telecommunications - SONITEL) f) Water Company (Societe Nationale des Eaux - SNE) g) Transport Company (Societe Nationale des Transports Nigeriens - SNTN) -------------- COMPANIES REMAINING FOR PRIVATIZATION -------------- NIGELEC (Societe Nigerienne d'Electricite): ¶4. (SBU) As Niger's primary electricity provider and producer, NIGELEC receives approximately 85-90% of its power from Nigeria. Compared to other West African companies, NIGELEC does a decent job of providing service to urban communities; nevertheless, customers complain about high rates and frequent power surges and cuts, particularly during the hot season. NIGELEC's privatization is problematic, with each of the two bidders seeking the contract posing different sets of problems (the same two firms have been the only participants in two separate tender offers). While the French multi-national Vivendi has probably the better technical package, civil society and the opposition would probably chaff at a French takeover of NIGELEC. Of greater concern to the GON would be fear of a backlash by the rival bidder, the Nigerian National Electric Power Authority (NEPA),who already supplies most power to NIGELEC at subsidized "fraternal" rates, were Vivendi to win the contract. ¶5. (SBU) Moreover, the entire question of privatizing electrical power distribution is politicized, with opponents (including inside the GON) arguing that keeping NIGELEC under state control is in Niger's strategic interest. Many average Nigeriens fear that with privatization, prices will only go higher and planned rural and secondary cities' electrification projects will stop. NIGELEC's Secretary General (SG) reports that the IBRD has some sympathy to GON concerns, and thus is not pushing hard for early privatization of the company. The IBRD recognizes that Niger can obtain outside loans for increasing the size of its electric grid but is also conscious that there is a point at which it might have to provide financial support directly to the GON. ¶6. (SBU) Thus the IBRD is focusing on improving NIGELEC's governance and international management controls. According to the SG, NIGELEC has been able to pursue business goals in recent years without much GON interference because President Tandja has made it clear on a number of occasions that under no circumstances are NIGELEC's operating funds to be touched for the private gain of government officials. NIGELEC has also begun to crack down on private consumers who illegally access NIGELEC's grid, and the SG estimates NIGELEC has recovered 700,000,000 CFA (approximately 1,300,000 USD) by pursuing those who steal electricity. Thus, from 2000-2005, NIGELEC's profits increased by 87 percent and its value as an enterprise increased by 56 percent, according to the SG. Moreover, NIGELEC has spent nearly 60 million USD on rural electrification investments during the same period. The SG foresees significant future demand pressures to increase power generation to supply secondary cities as well as large scale rural irrigation projects. To generate such electricity the GON is considering building a coal-powered plant in the city of Tahoua. Its showcase project, however, would be to build the Kandaji dam northwest of Niamey, which many critics view as economically unfeasible and potentially environmentally unsound. SONIDEP (Societe Nigerienne des Produits Petroliers): ¶7. (SBU) SONIDEP is the national petroleum products distribution company and sole licensed fuel importer and depot operator in Niger. With privatization, the hope was that the monopoly SONIDEP holds on fuel importation and storage would end. The Director General (DG) of SONIDEP estimated that the goal of privatization was to put 70 percent of fuel importation and storage in private hands. Approximately 51 percent of SONIDEP was to be sold to institutional, private interests, 10 percent to non-institutional, private interests, and 5 percent to employees. The remaining 34 percent was to be retained by the GON. Tamoil, a Libyan oil company, and Total, a French concern, are the only two remaining, professional, private companies with a presence in Niger that might purchase a sizable portion of the 51 percent of SONIDEP set aside for purchase by clients of this type. Unfortunately, neither firm seems interested. Total is owed money by the GON for fuel sales. Stock in SONIDEP is unlikely to be exchanged to eliminate this debt. Tamoil claims to be making little profit in Niger and thus might have limited interest in taking on greater obligations in the country. Nigerien companies have bought 6 percent of SONIDEP's stock. Included in this group is the local fuel retailer, Tahirou Sikieye enterprises, an Ex-Im bank loan recipient. ¶8. (SBU) Despite these challenges, SONIDEP remains a somewhat more likely candidate for privatization than NIGELEC, not only because its domestic defenders are far less influential than NIGELEC's but also because the IBRD has pushed the GON harder to privatize SONIDEP. In 2000, SONIDEP and the GON agreed with the IBRD to allow SONIDEP to keep its importation and storage monopoly for the time being, if in return SONIDEP would sell stock in the company and simultaneously make itself attractive for investment by lowering debts and fixing management problems. The DG of SONIDEP seems to be making good on his agreement with the IBRD, as he has received a number of awards for his management including a decoration in December 2005 by the President of Niger. Also SONIDEP's future plans include upgrades to its Information Technology (IT) systems and International Standards Organization (ISO) certification. Should these reforms occur, and if the GON removes its remaining (comparatively low) fuel subsidies; meets Total's or Tamoil's contractual concerns; and cracks down on illegal fuel imports from Nigeria, then SONIDEP's privatization attractiveness will increase. HOTEL GAWEYE (Societe Proprietaire et Exploitante de l'Hotel Gaweye - SPEHG): ¶9. (SBU) The Gaweye is the premier hotel in Niamey, albeit in an uncrowded field. The GON owns 95 percent of the Gaweye, with 5 percent of the hotel held by private and public companies such as NIGELEC, Sonibank, etc. The hotel was constructed during the uranium price boom of the 70's and early 80's. The Gaweye's parent company SPEHG lacked hotel management experience and contracted running of the hotel to Accor, a French multinational, who managed the Gaweye from 1981 to 2003. However, occupancy rates dropped to between 30-40 percent, losses mounted for SPEHG, and the contract with Accor was not renewed. Since 2003 the Gaweye has been managed by a Nigerien Army Colonel, Amadou Halidou. Also in 2003, the Gaweye hosted the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) summit conference, and was refurbished. The GON footed the bill for refurbishment, but did not completely pay its primary contractors, a Croatian firm INGRA and a politically well connected Nigerien businessman, Moussa Dan Fulani. According to a senior SPEHG officials, the off-books repayment of these outstanding credits to Dan Fulani and INGRA is but one of several complicating factors behind the Gaweye privatization. ¶10. (SBU) The bigger factor preventing privatization is that the GON still wants to maintain overall ownership of the hotel while privatizing its management. The GON has made two attempts to privatize the Gaweye since Accor ceased managing the hotel. In the first GON call for bids for Gaweye privatization, only Accor and INGRA responded. For the second call for bids, only Accor and a Malian concern made offers. Both bids up to now have not been acceptable to the GON, probably because it has set unrealistic conditions for the bidders, namely that they pay a yearly rental fee as well as provide funding for periodic renovation of the hotel. NIGERIEN RICE COMPANY (Societe Le Riz du Niger - RINI): ¶11. (SBU) Although farthest along in the privatization process, RINI is THE least viable of the four firms still on blocks for privatization. RINI is a partially privatized concern, with the GON still holding 30 percent of its stock. The remaining shares are distributed amongst the employees, 35 percent, cooperative rice producers, 30 percent, and private investors, 5 percent. However, selling the remaining GON shares in RINI will be difficult. Financially, RINI is suffering. RINI needs 4 billion USD a year to buy the rice harvests, to provide financing to individual rice producers or cooperatives for the purchase of seed and fertilizer, and to process the rice itself. With no agricultural banking system in Niger, prohibitively high commercial lending rates and little time between the two rice growing seasons, RINI has been hard pressed to find this funding. ¶12. (SBU) There also are lingering unresolved legal questions as to the ownership of the land of one of the three RINI plants. Of more concern, these three plants produce at under 20 percent of their capacity. At least a million dollars would be required to refurbish the RINI facilities, and it appears that local traders have effective networks to purchase Niger's modest rice harvests directly from farmers and use rice processing factories in Nigeria and Burkina Faso. -------------- THE WORLD BANK AND NIGERIEN PRIVATIZATION -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The IBRD has financed an 18.6 million USD project that began in June 2005 and will end in December 2006 to aid in the privatization of remaining Nigerien companies. Much of these credits, however, will not be spent on privatization. The IBRD did provide for the continued funding of the Privatization Coordinating Cell (CCPP) within the structure of the GON. Some IBRD funding was also provided for general support to the private sector, specifically, to help address areas rated in the most recent IBRD report titled "Doing Business." The aspects rated in this report include: a) starting a business, b) regulation of the construction sector, c) property transfer, d) getting credit, e) protecting investors, f) business taxation, g) international trade, h) contract execution, and i) closing a business. One million USD will likely be reprogrammed for GON efforts to control avian influenza (AI). ¶14. (SBU) According to the IBRD Country Representative, support still exists in his organization for privatizing the management of the Gaweye. However for SONIDEP and NIGELEC the focus is no longer privatization but restructuring. SONIDEP needs to improve its performance and pursue ISO and other certifications. In addition, the IBRD Representative noted the GON will have to aggressively court prospective buyers of SONIDEP stock as long as both Total and Tamoil remained uninterested interest. Like SONIDEP, NIGELEC needs to study and improve its performance. The IBRD Representative acknowledges that NIGELEC has a preferential contract arrangement with Nigeria and that privatization efforts would have a difficult time addressing this relationship. -------------- COMMENT: SUPPORT OF PRIVATIZATION WANING -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Public and GON support for privatization has definitely waned. In the eyes of some Nigeriens, privatization has not delivered what it promised: lower prices and better service. Many hold up the example of Sonitel, the national phone company, now owned by Chinese and Libyan interests, as proof that privatization has gone wrong. Sonitel's service problems are apparent with repeated line cuts, interference and inability to complete dialed calls. In addition, Sonitel is notorious for billing irregularities and when questioned often responds with little or no justification for charges. Privatization also did not lead to the creation of a shareholding class of any significant size in Niger. ¶16. (SBU) The small formal private sector has a clear vision of what steps it thinks the GON should take to encourage investment, and privatization is not high on that list. Instead, the private sector would like the GON to rationalize its tax structure, ease bureaucratic red tape, and establish transparent mechanisms to promote land ownership. ALLEN