Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI8356
2006-12-15 01:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008356 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN
SUBJECT: HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S.

NEW DELHI 00008356 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 008356 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2026 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PARM KISL PK BG IN SUBJECT: HOME MINISTRY AGREES TO CLOSER COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. NEW DELHI 00008356 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an extremely collegial exchange, S/CT Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Virginia Palmer identified several areas for future counterterrorism (CT) cooperation in a Dec. 8 meeting with three senior Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) officials, who briefed her on the current situation in Kashmir as well as discussed India's CT efforts. Both sides agreed to share information on terrorist groups that side-step a UN ban by adopting pseudonyms. Noting the success of recent terrorist financing prevention efforts, Palmer briefed on cash courier training efforts, and urged India to adopt Financial Action Task Force recommendation nine, requiring physical measures to detect cross-border currency trafficking. Joint Secretary (Internal Security) L. ¶C. Goyal replied that it could be done in June or July of ¶2007. Joint Secretary (Kashmir) Mitali Sen Gavai outlined a cohesive, three-pronged counterinsurgency strategy. She said Kashmir separatists have no political or public support in Jammu and Kashmir, but derive support from Pakistan, whose agents, she says, also "infiltrate" India via the porous Bangladeshi border. END SUMMARY. TERRORIST FINANCE AND SAFE HAVENS -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 8 meeting, S/CT Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Virginia Palmer met with MHA Special Secretary (Internal Security) G. S. Rajagopal, and his SIPDIS deputies, Joint Secretary (Internal Security) L. C. Goyal and Joint Secretary (Kashmir) Mitali Sen Gavai. Goyal noted that, though the UN has banned Kashmiri terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaeesh-i-Muhammed, many countries are not honoring their obligations to suppress these groups, citing Pakistan and Bangladesh as examples. He emphasized the case of the man suspected to be behind the 1993 terror bombings in Mumbai, Dawood Ibrahim. He said, "we know full well he is living in Pakistan, yet Pakistan does nothing about it." He lamented that the UN has also chosen not to react effectively to the fact that these groups simply change their names to side-step the ban and continue operating, citing the name change of Lashkar-e-Taiba to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD). Palmer also e
xpressed dissatisfaction that China had placed a hold on a U.S. request to designate (in the UN's 1267 committee) Jamaat-Ud-Dawa as a terrorist organization. Palmer asked Goyal about the possibility of joint demarches urging that the hold be lifted. Goyal replied that it would not help to simply ban the organization, because it would simply change its name again. He suggested that designation of the group's leadership would be more effective, adding that it was necessary to gather strong intelligence on the leadership, and to create dossiers for them. Palmer urged increased GOI-U.S. information sharing, and Goyal agreed. Palmer added that the dossiers would be more helpful if they were at a lower level of classification, so they could be disseminated more widely within the CT community. NEW DELHI 00008356 002.2 OF 003 ¶3. (C) Palmer asserted that UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 (banning terrorist financing and support thereof) are good documents, but suggested more could be done to enforce 1373's provisions requiring states to deny terrorists safe haven. Goyal replied that the UN Counterterrorism Committee should be given teeth, to pressure countries that are lagging behind on their obligations. Palmer noted that many countries do not comply, citing a lack of capacity in their border control, policing, and training. She suggested that UN Counterterrorism Executive Directorate should provide capacity when and where needed, but that afterwards, a mechanism should be developed to hold countries accountable for using that new capacity and complying with their UNSCR 1373 obligations. ¶4. (C) According to Goyal, most of the funding for terrorism in India comes from overseas, channeled through Islamic NGOs and charities. He noted that India has mechanisms in place to try to control this, including the Terrorist Financing Law of 2005, the Finance Intelligence Unit, and the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. Goyal added that the Act is being amended so that Indian banks will soon have reporting requirements on the flow of funds, origins and destinations, to track suspicous transactions. Palmer asked if the office overseeing charitable organizations was adequately staffed, and Goyal affirmed that it is. Palmer urged India to adopt Financial Action Task Force recommendation nine (NOTE: A recommendation requiring countries to have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency. END NOTE.). Goyal replied that it could be done in the next monsoon session of the Indian parliament, in June or July of 2007. ¶5. (C) Palmer remarked that the international effort to clamp down on financial institutions to prevent terrorist financing has been so successful, the U.S. has noticed that many terrorist groups are resorting to cash couriers, especially in the Philippines and the Gulf. She added that the Departments of Home Security and the Treasury are conducting cash courier training programs to train enforcement officials to help spot and interdict cash couriers, and invited GOI participation in what we hope will develop as a worldwide effort to increase the effectiveness of efforts to interdict terrorist cash couriers. KASHMIRI TERRORISTS - PAKISTANI OUTSIDERS? -------------- ¶6. (C) Gavai reported that over the past ten years, there have been 65,000 terrorist incidents and 40,000 people killed in Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorists have changed their tactics, she noted, explaining that they are now more risk-averse, and have taken to using IEDs and throwing grenades in order to minimize their own casualties. There were only five suicide bombings last year and two in 2006, she said. "We believe there are only about 2,000 terrorist foot soldiers on the ground," she shared, noting that some terrorism, particularly grenade throwing incidents, is NEW DELHI 00008356 003.2 OF 003 "outsourced", often to local children, for as little as $20-40. She observed that the terrorists have been shifting lately to softer targets, including individuals and tourists, or shooting security officers in the back at close range. "The tourists have fled," she lamented, adding, "tourism is a life-line for Kashmir and the terrorists target it." ¶7. (C) Palmer asked if local Kashmiri businessmen and hotel-owners protest or act against the terrorists who are destroying their livelihoods. Gavai replied that they fear reprisal too much, and don't want to become targets themselves. She noted that there is a grave problem of affluent local Kashmiris harboring terrorists, referring to them as "overground workers" because they operate relatively in the open. These sympathizers give safe haven and money to terrorists, she indicated, but it is difficult to gather enough evidence to prosecute them. ¶8. (C) Gavai outlined a comprehensive GOI strategy to improve security in the region through increased police presence, improved political participation (she cited the effect of the successful 2002 elections),and bolstered economic development. Rajagopal prompted Gavaitwice to mention human rights and she indicated that the GOI was dealing seriously with reports of abuses. Gavai noted that her office has a strong dialogue with local political parties and recently hosted a roundtable in the region. The separatist groups did not participate, however, because "Pakistan told them not to." The separatists have no real local support, she asserted, but are completely funded and controlled by Pakistan. ¶9. (C) "Indian Muslims have rejected terror outright," observed Gavai, noting that Pakistan is changing its tactics now by no longer "infiltrating" solely through Jammu and Kashmir, but also through Bangladesh and Nepal. The Bangladeshi border is not sufficiently controlled, said Gavai, adding "many Indian politicians want the border to be porous in order to allow Bangladeshi Muslims to enter freely." By sending terrorists to India via the Bangladeshi border, Pakistan is enhancing its "deniability factor," argued Gavai, noting that Pakistan maintains terrorists who enter by way of Bangladesh are not under their control. Gavai suggested that Pakistan is trying to recruit young Indian radical groups, especially students, so that they can claim terrorism is a domestic Indian problem. ¶10. (C) Pressed by Palmer about the links between outright extremist groups and local disaffected Indian Muslims, Gavai acknowledged her concern about that potential, which she thought was primarily fostered through contacts with Indian expatriates in the Gulf. ¶11. (U) S/CT Deputy Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Virginia Palmer cleared this cable. PYATT

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