S/CT DEPUTY COORDINATOR PALMER AND ADDITIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 008250 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED CLASSIFICATION) S/CT FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON, OES FOR MARC OSSFIELD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2021 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PK IN SUBJECT: S/CT DEPUTY COORDINATOR PALMER AND ADDITIONAL SECRETARY KC SINGH DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR NEXT U.S.-INDIA SIPDIS COUNTERTERRORISM JOINT WORKING GROUP (CORRECTED COPY) REF: NEW DELHI 8191 NEW DELHI 00008250 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a December 7 meeting, S/CT Deputy Coordinator Virginia Palmer and Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary (International Organizations) K.C. Singh discussed: -- Indian flexibility on dates for the next CTJWG, presumably in February; -- Pakistani-based terrorism, including Singh's role in the new joint mechanism and President Musharraf's proposal for a solution to the Kashmir conflict; -- bioterrorism; -- the possibility of joint C/T operations and enhanced intelligence sharing; -- biometrics; -- the link between narcotics and terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan; -- how to enhance future C/T training; and -- the situation in Iran and Iraq. End Summary. India Flexible On Dates For Next CTJWG -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 7 meeting in his office, Singh began by offering flexibility in scheduling the next Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG),which he presumed to be in February, saying he would only need short notice to be ready to receive S/CT Coordinator Crumpton and the American delegation. Palmer confirmed the U.S. commitment to the working group and said she hoped to follow up on a number of issues from the CTJWG in May. She began by expressing assurance that the USG, particularly counterterrorism officials, understood the difficult and sensitive terrorism problem India faces, particularly from Pakistani-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Terrorism, including from LeT, is a problem the U.S., India and the international community are forced to jointly confront, she said, adding the U.S. does engage the Pakistani government on dealing with terrorists operating from Pakistan. Singh Assesses Pakistani Terror, Composite Dialogue -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Giving his assessment of the U.S.-India counterterrorism relationship since the last CTJWG, Singh said the GOI was in the process of creating a new and separate counterterrorism unit, to be run at the director level, in the MEA. The new office would start with a small staff and grow over time, dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues. This new office would solve several problems the GOI has had in formulating C/T policy, NEW DELHI 00008250 002.2 OF 004 particularly providing someone who could focus on counterterrorism and bridge the GOI interagency process, as well as be the contact point for foreign governments wishing to liaise with India. One problem example Singh gave was in his difficulty in explaining to other agencies within the GOI the difference between cyber security and cyber terrorism, and that once he was able to clarify the distinction to his colleagues, the need for bilateral cooperation on cyber terrorism became clear. ¶4. (C) Turning to the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan, Singh said the meetings had been suspended after the July 11 Mumbai terrorist attack, but were back on track. He noted that Pakistan had, for the first time, expressed a willingness to investigate Indian allegations of Pakistani complicity in terrorist attacks in India. India has shared some data on "previous attacks" (NOTE: We understood that this did not include the Mumbai blasts. End NOTE.) with Pakistan, but has not heard back from Islamabad yet. Singh is the Indian Head of Delegation to the Joint (CT) Mechanism with Pakistan, which has been named but has not really begun. Singh said the plan is to have a Joint Mechanism meeting on the margins of nuclear confidence building measure meetings (his counterpart is Pakistan's Head of Delegation for those talks, too). Singh would prefer to meet more regularly and to begin immediately. ¶5. (C) Similar to the MEA views expressed in reftel, Singh's assessment of President Musharraf's recent proposal for resolving the Kashmir conflict was that it did not contain any real new ideas. Musharraf's four points had already being discussed in back channels, he said. Any solution would have to meet India's redlines that borders can not be redrawn and India's constitution can't be amended, but within those parameters India is willing to negotiate on Kashmir, Singh explained. Ultimately, any agreement on Kashmir would rest on the cessation of terrorism, he said. ¶6. (C) In order to end terrorism in Pakistan, Singh asserted, democracy must take hold. Terrorism attracts radical elements of society who have nowhere to turn to express their political views, he said, and Musharraf's style of "controlled democracy" has emboldened Pakistan's radical right wing while decimating its center. Democracy is both the short- and long-term solution for Pakistan, according to Singh, who said that Musharraf should allow democratic elections immediately, including candidates Benazir Bhutto and Newaz Sharif, along with others. The U.S. could help the process by pressing Musharraf to allow the democratic process to unfold. Bioterrorism A Concern For India -------------- ¶7. (C) Palmer suggested more frequent U.S.-India C/T interactions between CTJWGs. She thanked the GOI for the NEW DELHI 00008250 003.2 OF 004 Pathogen Security Workshop at the National Institute of Virology and said the USG looked forward to hearing Indian thoughts on a joint workshop to assess vulnerability and identify countermeasures on bioterrorism and our January 2005 proposal for a tabletop exercise on emergency response mechanisms. The tabletop exercise "should be possible," Singh said. He said bioterrorism was a good example of the GOI's shortcomings on CT coordination. Several ministries, such as Agriculture, still haven't come to realize that terrorism is an issue that belongs to them, he explained. He admitted that bioterrorism is one of India's largest threats, and offered to discuss the issue within the GOI and get back to Palmer on who will take charge of the issue for it. He noted that coordination problems such as this should be resolved when the new C/T office becomes operational. At Palmer's urging, Singh said he would try to clearly articulate the GOI's bioterrorism policy before February so it could be discussed at the CTJWG. Other Possibilities: Joint Ops, Intel Sharing... -------------- --- ¶8. (S) Palmer suggested the possibility of the U.S. and India doing more joint counterterrorism operations, as well as intelligence sharing. We also need to share current threat information much more quickly, she said. Both operations and information sharing need to be two way streets, she said. "We have to get our act together on this," said Singh, promising to follow up. ...Biometrics... -------------- ¶9. (C) Another area for further cooperation would be in biometrics, Palmer told Singh, adding that good progress on biometrics cooperation was made recently at the regional conference in Jordan. Singh, noting that MEA controlled India's passport agency, said that cooperation on biometrics was in India's interests, because as other countries adopt standards, Indian passports will either have to catch up with those standards, or Indian travelers will suffer. ...Narcotics/Terror Link -------------- ¶10. (C) Singh said that another possibility for further coordination could be the link between narcotics and terrorism, specifically pointing to the situation in Afghanistan. Singh explained that Tajik President Rahmonov had described to PM Singh during their September meeting the problem of narco-traffickers and Taliban terrorists collecting on the Tajik-Afghan border, and that some of the drugs were coming to India via Pakistan. Singh offered to further brief the U.S. at the CTJWG on India's liaison with the Eurasia Task Force. NEW DELHI 00008250 004.2 OF 004 Better Planning To Enhance C/T Training -------------- ¶11. (C) RSO George Lambert suggested that future counterterrorism training for India could be enhanced by working more closely together in the planning stages of a training course to tailor the training specifically for India. By mutually identifying the training requirement in advance, then fine tuning it for the Indian audience, we could build a link for long-term C/T coordination progress. Singh suggested that the new C/T Director would be the action office for such coordination. Iran: A Possible Indian Role? Iraq: No Spillover Expected -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Palmer and Singh (who served as India's Ambassador in Tehran) briefly discussed the situation in Iran, and whether sectarian violence in Iraq could have any spillover effect on Indian Muslims. On Iran, Singh said he had spoken with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Safari recently, and had told him he thought the U.S. would likely be willing to engage Iran on Iraq in exchange for regime stability, but that Iran's nuclear development would always be unacceptable because it would require the U.S.to take some sort of action, or, worse in Singh's opinion, leaving Israel to act unilaterally. Safari said Iran could never abandon its nuclear program under U.S. pressure, as it believes such a concession would only be a first step, leading to more U.S. demands until the regime is threatened. Singh said he believes a positive role India can play would be to persuade Iran to be pragmatic by assessing the situation realistically and not stumbling into a crisis by misreading U.S. intentions. On Iraqi sectarian violence, Singh said he did not believe it would have an effect on India's Muslims, as India's Shia community is small and historically has been relatively well-to-do. Singh also described a distinction between northern and southern Indian Muslims, with southern Muslims today more closely linked to the Persian Gulf and potentially susceptible to Wahabist influences. MULFORD