INDIA-PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARIES LAUNCH COUNTER-TERROR JOINT MECHANISM, REVIEW SIACHEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007954

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PBTS, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA-PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARIES LAUNCH
COUNTER-TERROR JOINT MECHANISM, REVIEW SIACHEN

REF: NEW DELHI 7797

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Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: The November 14th and 15th India-Pakistan
Foreign Secretary talks set up a joint mechanism for
discussing counter-terrorism issues, although it is yet to be
seen if the mechanism will allow India to keep talks going
should terrorists strike again in India's heartland. The
talks were preceded by Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri's
claim that an agreement was forthcoming on the longstanding
dispute over the Siachen glacier, and all that stood in the
way was India's political will. The talks ended with rumors
that Pakistan had made a concession on Siachen, allowing the
Prime Minister to move forward his personal agenda of
reaching an agreement, perhaps at some politically
advantageous time in the future. Kasuri's statements,
however, go against longstanding conventional wisdom in India
that an agreement on Siachen is unlikely anytime soon because
the Indian Army and the hardline in the Congress Party would
not be able to trust Pakistan enough to withdraw, regardless
of how much Pakistan is willing to concede. Long time
observers say that the Prime Minister will be significantly
constrained in any part of his agenda with Pakistan in the
coming months, especially in the face of significant
opposition from within his own party and an emboldened BJP
that views the joint mechanism as an opportunity to portray
the Congress Party as soft on terrorism. The Prime Minister
achieved a victory in the short term in simply holding the
talks, especially in the context of ongoing public anger in
India over Pakistan's unwillingness to curtail terrorist
groups operating from its soil. (See also reftel for more
details.) End Summary.

Joint Mechanism a Buffer
--------------

2. (C) Press reports say that November 14th, the first day
of talks, went well between India and Pakistan, with
discussion beginning on the modalities of the Joint
Mechanism. MEA Additional Secretary KC Singh and his
Pakistani counterpart were appointed tohead the Indian side
of the joint mechanism, acting as mediators between the two
intelligence agencies, who many fear will be unable to work
well together after decades of operating against one another.
(Comment: The Pakistani High Commission confirmed that
Pakistani MEA Additional Secretary for National Diplomacy
Tariq Osman Haider would head the Pakistani delegation, and
that each side would include three members.) National
Security Advisory Board member Manoj Joshi told Poloff that
the Prime Minister formulated the joint mechanism as a means
of providing some political cover so he can move forward with
Pakistan on other issues, even while terrorists continue
their attacks in India. Joshi further commented that at
least when the bombs go off, the Indian government will be
able to say they can confront Pakistan through a formal
process.

3. (C) Immediately, however, the joint mechanism became a
political football for the opposition BJP, with press reports
calling the Congress government "half wits" who don't
understand Pakistan's true intentions. The BJP has
threatened to use the issue of terrorism as the backdrop for

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their efforts against the Congress in the just begun
Parliamentary session -- calling for marches against the
delayed hanging of Parliament bombing conspirator Afzal
Muhammad as well as the talks with Pakistan to paint the
government as soft on terrorism.

Siachen A Done Deal?
--------------

4. (C) The rumors about Siachen began shortly after the
talks ended: Hindustan Times editor Pramit Pal Chaudhry told
Poloff that Prime Minister Singh's media advisor, Sanjay
Bharu, said that the agreement on Siachen was a "done deal."
Further Manoj Joshi -- a longtime follower of the Siachen
issue -- said the Prime Minister was pushing hard for a
solution on Siachen, but was waiting for a point when it
would be politically feasible in both India and Pakistan to
release the agreement. Press reports said Pakistan had
agreed to demarcate points on the map, but that this did not
satisfy the Indian side.

5. (C) Pakistani High Commission Counselor S. Zulfiqar
Gardezi told PolOff on November 22nd that his government had
agreed in principle to note down each army's current
positions, but only during technical level talks when the two
sides determined the locations to which each army would
withdraw. He said further that Pakistan would be flexible
about whether Indian forces would withdraw all the way back
to Leh and Ladakh, or if the cease fire line would be much
closer to the glacier/Saltoro ridge line. Where each
position would be demarcated, he said, however, would have to
be worked out at the technical level. He maintained that
these positions, for Pakistan, could not be "prejudicial" or
legally binding. He added that the Indian side had responded
positively, but had asked for more time to discuss the issue
internally.

No Way in Hell: The Hardline Raises the Bar
--------------

6. (C) Former Indian Ambassador Parthasarthy, who personally
dissuaded Rajiv Gandhi from making a similar deal on Siachen
in 1989, said this concession does not satisfy India's
underlying concern -- that points be agreed to in advance so
the Pakistani Army would be unable to simply march back in to
the area and take the high peaks around the Siachen glacier
that India currently controls. He said if Pakistan agreed to
demarcate points on a map, this would still fall short of
agreeing to an Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL),because it
would not amount to an extension of the Line of Control (LOC)
or even a cease fire line (as the LOC area was called before
1972). Amb. Parthasarthy further remarked that he had
discussed the issue with senior Congress Party members, who
have significant sway over Sonia Gandhi and Congress Party
politics, and there is "no way in hell" that they would allow
India to withdraw under disadvantageous conditions. He added
that the "Prime Minister won't get away with what he is
trying to do." He said Musharraf's book had convinced many
in the Indian army that they cannot trust Pakistan,
especially when he could blame an invasion of Indian
territory on "mujahideen." (Comment: Amb. Parthasarthy is
likely referring to Musharraf's statements that "mujahideen"
started the Kargil conflict. End comment.) In some ways, he

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said, it may be easier to find a solution to the broader
Kashmir issue first, and then tackle Siachen.

An Intractable Dispute, But They Keep Talking
--------------

7. (C) Comment: India has repeatedly come "very close" to
an agreement on the Siachen issue in 1989, and again (less
so) in 1993. Each time the Prime Minister of the day was
forced to back out by India's defense establishment, the
Congress Party hard line, and opposition leaders. The Indian
Army is resistant to giving up this territory under any
condition for a variety of reasons -- strategic advantage
over China, internal Army corruption, distrust of Pakistan,
and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that
thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.
Ultimately, the greatest positive in the talks was that the
Indian side was able to meet with their Pakistani
counterparts and conclude cordially this round of the
composite dialogue. While there is no agreed date for an
Indian Prime Minister visit to Pakistan and formal dates for
Foreign Minister level talks are still being firmed up, the
most important CBM is that the talks continue, with the Singh
government clearly committed to the broader goal of
rapprochement with Pakistan.
MULFORD