INDIA-PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARIES LAUNCH COUNTER-TERROR JOINT MECHANISM, REVIEW SIACHEN

Show metadata

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007954

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PBTS, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN

SUBJECT: INDIA-PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARIES LAUNCH

COUNTER-TERROR JOINT MECHANISM, REVIEW SIACHEN

REF: NEW DELHI 7797

NEW DELHI 00007954 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: The November 14th and 15th India-Pakistan

Foreign Secretary talks set up a joint mechanism for

discussing counter-terrorism issues, although it is yet to be

seen if the mechanism will allow India to keep talks going

should terrorists strike again in India's heartland. The

talks were preceded by Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri's

claim that an agreement was forthcoming on the longstanding

dispute over the Siachen glacier, and all that stood in the

way was India's political will. The talks ended with rumors

that Pakistan had made a concession on Siachen, allowing the

Prime Minister to move forward his personal agenda of

reaching an agreement, perhaps at some politically

advantageous time in the future. Kasuri's statements,

however, go against longstanding conventional wisdom in India

that an agreement on Siachen is unlikely anytime soon because

the Indian Army and the hardline in the Congress Party would

not be able to trust Pakistan enough to withdraw, regardless

of how much Pakistan is willing to concede. Long time

observers say that the Prime Minister will be significantly

constrained in any part of his agenda with Pakistan in the

coming months, especially in the face of significant

opposition from within his own party and an emboldened BJP

that views the joint mechanism as an opportunity to portray

the Congress Party as soft on terrorism. The Prime Minister

achieved a victory in the short term in simply holding the

talks, especially in the context of ongoing public anger in

India over Pakistan's unwillingness to curtail terrorist

groups operating from its soil. (See also reftel for more

details.) End Summary.

Joint Mechanism a Buffer

--------------

2. (C) Press reports say that November 14th, the first day

of talks, went well between India and Pakistan, with

discussion beginning on the modalities of the Joint

/>Mechanism. MEA Additional Secretary KC Singh and his

Pakistani counterpart were appointed tohead the Indian side

of the joint mechanism, acting as mediators between the two

intelligence agencies, who many fear will be unable to work

well together after decades of operating against one another.

(Comment: The Pakistani High Commission confirmed that

Pakistani MEA Additional Secretary for National Diplomacy

Tariq Osman Haider would head the Pakistani delegation, and

that each side would include three members.) National

Security Advisory Board member Manoj Joshi told Poloff that

the Prime Minister formulated the joint mechanism as a means

of providing some political cover so he can move forward with

Pakistan on other issues, even while terrorists continue

their attacks in India. Joshi further commented that at

least when the bombs go off, the Indian government will be

able to say they can confront Pakistan through a formal

process.

3. (C) Immediately, however, the joint mechanism became a

political football for the opposition BJP, with press reports

calling the Congress government "half wits" who don't

understand Pakistan's true intentions. The BJP has

threatened to use the issue of terrorism as the backdrop for

NEW DELHI 00007954 002.2 OF 003

their efforts against the Congress in the just begun

Parliamentary session -- calling for marches against the

delayed hanging of Parliament bombing conspirator Afzal

Muhammad as well as the talks with Pakistan to paint the

government as soft on terrorism.

Siachen A Done Deal?

--------------

4. (C) The rumors about Siachen began shortly after the

talks ended: Hindustan Times editor Pramit Pal Chaudhry told

Poloff that Prime Minister Singh's media advisor, Sanjay

Bharu, said that the agreement on Siachen was a "done deal."

Further Manoj Joshi -- a longtime follower of the Siachen

issue -- said the Prime Minister was pushing hard for a

solution on Siachen, but was waiting for a point when it

would be politically feasible in both India and Pakistan to

release the agreement. Press reports said Pakistan had

agreed to demarcate points on the map, but that this did not

satisfy the Indian side.

5. (C) Pakistani High Commission Counselor S. Zulfiqar

Gardezi told PolOff on November 22nd that his government had

agreed in principle to note down each army's current

positions, but only during technical level talks when the two

sides determined the locations to which each army would

withdraw. He said further that Pakistan would be flexible

about whether Indian forces would withdraw all the way back

to Leh and Ladakh, or if the cease fire line would be much

closer to the glacier/Saltoro ridge line. Where each

position would be demarcated, he said, however, would have to

be worked out at the technical level. He maintained that

these positions, for Pakistan, could not be "prejudicial" or

legally binding. He added that the Indian side had responded

positively, but had asked for more time to discuss the issue

internally.

No Way in Hell: The Hardline Raises the Bar

--------------

6. (C) Former Indian Ambassador Parthasarthy, who personally

dissuaded Rajiv Gandhi from making a similar deal on Siachen

in 1989, said this concession does not satisfy India's

underlying concern -- that points be agreed to in advance so

the Pakistani Army would be unable to simply march back in to

the area and take the high peaks around the Siachen glacier

that India currently controls. He said if Pakistan agreed to

demarcate points on a map, this would still fall short of

agreeing to an Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL),because it

would not amount to an extension of the Line of Control (LOC)

or even a cease fire line (as the LOC area was called before

1972). Amb. Parthasarthy further remarked that he had

discussed the issue with senior Congress Party members, who

have significant sway over Sonia Gandhi and Congress Party

politics, and there is "no way in hell" that they would allow

India to withdraw under disadvantageous conditions. He added

that the "Prime Minister won't get away with what he is

trying to do." He said Musharraf's book had convinced many

in the Indian army that they cannot trust Pakistan,

especially when he could blame an invasion of Indian

territory on "mujahideen." (Comment: Amb. Parthasarthy is

likely referring to Musharraf's statements that "mujahideen"

started the Kargil conflict. End comment.) In some ways, he

NEW DELHI 00007954 003.2 OF 003

said, it may be easier to find a solution to the broader

Kashmir issue first, and then tackle Siachen.

An Intractable Dispute, But They Keep Talking

--------------

7. (C) Comment: India has repeatedly come "very close" to

an agreement on the Siachen issue in 1989, and again (less

so) in 1993. Each time the Prime Minister of the day was

forced to back out by India's defense establishment, the

Congress Party hard line, and opposition leaders. The Indian

Army is resistant to giving up this territory under any

condition for a variety of reasons -- strategic advantage

over China, internal Army corruption, distrust of Pakistan,

and a desire to keep hold of advantageous territory that

thousands of Indian soldiers have died protecting.

Ultimately, the greatest positive in the talks was that the

Indian side was able to meet with their Pakistani

counterparts and conclude cordially this round of the

composite dialogue. While there is no agreed date for an

Indian Prime Minister visit to Pakistan and formal dates for

Foreign Minister level talks are still being firmed up, the

most important CBM is that the talks continue, with the Singh

government clearly committed to the broader goal of

rapprochement with Pakistan.

MULFORD

INDIA-PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARIES LAUNCH COUNTER-TERROR JOINT MECHANISM, REVIEW SIACHEN

Share this cable