FOREIGN MINISTER MUKHERJEE POSITIONED TO HELP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 007667 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR P, T, ISN, SCA, S/CT, C, NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL ECON, AMGT, CVIS, PK, IN SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MUKHERJEE POSITIONED TO HELP SHAPE RELATIONS WITH AMERICA REF: NEW DELHI 7338 NEW DELHI 00007667 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his first call on Pranab Mukherjee in his new position as Minister for External Affairs (bio in reftel),the Ambassador emphasized the importance of the broad vision for US-India relations outlined by the President, to which Mukherjee readily added his support and commitment. The Ambassador also raised the US-India civilian nuclear cooperation initiative, and urged continued progress on all fronts to ensure its complete implementation. The two agreed that there could be no distinctions between different types of terrorism, with Mukherjee insisting that a revitalized Taliban in Afghanistan or Pakistan would be a disaster and demanding that Pakistan do for India in the east what it was doing for America and Afghanistan on its western border. The Ambassador stressed the need for India to be firm when Iranian FM Mottaki visits, and appealed to India to keep looking for ways to be helpful to us in Afghanistan. Finally, the Ambassador urged the MEA to help us overcome some minor reciprocal tax and visa irritants, to which Mukherjee was receptive to trying to find a solution. Mukherjee is a serious, politically-savvy politician and a real breath of fresh air compared to his predecessor at MEA. His gravitas and clear understanding of Indian politics may help us as we negotiate the tricky shoals of Indian coalition tensions, which often impact the UPA's foreign policy, and not always in a helpful way. END SUMMARY. HOW SWEET IT IS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador started by congratulating Mukherjee on his new position. Mukherjee said that he had enjoyed excellent relations with SecDef Rumsfeld in his previous job as Defense Minister, and had presided over an era in which both sides had made great strides to institutionalize bilateral military ties that encompass the full gamut of cooperation, to include training, exercises, visits, and, increasingly, procurements and interoperability. Similarly, said Mukherjee, the Ambassador had contributed "substantially" to "widening and deepening" overall bilateral ties. The Ambassador responded that the relationship has indeed been transformed, not only at the government level, but more importantly in the eyes of the public. Thanks to the President's vision, the public attitude in the U.S. toward India now encompassed an understanding of how important our two countries have become to each other. The bilateral relationship includes a broad spectrum -- agriculture, military, space, health, etc. -- in addition to the core political and economic issues. Comprehensive people-to-people ties were also a factor, with Indian-Americans visible, successful, well-educated, focused on family values, and, as a result, very popular citizens. Media coverage of India has been completely transformed recently, and the relationship is poised to grow quickly. A NEW NUCLEAR FAMILY NEW DELHI 00007667 002.2 OF 005 -------------- ¶3. (C) Continuing, the Ambassador explained that the civil-nuke initiative is the cornerstone of that transformed relationship. The President had intended it to help forge the realization of his long-term, visionary view of our bilateral relations as well as his desirefor a new Indian presence in world affairs. In a dangerous world, our two democratic anchors would be essential to ensuring peace and stability. The President had proposed the nuclear initiative to give us the collective confidence to recognize India's responsible conduct as a nuclear weapons state and to revolutionize our nuclear nonproliferation stance. His idea had global implications for relations for both our countries vis--vis Russia, China, and others, so it was vital that the U.S. and India spend more time comparing notes so that our enhanced relationship can enhance the security of the entire world. ¶4. (C) Mukherjee revealed that he had asked the Secretary in their recent telcon how Vietnam-related legislation fit into our legislative priorities for the lame-duck session of Congress. The Secretary, he added, had said that the U.S. was trying very hard to get a vote in the Senate on the civil-nuclear legislation affecting India, and was also working to confine amendments to between five to seven, but the Senate would keep its own counsel with regard to the final outcome. The Ambassador stressed the broad bilateral support for the legislation in the House and Senate which, however the election comes out, would help ensure that the civil-nuclear legislation is successfully passed. The President was speaking to the Senate leadership, and debate was tentatively on the Senate schedule for November 16, added the Ambassador. The Ambassador also mentioned that it would be important to work on all fronts, including the on-going 123 negotiations, to help the deal secure passage, and asked how the Prime Minister might consider making it clear to Senators Frist and Reid the importance India attaches to the legislation's passage during the "lame duck" session of the Congress. The Ambassador also urged Mukherjee to continue to speak to the Secretary over the telephone on this and other matters. GETTING IN SYNC ON TERROR... -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador explained that terrorists' proven intent to strike at the Indian heartland was capturing the attention of senior policy-makers in Washington, because such incidents are direct blows against India's stability, prosperity, and harmony. The U.S. was experiencing a parallel problem in Afghanistan, so closer coordination and more frank and open discussions with in-bound USG visitors would be most helpful in giving Washington a better perspective of the nature of the new threat, emphasized the Ambassador. It was becoming increasingly apparent to the American public after the Heathrow plot and Mumbai that terrorism orchestrated from Pakistan remains a problem, and the U.S. policy environment was beginning to reflect this. NEW DELHI 00007667 003.2 OF 005 ¶6. (C) Mukherjee -- as animated as he became in this meeting -- forcefully exclaimed that the fight against terror could not be compartmentalized. It had to be an integrated effort. India, he revealed, had suspended its talks with Pakistan after the Mumbai train blasts because public opinion was so strong and the outcry so sustained that no democratic government could have ignored it. Evidence and forensics are important, but they are matters for courts of law. The public opinion, however, was emphatically directed against Pakistan, and so India told Pakistan clearly that it needed to do on its eastern border for India the same as it was doing for America and Afghanistan on its western border. The PM had insisted on a visible demonstration of Pakistan's good intentions. To do so, India had shared some information with Pakistan and was now waiting for a response. If Pakistan continues to ignore that information, a solution would be elusive. ...INCLUDING IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Mukherjee again emphasized that there could be no layers of distinction or compartments in the war on terror. He warned as well that a revived Taliban would be absolutely unacceptable to India, and would send the mistaken signal that the West had abandoned Afghanistan. Karzai, he said, needed lots of support to check-mate the Taliban. Pakistan must destroy its support infrastructure in Quetta and along the Durand line, and there needed to be a "comprehensive" approach there to the war on terror. The world community, he urged, needed to condemn terror in all its forms in the strongest possible fashion. Pakistan and others simply cannot tolerate some forms of terror while opposing others, he underlined. There was an impression that the West had withdrawn from its responsibility to curb the Taliban, turning it over to Pakistan. The Taliban's re-emergence, he again stressed, would be "disastrous." ¶8. (C) The Ambassador expressed his view that an assessment process was underway in Washington to examine these problems, and India and the United States should work closely together on cases such as Mumbai so our investigators can see with their own eyes the evidence that leads India to its conclusions. Such sharing could lead to significant improvement in the U.S. understanding of the nature of the threat to the Indian heartland, and how ruinous that is compared to a former pattern of threats in the remote border regions of Kashmir. THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION CONFERENCE -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador invited Mukherjee's ideas for making the regional economic conference on Afghanistan November 17/18 a success. Assistant Secretary Boucher would lead the U.S. delegation, and America was committed to working closely with India. We remained hopeful for a big success, and the U.S. also was receptive to new Indian initiatives. Mukherjee NEW DELHI 00007667 004.2 OF 005 said development in Afghanistan had not been sufficient, so India was seeking new ideas. The Asian Development Bank would make a presentation at the conference, for example. IRAN -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador expressed our grave concerns about Iran, outlining how the EU-3 and then the P5 1 had gone to extreme lengths to get the Iranians to respond to their proposals. It was vital that India recognize the American offer to talk to Iran if it ceases uranium enrichment, he emphasized. If Iranian FM Mottaki does indeed come to Delhi for the Afghan economic conference, the Ambassador urged India to continue to put pressure on him and Tehran not to pass up such an important and ground-breaking offer by the United States and others. There was only so far that anyone could go in any negotiation before further waiting becomes fruitless, warned the Ambassador. Congressional interest in the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit would be very high, especially in the context of the civil-nuke legislation, he added. MINOR IRRITANTS -------------- ¶11. (C) Finally, the Ambassador implored Mukherjee to use his influence to help us put an end to some irritants that had no place in our transformed relationship, including the reciprocal tax problems between the MEA and the State Department and the MEA's insistence to clear in Delhi any visa issuances for American diplomats assigned to India. By contrast, the Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. Embassy had put an enormous emphasis on ending the visa backlog for Indians precisely so it would not be the first thing Indians think of when they think of America. As a result, any Indian could now get an appointment within six days, and the Embassy was working hard to keep the backlog at bay. The Ambassador also asked Mukherjee to secure quick MEA permission for the Andhra Pradesh government to begin talks with the Embassy on a permanent site for the new Consulate in Hyderabad. Mukherjee directed his staff to analyze the Ambassador's requests with a view toward resolution. COMMENT: A MAN WHO MATTERS -------------- ¶12. (C) Unlike his prickly, ideological, scholarly, and short-tempered predecessor, Mukherjee is circumspect, pragmatic, and influential. He has a great deal of influence with the PM and, more importantly, with Sonia Gandhi. He also understands the complexities of Indian politics and may be helpful to us in fending off some of the political pressure that the UPA's quarrelsome Left partners put on India's foreign policy. He was very effective as Defense Minister in forging new ties with America, including an historic Defense Framework Agreement, in the face of vehement political criticism. As such, he is not to be under-rated as an interlocutor. If Mukherjee "gets" it, we can be sure that NEW DELHI 00007667 005.2 OF 005 the UPA's top leaders will "get" it, too. We will work very hard to influence the thinking of this welcome new member of the Indian foreign policy leadership, who may help set the tone for U.S.-India relations over the next two to three years. END COMMENT. MULFORD