INDIA STRONGLY DENIES HOWITZER SALES TO BURMA, BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007514

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2011
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS MARR BM IN
SUBJECT: INDIA STRONGLY DENIES HOWITZER SALES TO BURMA, BUT
OTHERS CONFIRM

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (SBU) Summary. Embassy contacts have confirmed press
reports that India has supplied Burma 105 mm Howitzers and
associated equipment. However, the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) denied that any such deals had transpired.
India's rationale for supplying weapons to the junta is
ostensibly to support joint counter-insurgency operations
aimed at Indian separatist groups based within Burmese
borders. End Summary.

Press Reports India Arming Burmese Government
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2. (U) Indian press reported in early October that India had
transferred lethal military equipment, including Howitzers
and related equipment, to the Burmese government. According
to The Hindustan Times (HT),in August 2006 the Indian Navy
transferred two BN-2 "Defender" Islander (sic) maritime
surveillance aircraft and deck-based air-defense guns along
with surveillance equipment to Burma, despite British
protests and a British declaration that it would not provide
spares and maintenance. In September, India "recommended and
started giving (Burma) 105 mm Indian field guns," according
to Indian Army Vice-Chief Lt. Gen. S Pattabhiraman, as quoted
in Force magazine. Pattabhiraman reportedly declared that
India had previously provided 75/24 Howitizers, putting the
number as somewhere between "not much" and "not symbolic."
IANS also reported that Defense Secretary Dutt had agreed to
supply Burma with an unspecified number of soon-to-be-retired
T-55 tanks, mortars, armored personnel carriers and advanced
light helicopters.

Rationale: Counter-Insurgency Along Border
--------------


3. (U) The press articles speculated that India is supplying
arms to the Burmese junta as part of a deal to cooperate in
flushing out insurgents in the India-Burma border region.
India believes violent separatist groups such as the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) operate against India from bases
in Burma. HT also suggested India seeks a limited military
relationship with Burma as a check to China's influence in a
country India asserts is of critical strategic importance in
its near abroad.

UK High Commission Engagement Noted, Apparently Disregarded
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4. (C) The UK High Commission in New Delhi confirmed that it
was alerted in December 2005 that India intended to give
Burma two British-origin Islander (civilian) aircraft for use
in maritime surveillance, although at the time the High
Commission was concerned that the Islanders may have been
upgraded to include arms or may have in fact been the
military version of the Islander, i.e., the Defender. The UK

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vigorously protested, explaining the EU arms embargo on
Burma, as well as human rights concerns. According to a UK
diplomat based in New Delhi, India noted the British
concerns, but offered assurances that the Burmese would
merely use the planes for innocuous coastal surveillance.
The UK registered its disapproval several times with the GOI,
however, with no end-use agreement in place, the High
Commission felt ultimately India had control over the fate of
the planes in question. The High Commission told us it had
not been notified of the actual transfer of the planes to
Burma, nor could it confirm where the planes currently are.

MEA Categorically Denies...
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5. (C) During an October 24 meeting with Mohan Kumar, MEA
Joint Secretary for Burma/Bangladesh/Sri Lanka/Maldives,
Polcouns pressed Kumar on the press reports. Kumar
categorically denied that the GOI is training or selling arms
to the Burmese junta, calling such reports "absurd." He
claimed that the GOI has only provided Burma with dump trucks
and bulldozers for border road projects and the relocation of
border markers. He maintained, however, that the GOI will
continue its policy of "constructive engagement" with Burma,
as it needs Burmese cooperation for dealing with northeast
Indian insurgents. He asserted that, in his opinion, the
USG's policies of sanctions and isolation were ineffective
and that the Burmese regime was impervious to outside
influence. He noted that, "even China does not control
Burma."

...But USDAO Contacts Confirm
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6. (S/NF) The Burmese Defense Attache in New Delhi verified
to USDAO on October 30 the transfer of 18 used 105 mm
Howitzers and associated equipment. USDAO also received
confirmation of Howitzer transfers to Burma from a colonel in
the Directorate General for Military Intelligence (DGMI).
Both military contacts claimed the purpose of the equipment
was to support the Indian strategy of using Burmese
assistance to conduct cross-border counter-insurgency
operations.Also, the Indian Air Force general officer
responsible for foreign cooperation told the DATT that
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the
Air Force Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi was visiting Burma
(along with Cambodia and Singapore) in November 2006 as part
of an Integrated Defense Staff and MEA official trip.

Comment: National Interests Trumps Human Rights Rhetoric
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7. (C) Despite MEA's insistent denial, dual confirmation from
both Burmese and Indian military sources lead us to believe
the news reports are most likely accurate. There are two
possible explanations for MEA's denial: 1) the MEA realizes
its policy toward Burma runs counter to what the U.S. and

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nearly everyone outside of Rangoon would like to see; or 2)
MEA is out of the loop on actions directed by the Ministry of
Defense. In either case, India believes it has legitimate
reasons for engaging with the Burmese junta -- in addition to
the counter-insurgency campaign -- including desire for a
land corridor into SE Asia; a check on China, which India
fears is pursuing a "string of pearls" strategy of clinching
defense and security agreements in the region; a check on
Pakistan, who has long standing commercial relationship with
Burma; and a claim that it can wield more influence by
remaining engaged. Regardless, we will protest these sales
vigorously when we see key contacts at higher levels of the
MEA.
MULFORD