Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI7305
2006-10-23 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA'S TAMIL-BASED PARTIES RELUCTANT TO EXPEND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PREF IN CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007305 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF IN CE
SUBJECT: INDIA'S TAMIL-BASED PARTIES RELUCTANT TO EXPEND
POLITICAL CAPITAL ON SRI LANKA CAUSE

REF: REF: A) CHENNAI 2229 B) CHENNAI 1813 C) CHENNAI
1426 (ALL NOTAL)

NEW DELHI 00007305 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007305 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF IN CE SUBJECT: INDIA'S TAMIL-BASED PARTIES RELUCTANT TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL ON SRI LANKA CAUSE REF: REF: A) CHENNAI 2229 B) CHENNAI 1813 C) CHENNAI 1426 (ALL NOTAL) NEW DELHI 00007305 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Citing lingering ill feelings over the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the embarrassment caused by the hasty withdrawal of Indian peacekeeping force deployed to Sri Lanka from 1987-1990, and the unpredictability of the LTTE,leaders of Tamil Nadu's Tamil-based parties have told us they do not intend to waste political capital attempting to pressure the GOI to get more directly involved in the Sri Lanka conflict--unless casualties among non-LTTE Tamil civilians increase dramatically. The majority of Tamil Nadu's elected officials appear satisfied with the current GOI approach of pressuring the GOSL behind the scenes to make sufficient political concessions to convince the LTTE to remain at the table for substantive negotiations. They perceive the Sri Lanka conflict as a GOSL/LTTE contest until the Tamils present a viable option to the LTTE. In addition, the GOI does not consider refugee influxes a sufficient tripwire for major reconsideration of its Sri Lanka policy. END SUMMARY. -------------- "Once bitten, twice shy" -------------- ¶2. (C) During his October 10-11 meetings with Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) party leaders, GOI officials, journalists and academics, Poloff noted that, while dravidian parties continue to harbor some sympathy for the LTTE based on common ethnicity, it has diminished considerably since the assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu in 1991. Indeed, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi told Ambassador Mulford (ref a) that decline in support for the LTTE after the assassination was "like AD and BC." The unwillingness of the LTTE, or its political arm, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),to unequivocally apologize for the assassination has further alienated Tamil sentiments. Mr. R. Shunmugasundaram, DMK leader in the Rajya Sabha, noted that he felt "betrayed," as the assassination led to New Delhi's dissolution of the state government (then headed by the DMK and current Chief Minister Karunanidhi) and the application of tremendous p
ressure by the Intelligence Bureau and police forces on local Tamils. He contended that this lack of trust is still pervasive and underlies Indian Tamils' hesitation to pressure the DMK and AIADMK to support a more aggressive Sri Lanka policy. Mr. Thirunavukkarasar, formerly of the AIAMDK and now a BJP member of the Rajya Sabha, agreed with Mr. Shunmugasandaram's assessment. He maintained that "only fringe parties--like the MDMK's, led by Vaiko, and the PMK, headed by Ramadoss are pro-LTTE," and that "Vaiko has connections with Prime Minister Singh, so he is tolerated for now." (NOTE: Mr. V. Gopalswamy, A.K.A. "Vaiko", the vociferous General Secretary of the very small Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) party, was jailed in 2002 for pro-LTTE speeches, and continues to press the GOI to support the LTTE. Mr. Ramadoss is the founder of another tiny party, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and father of the current Union Minister for Health. Sri Lanka's media speculated that Ramadoss met secretly with LTTE leaders in Bangkok in January, 2006. END NOTE). NEW DELHI 00007305 002.2 OF 003 ¶3. (C) On the other hand, Mr. R.S. Vasan, Program Director for the local branch of the national think tank, Observer Research Foundation, cautioned that excessive GOSL pressure on Sri Lankan Tamils that resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties could ignite a public outcry and force state politicians to press for a more aggressive Sri Lanka policy. Mr. Shunmugasundaram pointed out that the younger generation of Indian Tamils do not identify as closely with their Sri Lankan cousins. "They are more interested in a good education, a good job, buying a house and a car. Most strong sentiment lies with the older generation." -------------- "We have a population of 79 million. What's 65,000 more?" -------------- ¶4. (C) When asked whether a massive refugee influx would be a tripwire for a policy reassessment, Tamil Nadu's Public and Rehabilitation Secretary, Jothi Jagarajan, laughed and replied, "We have a population of 79 million in Tamil Nadu. What's 65,000 more?" He noted that approximately 16,000 refugees have arrived in 2006 with August (5,769) and September (3,749) the peak months. However, he said there was a sharp drop off in October (411),which he attributed to October's typically rough seas. Also, he surmised that increased fighting and road closures in Sri Lanka make it difficult for potential refugees to travel from northern Sri Lanka to departure points in the West. Jagarajan further noted that Sri Lankan Tamils are spread throughout Tamil Nadu in over 120 camps to ameliorate competition for jobs, school overcrowding, and infrastructural strains and attributes the lack of local resentment to the success of this approach. He commented that the demographics of the refugees has changed with the first arrivals being the elderly and young children, while the current refugees are between 20-30. He attributed this trend to increased forced conscription by the LTTE. -------------- Adequate care of the refugees -------------- ¶5. (U) Mr. Jagarajan reminded Poloff that, as India is not a signatory to the Convention Relating To The Status of Refugees of July 29, 1951, the UNHCR does not screen the Sri Lankan Tamil arrivals nor at the camps overseen by the UNHCR. However, he maintained that the Tamil Nadu government provides the refugees adequate housing, basic utensils, an annual clothing allowance, and a cash dole ranging from Indian Rupees 400 per month (approximately $8.80 per month) for the head of family to 90 rupees ($2.00 per month) after the first child. In addition, each refugee over eight years of age is allocated twelve kilograms of rice per month, while children below eight are given six kilograms per month. All rice is sold at approximately $0.02 per kilogram. Also, each person is allocated 500 kg. of sugar per month and five liters of kerosene. Jagarajan stated that all Sri Lankan Tamil children can attend local schools and all adults can work legally on the open economy. He also said that the refugees qualify for reserved spots (a quota system) in tertiary education. The UNHCR's Repatriation Officer in Chennai, Vadeja Bharathi, could not comment on living conditions in the camps, as the UNHCR has not been allowed access. Bharati also pointed out that as an unofficial NEW DELHI 00007305 003.2 OF 003 intermediary, he could not comment on the treatment of the refugees but only make periodic suggestions to the GOI. He referred more specific questions to his colleagues in Sri Lanka. -------------- GOI enjoys the support of native Tamils, for now -------------- ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Although still a factor in Tamil Nadu, Indian-Sri Lankan Tamil solidarity has been in significant decline since the 1991 Gandhi assassination. The younger generation of Indian Tamils is more concerned with prosperity than ethnic ties, and votes accordingly. As election outcomes determine the amount of pressure the DMK and AIAMK parties are willing to exert on the GOI, calls from Tamil Nadu for a change in GOI policy are not imminent. ¶7. (C) This could change if GOSL forces inflicted large numbers of casualties among Sri Lankan Tamil civilians. In addition, the current refugee influx does not serve as a tripwire for a reassessment of the GOI's Sri Lanka policy. The GOI therefore appears comfortable with its policy of prodding the GOSL into proposing a realistic devolution plan palatable to the LTTE, attending the October 28-29 Geneva peace talks, and maintaining a dialogue with the LTTE until a comprehensive peace plan can be put in place. END COMMENT ¶8. (U) This message was coordinated with Consulate General Chennai. PYATT

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