INDIA'S LATEST DEFENSE SCANDAL: FEW LONG-TERM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 007274 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS KCRM ECON IN SUBJECT: INDIA'S LATEST DEFENSE SCANDAL: FEW LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS EXPECTED Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Former NDA Defense Minister George Fernandes was accused on October 10 of receiving bribes in a 2000 defense procurement contract for Barak missiles from Israel. The scandal revived memories of last year's Denel affair, where a South African company was blacklisted and all outstanding contracts were canceled. Some pundits also referred to the 1989 Bofors scandal, another bribery case which eventually brought down a Congress government. Fernandes and his BJP allies have gone on the offensive, attempting to deflect the allegations by accusing Congress and its chief Sonia Gandhi of pursuing a political vendetta. Newspapers have also highlighted that the Israeli system was more effective than the competing Indian one made by a now-vengeful state monopoly. While most people believe this scandal will not have the lasting implications of Denel and Bofor, it has exposed divisions within India's defense establishment and revealed how little the services trust the state-run defense industries' capabilities. U.S. interests should not be affected beyond the possible delay in RFPs being issued for new procurements, and if anything USG and U.S. private companies could gain a slight bump in reputation as India's military increasingly looks to foreign firms to provide what the government monopolies fail to furnish. End Summary. The Facts -------------- ¶2. (C) New Delhi awoke on October 11 to headlines declaring allegations of bribery against former Defense Minister George Fernandes in a 2000 missile procurement deal with Israel. Two others were named by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and three other deals under Fernandes, watch are also under scrutiny. Reportedly, then-Minister Fernandes ignored objections by the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) and the government's then scientific advisor, Abdul Kalam (now President Kalam),that the Barak missile system was unreliable, and approved a deal that was quoted initially at approximately USD 250 million, and ultimately negotiated at about USD 268 million, allegedly with no justification for the extra USD 18 million. Press reports the Israeli entity Israel Aircraft Industries (AIA),through a middleman, paid bribes of approximately USD 450,000 to Samata Party leader Jaya Jaitly, who passed on the money to then Defense Minister Fernandes. Kalam had said at the time that the Barak systems "have a failure rate of nearly 50% as witnessed by DRDO during trials." Fernandes and Jaitly immediately went on the offensive, claiming the accusations were a political vendetta initiated at the insistence of Congress Party chief rival (both professional and personal) Sonia Gandhi. After nearly a week of silence, the BJP came to Fernandes' defense, challenging the UPA "to produce a shred of evidence." Potential Implications: Not Much NEW DELHI 00007274 002 OF 004 -------------- ¶3. (C) Immediately, comparisons were made between this affair and last year's Denel scandal, whereby the Congress government blacklisted Denel and canceled all deals with the South African arms manufacturer after the dealer used "undue influence" by offering commissions to a middleman for an anti-material rifle deal. Some journalists also referred back to the 1989 Bofors scandal, where Congress was voted out of power after a bribery scandal in an artillery deal, although the analogy is weak since the BJP is not currently in power. However, this latest scandal (which harkens back to the 2002 Tehelka affair) has not reached the heights of past scandals, and its impact is likely to be less. AIA has not been blacklisted, nor will it likely be, not only because current Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee has publicly stated that the Denel and Barak cases are not comparable, but also, as Israeli Embassy DCM Yoed Magen points out, because AIA has so much business with the Indian military (around USD 900 million per year, second only to Russia) that to cancel all on-going projects would affect national security. Israel Not Worried -------------- ¶4. (C) Israel is India's number two defense equipment and services provider. IAI has a $1 billion AWACS deal with the GOI that would be endangered if retaliatory measures were taken. Also, IAI recently penned a deal with DRDO (signed by current Defense Minister Mukherjee) to jointly research and produce a Barak II and "next generation" Barak missile for use here, in Israel and for international sale. Moreover, IAI is heavily involved in avionics upgrades for the aging Indian aircraft fleet. DCM Magen also stated there was no wrongdoing on the part of IAI. It's All Politics -------------- ¶5. (C) Sanjay Kapoor, Managing Editor of Hardnews magazine, told Poloff that, at a meeting of news editors he recently headed, the consensus was that it would be difficult for the government to prove a case that was so far in the past, and most editors concluded that the charges were a political tactic to discredit the BJP prior to upcoming local elections. Besides, Kapoor reasoned -- echoing at least one op-ed which has appeared -- Fernandes is an easy target, as his prolific corruption on behalf of his poorly endowed Bihar-based political party are common knowledge. The Indian public is also well-aware of the personal nature of the Fernandes-Sonia Gandhi rivalry, he said, which painted Fernandes as a crusader against the perceived Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and includes years of harsh public criticisms about each other's integrity. DRDO's Gambit Backfires NEW DELHI 00007274 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶6. (C) For India, perhaps the most significant aspect of this latest scandal is how it has exposed the chasm between India's defense establishment and the political class. DRDO's 1999 criticism of the Barak missile has been interpreted as protectionist self-interest, i.e., an attempt to justify its existence despite a lousy track record. On October 18, NDTV ran a story with the subject line "DRDO: Does it really deliver?", suggesting that the armed forces had no confidence in DRDO systems and prefers foreign procurements. This followed a series of editorials by such notable journalists as Manoj Joshi in the Hindustan Times questioning the ability of the state-run monopolies to produce effective weapons/systems. In a DNA news article entitled "The defence mess," Sonia Gandhi advisor Rajiv Desai referred to "the dinosaur scientocrats" of DRDO and noted that its Trishul missile project, which was the supposed competitor to Barak, has incurred "incredible" costs since it was begun in 1983, yet is still nowhere near operational. Barak, on the other hand, is deployed and working. Meanwhile, as one group of politicians argues for supporting a domestic industry that has yet to show results, and another argues for canceling foreign contracts each time corruption is exposed, voices within India's military establishment lament that military preparedness is being severely compromised by a procurement process that stops and starts. ¶7. (C) The controversy has also brought the role of middlemen in such deals under close scrutiny. India's Defense Ministry does not recognize a role for middlemen -- what some would call "consultants" -- in defense procurement deals, although the government apparently realizes that middlemen can be a necessary evil, and is saying it will try to make the process more transparent by require some sort of registration process. The shadiness of the middlemen's role is nothing new here, and some U.S. companies, such as Boeing, have voluntarily removed them from the process. But other companies claim middlemen provide "access" they wouldn't otherwise have, so they will likely remain entrenched. Little Long-Term Effect on U.S. Interests Foreseen -------------- ¶8. (C) U.S. defense industry contacts in New Delhi also shrug off any concern over long-term effects from this scandal. A Lockheed Martin representative (protect) said that while some GOI officials responsible for defense procurement might be more hesitant in the short term to put their name on deals that could come back to haunt them years down the road, thereby delaying pending requests for proposals, the scene will quickly return to normal. (Note: IAI is a supplier to Lockheed's F-16. End note.) A Boeing rep (protect) noted that defense procurement scandals are nothing new to India -- nor to the rest of the world, he said -- and saw nothing in this scandal to indicate the GOI would be any less inclined NEW DELHI 00007274 004 OF 004 to do business with the USG or U.S. companies. In fact, he said, given the U.S.' reputation as a relatively clean, honest business partner, this could actually present an opportunity for the U.S. -- both in private and government-to-government sales -- since it could make American entities more attractive vis-a-vis other countries who are seen as more willing to lure politicians into scandal. The Boeing rep was hopeful that the Barak missile's shortcomings were becoming exposed, and was analyzing whether an opportunity was opening up for Harpoon missile sales to India Comment: Business As Usual -------------- ¶9. (C) These allegations against Fernandes will not likely gain much political traction, nor in the long run will the controversy have much of an impact on U.S. commercial and defense interests. Since corruption is common and deeply engrained in India, it isn't difficult for political rivals to dredge up corruption cases, especially those involving governments no longer in power. With his status as a political outsider, Fernandes is an easy target. In this case, Congress is contesting important elections in early 2007 in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh and would like to deliver a death blow to the BJP and its NDA allies. For U.S. suppliers, this may be a moment to emphasize the corruption-free nature of the USG and U.S. industry. However, as one American defense industry rep here pointed out, the U.S.' reputation is already well-known worldwide, yet quickly forgotten when real-life contracts are being pursued and big time money enters the picture. PYATT