MEA ENGAGED ON AFGHANISTAN, DOUBTFUL ON PAKISTAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS ENRG EPET KISL PK
IR, AF, IN
SUBJECT: MEA ENGAGED ON AFGHANISTAN, DOUBTFUL ON PAKISTAN,
AND PEEVED AT IRAN

NEW DELHI 00006584 001.3 OF 004


Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a recent discussion, MEA Joint Secretary
Dilip Sinha told US that India:

-- Could do more in Afghanistan but was worried about security
-- Doubted the wisdom of Pakistan's agreements with
Waziristan
tribes
-- Envisioned a robust economic conference that would not be
a
donor exercise
-- Sought the Secretary's attendance at the Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, starting Nov. 18 in
Delhi
-- Retained deep skepticism about Pakistan and possibilities
for renewed dialogue
-- Remained irritated that Iran welched on the LNG contract
-- Continued to urge Iran to respect its NPT commitments

Sinha's comments offer opportunity in at least two areas:
India can and may do more for Afghanistan and will likely
announce new initiatives at the Delhi conference. Engaging
New Delhi in our security discussions will be useful
and we should give the Indians suggestions on how they can
usefully contribute to Afghanistan's reconstruction. On
Iran,
if we can get Pakistan to consider easing the rules on
transit-across-Pakistan, it will not only boost the renewed
Delhi-Islamabad peace process, but give India one less reason
to engage with Iran. END SUMMARY.

AFGHANISTAN BORDER: SLIPPING AWAY?
--------------


2. (C) MEA Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan Dilip Sinha told DCM, PolCouns, and D/PolCouns
September 13 that the U.S. and India had enjoyed excellent
coordination on Afghanistan for the past four years, but
that press reports of Pakistani agreements with Waziristan
tribes were "deeply alarming." DCM pushed back, arguing that
press speculation to the effect that the US was walking away
from Afghanistan had no factual basis. To correct those
faulty
impressions, the Embassy was sending leading diplomatic
correspondents to NATO in Brussels to learn more directly
about
the full scope of USG efforts. Pointedly, the DCM added that
we
should clear the air by meeting each other, not by taking
potshots in the press. DCM also added that the Waziristan
agreement, far from being a capitulation, was just like
agreements South Block used to sign with the tribes before
Partition, and just like the government signs with regularity
by
India even in modern times with North East ethnic groups as a
way of switching up its tactics from time to time. The
agreement would require the tribes to expel foreigners
engaged
in Jihad, clarified the DCM, and no tolerance of any renewed
Taliban activity would be permitted.

NEW DELHI 00006584 002.3 OF 004



IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE LONG HAUL, BUT EXPERIENCING SECURITY
PROBLEMS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Sinha said the Indian road projects had come under
mounting attacks in recent months, and that projects were
slowed as a result. In a series of attacks, Taliban
insurgents had rocketed the road works using multiple barrel
launchers positioned as much as ten kilometers away. The
DCM offered that the 18-19 November Afghan economic
conference
hosted in Delhi would show the world that Karzai remained
fully supported, and added that General Jones was
highlighting,
in public comments, the need for a more robust NATO presence
in
the southern provinces. MEA Afghanistan Country Director
Aquino Vimal revealed that India has slated to deliver 2,500
body armor suits to the ANA in October as part of its
commitment to help secure the country. Sinha added that
Indian aid was peaking in various areas currently -- road
building, wheat biscuits, school and hospital rehabilitation,
and energy projects -- and India was facing a "budget crunch"
as a result. Nevertheless, India, he promised, would
entertain any GOA request for further support, to include
training and scholarships, where further scope exists. India
could usefully focus on the recurring polio problem in
southern Afghanistan, and while doctors remained in five
cities to enhance health infrastructure and improve
facilities and diagnostics, the security threat was mounting.
The DCM
mentioned Afghanistan's interest in a short course for NCOs,
and also suggested the US and India work together in
Afghanistan much as USAID and India do in India to combat
disease and promote good health policies. He expressed
frustration that Indian deliveries of high protein biscuits
must be routed through Iran because Pakistan denies transit
rights.

THE DELHI CONFERENCE: NOT A DONOR EXERCISE
--------------


4. (C) India, mentioned Sinha, will host a conference on
Afghanistan's economy in Delhi starting November 18. Karzai
would inaugurate the gathering, to which India planned to
invite
the G-8, five Central Asian states, Turkey, Pakistan, China,
UAE, NGOs, and others. India hoped the US would be
represented
by the Secretary of State. The conference would not be a
donor's session, but rather an effort to discuss ways to
boost
Afghanistan's economy. In conjunction with the government to
government conference, the Federation of India Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (FICCI) is organizing a regional
business
conference (in coordination with Afghanistan's development
agency (ISA) and the Confederation of Indian Industries
(CII))
to consider ways to attract investment in infrastructure,

NEW DELHI 00006584 003.3 OF 004


agriculture, energy, and transportation.

PAKISTAN: SHOW ME FIRST
--------------


5. (C) Sinha said India wanted action, not words, from
Islamabad. Pakistan had indeed taken some actions to curb
terror in 2004 and 2005, but trouble always revived, lamented
Sinha. The spike in terror in 2006, especially high profile
attacks like Mumbai, had greatly complicated relations. Even
though police continued their investigations, the discovery
of
military explosive residue such as RDX "reflects the usual
foreign hand" and a measure of training and sophistication
not
available domestically. Infiltration also continued from
Bangladesh and Kashmir, and Lashkar-e-Tayiba leader Hafez
Saeed
continued to thrive despite occasional house arrest. In any
case, India had to re-engage with Pakistan. A revived
Composite
Dialogue would be difficult to sustain if terrorist incidents
continued. "The mind set remains the same," insisted Sinha,
with Pakistani agents continuing to help plan attacks against
Indians in Afghanistan. Musharraf continued to propagate the
fiction that India had eight consulates in Afghanistan,
although
there are only four, the same as in pre-Taliban Afghanistan,
and
the same as Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan was not interested
in
the truth, and that did not augur well for a revived or
sustained Composite Dialogue. Some progress continued on
people-to-people ties, trade, pilgrimages, and family travel,
but since January, Pakistan had accepted no Indian proposals
whatsoever. Pakistan's opinion seems to be, mused Sinha,
"Enough CBMs, let's do Kashmir." India could not "do"
Kashmir
in light of the spike in infiltration and the string of
grenade
attacks that killed the Kashmir tourism season and blew up
numerous buses and tourists. Pakistan's hand and
instructions
in that "were clear." India wanted Kashmiri insurgents to
join
the mainstream political dialogue, and would continue to do
so
in any case. The DCM said Washington was working to get
S/CT's
Hank Crumpton to Delhi ASAP to help explain Pakistan's
counter-terrorism efforts and to keep the dialogue going with
India on terror in the region, including in Pakistan and
Bangladesh.

STIFFED ON GAS BY IRAN, MIFFED ON NUKES
--------------


6. (C) Sinha said Iranian Deputy FM Safari's visit to Delhi
in
August resulted in pressure by India on Iran to abide by its
NPT

NEW DELHI 00006584 004.3 OF 004


obligations and stick to the price India and Iran had
negotiated
last year on LNG supplies. India also stressed that Iran
could
only renegotiate gas prices after five years according to the
terms of the contract. What they finally agreed was that a
pricing consultant would look into the matter and issue a
report. The two sides also agreed to continue to cooperate
on
the road project that would connect the Iranian port of
Chabahar
with Herat so Indian exports could avoid Pakistan's continued
ban on Indian ground transit across Pakistan. Sinha
commented
that Ahmedinejad seems to want to be the "chief spokesman" of
the Revolution, but Iran's recent actions in Lebanon, Iraq,
and
even Lucknow and Hyderabad to stir up trouble did not inspire
confidence. Sinha lamented Iran's posturing, asking, "if
they
walk away from the P6 offer, what is their agenda?" Signals,
he worried, were not encouraging. What was needed from Iran
now,
he added, was action, not words.

COMMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS
--------------


7. (C) We were encouraged to hear Sinha say that India would
consider doing more in Afghanistan. Before the November
conference, we should suggest to New Delhi a list of actions
India could take to assist Afghan reconstruction so we can
influence whatever they announce at the conference. We
should
also rope the Indians into our Afhgan security discussions
because their donor efforts are increasingly affected by the
situation on the ground. India believes that elements in
Pakistan are actively targeting Indian officials in
Afghanistan, including the Indian Ambassador (septel). On
Iran, dissonance over the gas deal is an opening we can
exploit. The road project to Afghanistan remains troublesome
for the Indians, and if we push Pakistan to permit transit
across its territory, India would have less incentive to work
with the Iranians. As for Pakistan, Sinha reveals the depth
of skepticism in the MEA establishment; he and many other
Indians remain from Missouri, the Show-Me State.
END COMMENT.
MULFORD